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Preface 
 
 
It may be said that from the Kleinian perspective that happiness is having the freedom to live for 
those things and people for whom one ought to feel grateful.  
 
 
 
“There was a patient in analysis with a Kleinian who had a dream that he told her.  In this 
dream his mother sat on his face or chest and he wasn’t able to breath.  The analyst interpreted that 
his dream was evidence that he was envious towards her, and didn’t want to take in what she was 
offering” … or something along these lines was the story I heard as a first year clinical student, 
offered as an example of the abusive potential of psychoanalysis.  It didn’t leave me with a burning 
desire to study Kleinian technique.  I have heard other stories along these lines from clinicians, 
stories of perverse abuses of power in Kleinian therapy, offered like warnings of what I don’t want 
to become or what they fear I might be doing, a scary image of procrustean bed technique. 
When I started graduate school I had no interest in psychoanalysis, in fact I was hostile to it 
because as a gay man I had a similar stereotype, that the analytic couch is really a procrustean bed 
where patients have no say so with regard to their reality, since the analyst, like an arrogant surgeon, 
assumes a god-like perspective when it comes to ailments of the heart and head, disregarding and 
disempowering the person.  Then, after listening to one lecture after another and one critique after 
another asserting that analysis, because of its very concepts and philosophical underpinnings, can be 
little other than a procrustean bed my stereotype gained that aura of a “natural attitude.”  According 
to this natural attitude, psychoanalysis reduces people to parts, dubious entities like egos, ids, 
superegos, some energy called libido, and worst of all, some bizarre and ridiculous notion of a death 
drive, the final proof of its status as a miscarriage of mechanistic thought that is incapable of doing 
justice to human existence.  According to this natural attitude and its variants, analysts are cold, 
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detached, talk about the past in the most banal clichés, and force their victims’ experience into the 
same tired storylines, like the story of the Kleinian analyst above.  But if I was familiar with, and to 
be fair I participated in it as well, the contempt heaped upon Freud by some, I was not prepared for 
the – at times – downright hostility towards all things Kleinian.   
Consider the following story.  Not too long ago I met with a prospective supervisor – who is 
decidedly not psychoanalytic.  This was our second meeting, although it had to be rescheduled two 
weeks prior because at the last minute, for unforeseen reasons, I did not have the car to take to the 
appointment.  So I called to explain and apologize and see if we could have our supervision by 
telephone in any case.  When she called me back she emphasized over and over again that this hour 
was one she set aside for me when she could have had a paying client use the time, etc.  The nature 
of my circumstances had no bearing on her interpretation of my “inexcusable lapse” in “planning.”  
So, walking into this, our first appointment since, I was anxious about discussing what had 
happened because I felt mistreated.  After about twenty minutes of explanation, counter 
explanation, explanation, counter explanation, she asked me, after telling me it was no longer an 
issue for her, “so I’m wondering why you have a hard time letting me be angry about this.”  I replied 
that it wasn’t her anger but the fact that I felt like no matter what I said on that phone she was going 
to interpret what happened in that one way.  Without awareness of what she was saying, she said, 
“and I still do see it that way.”  Ergo, she is really still angry about it and I’m stuck in the same 
pigeonhole in her mind where I was placed before our phone conversation.  This supervisor was no 
Kleinian, but her difficulty is the same one operating in the genre of abusive Kleinian stories I have 
heard (and stereotypes of psychoanalysis in general): the all too human difficulty and ultimate refusal 
to encounter the Otherness of the other, respect it, and dialog about it productively.  Certainly, this 
is not a unique problem Klein invented or patented as a therapeutic technique; it is a problem of an 
 vii 
attitude towards Otherness in general.1  On the basis of what I’ve learned about contemporary 
Kleinian technique I think these stories are caricatures of poor technique period, Kleinian or 
otherwise.  However, it took a lot of work immersing myself in the worldview of CKPP to rearrange 
my ideas about analytic work, analysts, and analytic theory.  The study that follows is an account of 
this immersion and rearrangement, a story of contemporary Kleinianism in its Otherness.2  Far from 
finding its concepts and technique dehumanizing or reductionistic, I have found that they help me 
illuminate, examine, and engage – phenomenologically – with the experience of patients in a way 
that has transformative potential.  
This irony of my graduate education called for an explanation, one motive for undertaking 
this study.  I am convinced that to evaluate and critique clinical technique and theory it is not 
enough to do so as an “outsider.”  Certainly we would think it ridiculous for an anthropologist today 
to write a book about an indigenous society, making all manner of claim about the language and 
world outlook of the society, if he or she had never immersed him or herself in that society and 
studied it from the “inside,” to the extent that this is possible.  So why do we not bring that level of 
sophisticated understanding to the problem of understanding different, highly specialized languages 
and the subcultures that produce them within our own society and institutions?  If there is always a 
surplus of Otherness no matter how much we think we may know someone, does the same 
principle not apply to the Otherness of a school of thought and practice?   
                                                 
1      So, continuing the example, the analyst might have said, “your anxious and scared that there’s not enough room in 
here for you to breath easy and have your own mind with me, so you feel compelled to say what you think I want to 
hear.”  Assuming the accuracy of this, it would have provided an understanding to bind the patient’s anxiety and thereby 
the symbols necessary to open a discursive space to discuss this terror of attachment and how he’s come to use an over 
practiced “habit” for dealing with it at his own expense.  
2      Of course the practice of CKPP has the potential for abuses of power like any other therapy.  The point is that 
perhaps the abuses are not built into the theory, but reflect the limitations of the person attempting to employ them . 
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Whatever else may be said of her, Melanie Klein was a woman who stood up for her ideals 
with the support of those who believed in what she was doing despite the personal, professional, 
and political risks involved.  Yet this appreciation is eclipsed by the negative stereotypes of her and 
her work – all the negative transference onto Klein that has and does go on today in some quarters.  
Perhaps it has something to do with “the objective reality” of Klein and what she did or did not do 
or say.  Yet perhaps it has to do with a larger problem in our world, the problem of how to take and 
deal with people who are carried by their ideals to the point of working to change what has been 
handed down by tradition.3  Klein’s work, unlike Freud’s and Lacan’s, eclipsed the radiance of the 
Phallus with the shadow of the Breast in a deeply sexist society, a society that has long split itself off 
from a cultural image of an omnipotent woman (the non-threatening, idyllic and idealistic figuring of 
a Madonna – servant to an infant male – is hardly an omnipotent female figure).  Look at what 
happened, how Klein has generally been recorded as a distorted character in, what was until recently, 
a sexist, heterosexist, white and upper middle institution with little in the way of a built in 
mechanism for self-correction and historical change: The American Psychoanalytic and its tributary 
scholarship.  These are, in my view, equally important aspects of the historical record that 
contextualize her objectionable Otherness.  This situation is only now, slowly, changing.  Of course 
this does not mean that as a fallible person Klein was perfect or can never be critiqued for clinical or 
personal errors.  It does mean that this study is about contemporary Kleinian work and some of its 
roots, not the merits or demerits of Melanie Klein as a person. 
                                                 
3     In this regard, perhaps fundamentalism is the symbolic representation of a global false-self idealism (inauthentic 
idealism).  It – in all its forms – is the parody of genuine idealisms about a better future since they actually lead to self-
destruction.  I am not saying that all idealisms are equal or should be embraced unquestioningly, but in our age any 
idealism is dismissed as equally “fringe” so, instead, like a neurotic world, we keep going around and around on the same 
problems, rather than change course.  Without realistic ideals, what or who can one expect to guide growth towards a 
better future?  Our problem is we no longer seem to believe in following, renewing, or creating fresh ideals like our 
forefathers and foremothers.   We rehash not political goals or moral goals but monetary goals.  Our forefathers stood 
for a lot more than that.  The Federalist Papers show how our forefathers struggled with the ideals we have reduced to 
consumer consciousness as their parody. 
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This work, the kinds of thoughts expressed above, and the following historical record of the 
kind of practice I’ve been doing are a few results of a process of subjection I began three years ago 
as an “novice” or “initiate” to the clinical working of contemporary Kleinian oriented psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy (CKPP), and an empirically based, rigorous and human scientific qualitative method 
for examining a human phenomena: an “interpretive methodology” as Dr. Packer has accurately 
described it in published and unpublished work.  Indeed, this study, analyzing and interpreting my 
behavior during one session with one patient, has required assuming the perspective of a researcher 
to foreground and examine CKPP as an entity-in-the-world and report back from the front line, as it 
were, to an audience more or less unfamiliar with this phenomena.   
What you read me saying and doing in the following pages follows a comportment pattern.  
This comportment pattern is the role, idiosyncrasies of the author aside, of a CKPP practitioner at a 
singular point in his training.  It is therefore a historical account of a highly specific way of being in a 
relationship.  This comportment pattern is the result of choosing to follow a discipline of training, 
for a period of time, and choosing to use the tools I’ve learned as a phenomenologist to take stock 
of what has been accomplished.   
 What is this comportment pattern?  It is a way of learning from the Other that has 
transformative potential, more so for one participant than the other.  So in addition to an account of 
practicing a subject-forming discourse, what follows is the record of a point in the author’s 
transformation, the (re)production of his subjectivity by subjecting his Self to a specific disciplinary 
tradition – I deploy these loaded terms purposefully, since it strikes me as noteworthy that that they 
have come to have a distinctly negative connotation.   
What Klein’s work says to me as this (re)constituted subject is that subjection takes place in a 
context, the context of an extremely important relationship fraught with conflicts and existential 
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concerns.  Will this Other break his or her commitment to my ontological security?  Will I die when 
she’s gone?  Why does his love come and go?  Is this pain going to kill me?  Is this a betrayal?  How 
can I get what hurts away?  How can I say no if he can leave?  Did she like what I just did so she 
won’t be mad?  Will my dream come true?  Will this ruin me?  Klein’s outrageous (outrageously 
brilliant) conviction was that adult life is animated by concerns that have timeless salience in and for 
our lives, concerns we struggled with in infancy: these problems are first lived viscerally and play 
themselves out on the surface of that bodily ego, inscribing it with indelible marks.  The human kind 
of being is both the same and different with each cycle of itself; the periodicity of becoming has 
priority over being – another similarity between the spirit of Klein’s researches and Deleuze.  This 
becoming is organized by a code of the virtual in response to the environment – the phantasies that 
govern the unfolding and evolution of development (i.e., becoming); the production of meaning 
must come before action as much as it may evolve through action.  However, this development is 
not linear but rhythmic.  The same “themes” or “melodies” of becoming are patterned and 
sequenced.   
For example, Klein articulated the paranoid/schizoid and depressive position “melodies” as 
two essential moments of time and change (anxiety), which occur differently for people, yet are 
similar enough to be classifiable as clinical facts conferred with conceptual status.  This shift away 
from Freud inaugurated the metapsychology of Object-Relations.  Klein’s refiguring of the 
therapeutic relationship, a shift to the metaphor of the mother-feeding-infant relationship 
foreshadowed by Ferenczi, changed the emphasis from being (Freud and Anna Freud’s models were 
structural) to becoming (a developmental model), from what-ness to how-ness.  With this change 
came an evolution in the psychoanalytic lexicon that she inherited from Freud, Ferenczi and 
Abraham, shifting the analyst’s attention to the patient’s anxieties and problems of becoming as a 
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patient in the room and, therefore, as a person in the “real world.”  If we conceive of self-initiated 
and self-determined change on the model of a birth or “re-birth” of the Self as different yet similar, 
then one can see how appropriate Ferenczi’s metaphor of the analyst as obstetrical physician, the 
“midwife to thought,” may really have been, lending itself to become the image of the mother-
feeding-infant triad. 
Therefore to help an adult deal with adult human problems, we must notice how they handle 
the infantile equivalent of these problems in the here and now of an ongoing relationship, because 
that is the location of these precursors of meaning, so to speak, that continue to deform the patient’s 
quality of life; what’s infantile in the here and now.  Part of the problem is the conception of time.  
If it happened back then, why focus on the here and now as done in CKPP?  This is usually 
conceived as a past trauma acting on the present, so that differentiating the past from the present is 
attempted by means of interpretive “reconstructions.”  CKPP, as I have learned it, makes little use 
of such reconstructions.  Perhaps this indicates that it is not the past that needs to be separated from 
the present, but a way of becoming in the present that has never changed into a former present, 
recycling the same thematic memories and fantasies, albeit with apparently different content.  In 
other words, perhaps relational time is always in the present (which is why one can have a close 
friendship for over ten years that both feels fresh and new yet like a historically permanent feature of 
one’s life, “like I’ve known you forever” as the saying goes).  In other words, for subjection to occur, 
for the patient to continue to develop as a subject – i.e., for the patient learn and grow from his or 
her own experience of becoming, attention must be focused on the contemporaneous dynamics of 
the relational context within which the original response patterns to subjection formed, persist, and 
continue to shape experience.   
 xii 
Clearly, the stakes are high in this way of working.  Learning this approach to therapy has 
provided me with tools for listening and speaking to patients, a power for working with them.  The 
following pages examine and explain these tools and describe the practices of this “power” as they 
are occurring.  And with power come responsibility and ethical restraint.  The Afterward will 
provide some discussion on the ethics and limitations of this power after it has been articulated. 
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 1 
1. Introduction and literature review 
 
 
 Clinical supervision is required for every graduate student pursuing a clinical track in 
psychology.  A clear example of its importance is that to be competitive for the required predoctoral 
internship, every trainee must complete at least 800 hours of supervised clinical work.  It is generally 
expected that supervisors “deliver the requisite skills to the trainee in a deliberate and effective 
manner” (Halloway & Neufeldt, 1995, p. 212).  The trainee expects and is expected to change, 
insofar as they develop these skills.  Wampold and Holloway (1997) proposed a model to organize 
the accumulated research in supervision and guide future investigations.  They argued that, “whether 
it be changes in skill level, attitudes, self-understanding, or some other characteristic, the effect of 
supervision results most proximally in some modification of therapists’ characteristics.  These 
changes in the therapist will then, it is hoped, result in the delivery of more efficacious treatment . . .. 
all effects of supervision are transmitted through therapist characteristics” (p. 12, italics in original).  
Based on this assumption, the original aim of this study was to provide a new approach to 
the study of changes in therapist characteristics as an effect of supervised clinical practice, viewing 
them through the trainee’s communicative competence in the practice of delivering 
psychotherapeutic treatment.  While the study accomplishes the aim of articulating this 
communicative competence, the design did not allow for the examination of how this 
communicative competence was the direct result of supervision – that is, the design did not provide 
for a means to trace each aspect of the trainee’s communicative competence to that of the 
supervisor.   However, through the course of the analysis it became evident that the design was well 
suited for the study of the subject-forming work of psychotherapy in general, and contemporary 
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Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy (CKPP) in particular.  Thus, the primary aim has 
shifted to addressing the subject-forming work of the trainee’s communicative competence. 
 To date, there is no empirical literature on the subject-forming work of trainee 
characteristics while under supervision.  Typically, researchers investigating how changes in trainee 
characteristics affect therapeutic practice have relied on rating/coding procedures to gauge trainee 
competence (cf., Guest & Beutler, 1988; Henry, Schacht, Strupp, Butler, & Binder, 1993; Krasner, 
Howard, & Brown, 1998; Newman, McGovern, Kopta, Howard, & McNeilly, 1988; Pierce & 
Schauble, 1970).  Pierce and Schauble (1970) appear to have been the fi rst researchers to investigate 
the effects of supervision on clinical practice.   And while more recent studies, such as the often 
cited “Vanderbilt II,” have begun to focus more on process, they continue to exclusively employ 
these rating/coding systems and statistical analysis, only in a more complex manner and with more 
sophisticated statistical methods. (Henry et al., 1993).  Wampold and Halloway (1997) note that a 
weakness of using rating and coding procedures to assess frequency or sequence is that, “the 
construals of the participants (i.e., the meanings given to the events by the participants) are thought 
to be nonexistent or not important” (p. 17).  This is no minor problem, since it is through the 
“construals” of the participants that the subject forming work of psychotherapy is accomplished as 
this study demonstrates.  This is a problem of the interpretive framework and methodological 
procedures that quantitative psychological research has employed in the study of trainee change in 
the context of supervision, whether at the site of supervisor-supervisee interaction or supervisee-
client interaction in the therapy room.   
In short, when the coded event or statement is taken out of the context of the participants’ 
immediate interaction and placed in the context of the raters’ theoretical background and personal 
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preferences, important information is lost regarding the communicative processes involved in the 
interaction.  This study was designed to explore the consequences of an alternative approach to the 
study of the effects of supervised clinical practice, one that does not employ a coding system and 
attends to the subject forming work of the psychotherapeutic encounter.  It is the study of 
supervised clinical practice as an induction process into a specialized linguistic community, requiring 
the acquisition of new forms of communicative competence (whether psychoanalytic, cognitive-
behavioral, narrative, or client-centered communicative competence).   
  Learning to become a clinician is a sort of induction, an initiation, of novices into the 
practices of experts.  There are rituals and rights of passage that are involved – such as completing 
so many hours of training under supervision.   Viewed as a cultural phenomenon, supervised “direct 
hours” are socially created and sustained events that provide a context for the acculturation of the 
initiate (supervisee) into the discourse practiced by more experienced members of the specialized 
linguistic community (licensed psychologists).  More precisely, the interaction between the client and 
the supervised therapist is a primary site for practicing new forms of “communicative competence,” 
which Habermas (1970) defined in Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence: 
it is not enough to understand language communication as an application – limited by 
empirical conditions – of linguistic competence . . . .  On the contrary, in order to participate 
in normal discourse, the speaker must have – in addition to his linguistic competence – basic 
qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role-behavior) at his disposal, which we 
may call communicative competence. (p. 138) 
 
By examining Freudian psychoanalysis through the lens of communicative competence, Habermas 
argued that it is both a theory about systematically distorted communication and a technique for 
working through such patterns of distortion.  Analysands suffer from deviations in the acquisition of 
certain “normal” communicative competencies, which the analysis seeks to correct by providing the 
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condition necessary for “subject-forming processes” to occur. (McCarthy, 1978)  Yet to accomplish 
this requires a specialized communicative context (e.g., the 50 minute hour), where one participant 
in the dialogue (the therapist or analyst) relies “on theoretical perspectives and technical rules that go 
beyond the normal competencies of a speaker of a natural language.” (McCarthy, 1978, p. 197)    
This study addresses the following question: What cha racterizes the communicative 
competence of a supervisee’s clinical practice after two years of specialized supervision in CKPP and 
how does it operate to produce occasions for the subjection of the patient, where:  
“Subjection” signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process 
of becoming a subject.  Whether by interpolation, in Althusser’s sense, or by discursive 
productivity in Foucault’s, the subject is initiated through a primary submission to power.  
Although Foucault identifies the ambivalence in this formation, he does not elaborate on the 
specific mechanisms of how the subject is formed in submission.  (Butler, 1997, pp. 1-2) 
 
Thus, what began as a method for looking into the effects of supervision became an examination of 
CKPP as a site of subjection. 
The interpretive analysis of CKPP as a practice of subjection is particularly appropriate for 
three reasons.  First, the contours or horizon of Kleinian discourse are defined by tropes of 
asymmetrical power and dependence – the infant relating to the mother’s body on whom it depends 
for life as well as the conditions for becoming a person in his or her own right.4  Within this 
tropography therapy is conceived as a feeding situation.  The therapist may be a good breast, bad 
breast, devouring breast, empty breast, impinging breast, etc.  Patients can be understood as getting 
rid of unwanted experiences on the model of the baby evacuating burning feces through “anal 
sadistic” and “urethral attacks” on the mother-therapist and so on.  Klein’s final model of 
                                                 
4   Following Fink (1997) I will use ‘mOther’ to denote the mother as both a person and a symbolic function – a basis of 
multiple meaning, a source of meaning.  Likewise, ““Other with a capital “O” generally refers to a person or institution 
serving a symbolic function (legislating, prohibiting, putting forward ideals, and so on) …” (p. 232) 
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development portrays identity (the who one is) as founded on an economy governed by a dialectical 
tension between the desire to be (Eros) and the desire not to be (Thanatos) and how this tension 
plays itself out in relation to a feeding mother who contributes to the shaping of that identity by 
how and what she feeds her child, as well as how and what she does in response to the child’s 
feeding reactions.  This relation is viewed as the context within which every capacity the subject may 
be said to have is begun.   
Second, for Taylor (1988) the notion of the self is a spatial one, a “moral topography” that 
has changed and changes through history and the configurations of different cultures: 
Being a self is not like having some biologically given organs, say eyes or faculty, like vision, 
which are there as part of our equipment regardless of how we understand them or interpret 
them.  Being a self is existing in a space of issues, to do with how one ought to be, or how one 
measures up against what is good, what is right, what is really worth doing.  It is being able to 
find one’s standpoint in this space, being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it.  This is what 
Heidegger was getting at in his famous formulation about Dasein that its being is always in “in 
question.”  (Taylor, 1988, p. 298) 
 
Kleinian theory is a theory of the development of the self within a moral field.  The infant-mother’s 
body partnership defines the becoming-in-time for the infant within the contours of goodness (signs 
of life, the good breast) and badness (signs of death, the bad breast).  The mother’s body as the site 
of the infant’s growing sense of self is a body that is experienced as good and bad, and towards 
which the infant loves, hates, feels loved, hated, persecuted, etc., as he or she negotiates persisting in 
time.  Whatever the infant comes to believe about itself “inside” originally comes from “outside” in 
this relational matrix with the mother.  In the context of the infant’s hunger pangs, weaning 
inaugurates the inside of the infant’s psyche predicated on its differentiation from its relation to the 
mother within a moral milieu and its struggle to come to terms with this differentiation process.  
From its inception, the Kleinian tradition has not viewed the ego as a “neutral steering mechanism” 
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that is encapsulated within its own hydraulic machinery, but as the nascent “I” existing, “in a space 
of moral questions, [where] that moral topography is not an external addition, and optional extra, 
but that the question of being or failing to be a self could not arise outside of this space” (ibid., p. 
317).  In fact for Klein, the nascent ego has its own practices for trying to shape this moral field, 
because its largest struggle is coming to realize that life means being dependently related to another, 
which initially, is a painful reality to be mourned.  To be confronted with a world that is deficient is 
to be confronted with a primordial vulnerability towards a lack in the “in-itself” for “the for-itself,” 
in Sartrean parlance, highlighting a dependence on a power external to the self’s control.  Moreover, 
this circumstance of infantile dependence and relating to those on whom it depends for survival is a 
universal circumstance that every person in every time and culture has confronted.  And in so far as 
culture is transmitted through verbal linguistic practices, then those aspects of human being that can 
be said to be universally shared, will most likely by found at the pre-verbal level, the level most 
insulated, as it were, from cultural determination.   
Third, Both Taylor and Butler are interested in locating the source of conscience.  For 
Taylor (1988), its origin cannot be found by “radical reflection” inside the self, since that would be a 
solipsistic search for an inner essence (the fantasy of ‘natural law’) that is not interpretation-
depended and contextualized by social relatedness.  In CKPP the problem of the patient is not that 
he or she is unable to look inside the self enough, but that he or she has a problem “allowing 
another mind to think about their problems differently,” as Dr. R, my supervisor would say during 
our supervisory sessions.  It is a problem of authority and knowledge, particularly the violence that 
attends the forceful entry or extension of one field into another – as Phillips (1998) describes the 
Kleinian conceptions of projection and introjection.  It requires seriously considering the 
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sighting/citing of the self from the vantage point of another, and then take that understanding into 
the self to broaden its scope. 5  This is why Kristeva (2001) can argue that Klein reformulated the 
analytic question in terms caring for the capacity for thought and the conditions necessary for “our 
capacity to become creatures of symbols” (p. 14).  As Phillips (1998) argues in his deconstructive re-
reading of Klein, she was a sort of phenomenologist of the unconscious for whom the question of 
how we can come to discern between phantasy and reality, between inside and outside, is the 
capacity, sin qua non, for “having” knowledge at all.  This capacity begins with and depends on the 
psychic equivalent of the mouth: 
…the child is born not as a closed circuit of alternating impulses, a fragile entity at the mercy 
of external influences, but already as the enigmatic opening to the violence of the outside (its 
encroachment into the space of phantasy).  This earliest position supplies the conditions for 
each occasion where ‘external’ events provide material for the ‘inner’ world.  A fissure, as a 
kind of original opening to the outside, makes possible all relations.  Out of this fissure 
comes every experience of authority [including the authority of knowledge], including both 
the death instinct and the super-ego.  Each functions in the same way within the pattern of 
phantasy that must maintain absence, negativity, and mystery in the process of acquiring 
knowledge.  In other words, these persecuting authorities represent and intrinsically 
unknowable element that, whether in phantasy or reality, makes knowledge and its 
acquisition possible. (p. 172)6 
 
For Butler (1997) the problem of conscience and subjection is that the subject turns towards 
subjection and submits to it; the result of this is the installation of conscience as the paradoxical 
effect of power that both subjects us to cultural-moral imperatives and conditions the possibility for 
our agency, including any ability to subvert that very power-moral-knowledge complex.  Therefore, 
                                                 
5  Throughout the text the signifier “sight/cite” and grammatical variations thereof are employed to indicate the 
inextricability of saying and seeing, of the saying power of the word to shape what we visually apprehend.    In other 
words to see someone as a so in so is to inscribe their body with what one means to say about them.  Conversely, to say 
someone is a this or that is to foreclose one’s vision upon their potential as an Other. Perhaps one can say what one 
does not mean, but it seems impossible to see what one does not mean.   
6   Here one can argue that there is a basic agreement between the implicit ontology of Klein and Heidegger’s notion of 
Dasein: that each person is fundamentally an opening onto the world, a “world spanning openness” in his terms (cf., 
Heidegger, 1926/1962) 
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the basis of this turn cannot be external for there would be an infinite regress of the same question – 
it cannot be that the subject turns to subjection because subjection made them turn, and so on.  
Butler (1998) ultimately turns to Klein to address the “ambivalence” and “paradox” of subjection, 
because Klein’s account of conscience – figured as the “super-ego” – is based in ambivalence.  The 
superego, under optimal conditions, becomes the source of prohibition and encouragement, for feeling 
both good and bad about one’s persistence as a self in time – one’s desires, aspirations, actions and 
moral identity (a.k.a., “self-esteem”).  Butler’s close reading of Klein emphasizes that conscience 
begins with the infant’s desire to preserve the loved mother and source of life from its own 
destructive aggression and not with an external prohibition as in Freud and Lacan.  Butler finds in 
Klein an account for the ambivalence of subjection, because the good mother figure – the superego 
as source of support and well-being – is preserved as a sign of life by the rerouting of infantile 
aggression into the creation of the super-ego as censorship and inhibiting citations on the self.  In 
short, we want to hear the voice of the law in our heads to police ourselves because – optimally – it 
is the same voice that ensures the possibility of life, love, and belonging: not just being-in-time, but well-
being-in-time.  The desire to persist through subjection and become a subject stems from the 
“passionate desire to be” in Butler’s terms, to be in relation with anOther.  Thus, “By Butler’s 
reading, Klein’s account of an internal world ravaged by rage and guilt is not, as some of her critics 
have charged, simply a morbid and solipsistic model of intrapsychic relations: rather, loss, guilt and 
love in Klein reveal how the ego is always and precariously socially attached” (Stonebridge, 
introductory remarks, in Phillips & Stonebridge, 1998, p. 180) 
 The problem of being able to occupy a standpoint in a space of issues that confront one 
with possible commitments for action is the problem of being a subject whose configuration is 
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subject to conditions outside of one’s control.  The issues or exigencies of life figured as the hailing 
call of reality – everyday interpolation, as it were – require subjection in order for the subject to 
respond and make a dent in that reality (i.e., to exercise whatever freedom we may be said to have; 
subjection is both the condition and limit of freedom).  When patients come to seek treatment, they 
are having some difficulty living this paradox of subjectivity, in the form of a problematic present 
that refuses to pass.  In CKPP the therapist follows the trail of the patient’s anxiety to examine and 
make explicit their self-defeating means of dealing with that anxiety.7  
What for Butler and Taylor are serious theoretical concerns are vivid realities that come to 
life in the therapeutic office.  The following case of “John” shows a young man who has tried to 
deny the paradox.  By running away from the possibility of subjection he also runs away from the 
possibility of agency.  At the time the following session took place John was a 35 year-old, 
Caucasian, gay man.  He participated in one kind of therapy or another since the age of 18 for 
“depression” including several hospitalizations for suicidal behavior.  John was dissatisfied with 
every aspect of his life.  He had only ever worked in entry level, low paying, temporary clerical and 
retail positions.  His relationships ended in the same way as his jobs – John would start to feel 
“suffocated” by their demands, become despondent and passive, and eventually his boyfriend would 
break up with him, or his boss would fire him for unexcused absences.  The earliest memory he 
reported speaks volumes about his attitude towards life in general: when he was two or three years 
old he walked into a neighbor’s house, saw his reflection in the hallway mirror, and became so 
frightened that he turned and ran away.  In fact by the time of the following session, he had agreed 
                                                 
7  This is the condition of anguish that drives Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost.  In that classic work of literature, Satan can 
be viewed as the allegorical representative of humanity, who, out of envy and greed, is forever trying in vain to become 
the basis of his own power and deny God as the creator to whom he is subject.  Satan’s frustration is his inability to 
realize his fantasy that he can become the basis of his own power, resulting in the compromise of existing as the 
problem of God, existing as a not towards creation and life.  
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in one of our sessions that “trying to be invisible” and “feeling like a fake” were two of the unifying 
themes of both his social life and his work life.  By the time we terminated treatment, John and I 
had worked together for two years, twice a week, and for one year three times per week. 
“I had a hard time coming in today,” John begins after sitting down near the foot of the 
chaise in my office, opposite the window and close to the door.  He says this with his head turned 
down a bit, his lips puffed out a little.  He looks like he’s pouting.  John is about 6’2” with reddish 
blond hair.  He makes no eye contact as usual.  When we began working together he explained that 
that, “I can’t make eye contact” because if people looked “at me in the eyes they’ll see I’m empty 
and weak.” 
I write down what John says and he continues a minute or so later, “I almost didn’t make it 
in today.  I don’t know why…” he begins as his voice starts to crack as if he wants to cry, “… why I 
get so upset about the bus.  I was walking to the stop and I could see the bus leaving without me.” 
 We waited a few moments in silence.  John began to shift into the corner where the foot of 
the chaise meets the surrounding walls.  His head drops a bit more as he speaks with the same 
distress in his voice, “I almost got killed last night after work.  I was walking home after work and 
standing on the corner starting to cross the crosswalk.  I turned to the right and there was this 
woman trying to turn right and she was only looking left, so I jumped up and down and waved my 
arms so she would see me but she didn’t.  She came this close” – gesturing with his fingers – “to 
hitting me!” 
 Having formulated something to say based on what I inferred from his examples, I told him, 
“I think that while a part of you wants to be seen by me another part of you is scared that no matter 
what you do I won’t and you’ll be hurt.” 
 John nods his head up and down a bit before replying, “I want to lie down.”  After a 
moment of silence he scoots over to his right towards the middle of the chaise and begins to lean 
towards its head, stops halfway before reclining, and sits back up with his head still turned down. 
 “I’m scared to lie down,” he states in a frustrated tone.  
 “Scared of?” I ask 
 “I don’t know,” pausing, he continues, “When I was a kid I remember finding this calendar 
on the bank behind our house.  Someone had taken the time to mark appointments and things on it 
and it made me sad.” 
 “Perhaps a part of you is scared about wasting time in here.” 
 “No.  I was sad because someone took the time to put things on it and now it’s useless.  It’s 
useless.” 
 “Useless” I repeat, not sure where this is going. 
 “I used to have this fantasy of getting away from it all where I drove out of town in a 
Volkswagen beetle and as I got out of the city limits a cop pulled me over for speeding and when he 
opened the door a wind blew me away and he saw I was made out of paper.” 
 “So, even though a part of you wants me inside you, another part is scared that if you let me 
in I’ll see you are useless and empty.” 
 “Useless,” he says as he nods in agreement and lies down, face up.  
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In terms of Taylor and Butler, John’s fantasy encapsulates his life project as an attempt to 
deny the paradox of subjectivity.  His being is not “in question;” it is foreclosed.  His life is an 
argument that he invites others to participate in: the argument that he cannot assume a subjectivity 
that can alter the circumstances in which he finds himself because he is depleted of agency.  
“Getting away from it all” in his car is an attempt at escape from being “a self [as] existing in a space 
of issues, to do with how one ought to be, or how one measures up against what is good, what is 
right, what is really worth doing … being able to find one’s standpoint in this space, being able to 
occupy, to be a perspective in it”.   This attempt is a failure because the law (reality, his job, his 
boyfriend, his therapist) pursues John and is bent on sighting/citing him, and in doing so making 
citations about the subject he is – and thereby requiring a response.  However, John thwarts this 
effort to be reached by a trick.  As a fake person (invisible) he tries to evade subjection, the 
obligations of being in relationships that matter.  The long arm of subjection can’t grasp him; as the 
simulacra of a subject he is “useless.”  At the same time however, he negates the only possible way 
to truly resist subjection.  After all, an agent cited by the law could still choose to speed away even 
after citation.  John’s only option is to be carried by circumstances like a useless surface. 
As a form of power, subjection is paradoxical.  To be dominated by a power external to 
oneself is a familiar and agonizing form power takes.  To find, however, that what “one” is, 
one’s very formation as a subject, is in some sense dependent upon that very power is quite 
another. … this fundamental dependency on a discourse we never chose, but that, 
paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency.  (Butler, 1997, pp. 1-2) 
 
Thus, this study examines the paradox of subjectivity in the context of therapeutic practice.   
It employs a hermeneutic case study method to study some of the author’s clinical work while 
supervised by a contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic psychotherapist and reports the findings in a 
manner that draws from the creative nonfiction genre.  
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Case study methodology 
The case study approach, utilizing the author’s own clinical work, was adopted for three 
reasons.  First, from the object-relations perspective, every case is a case study – quite literally.  It 
involves the study of each patient’s complex history and difficulties, largely through interpretations 
based on the therapist’s participant-observation of the relationship that develops with each patient.  
Thus, the use of an interpretive study focusing on relational dynamics parallels the nature of the 
phenomenon under study.    
 Second, Clarkson (1995) and Pugh (1998) have argued that a disciplined and methodological 
case study conducted by the therapist using their own clinical data provides a means for an 
integrated approach to therapy and research.  Noting the traditional separation between research and 
clinical practice, where research is often conducted as a means for securing a degree to be able to 
practice (that is, completing the dissertation requirement), Clarkson (1995) argues that therapy and 
research ought to be a simultaneous and ongoing processes with every client, providing the research 
is appropriate to the clinician’s approach to therapy.  Following Clarkson (1995), Pugh (1998) 
believes that encouraging doctoral students to study their own clinical process in depth, using a 
method like the one employed in this study, can provide a vehicle for enhancing their own sense of 
confidence, independence, and their ability to respond ethically to clients as psychotherapists.  
 Third, the case study approach is generally considered the appropriate method for 
conducting focused analyses of clinical processes, particularly the communicative interactions 
(including frequency, type, and patterns) between clients and therapists (cf., Clarkson, 1995; Martin, 
Goodyear, & Newton, 1987; Pittenger, Hockett, & Danehy, 1960; Pugh, 1998).  While many authors 
offer little if any justification for this assumption, Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy (1960) emphasize 
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one that is particularly well suited for this study.  By concentrating their study on the first five 
minutes of a psychiatric interview, they were able to examine the communicative pa tterning between 
the psychiatrist and the patient in greater idiographic detail.   They write: 
The members of any single human community share literally thousands of behavioral 
conventions which are as dominant as our rule of keeping to the right [while driving in 
America], but which are much more subtle than that because they are learned, acted, and 
responded to, and taught almost entirely out of awareness.  Human beings live their lives, 
from day to day, and from centisecond to centisecond, in terms of such patterning.  In the 
discovery and explication of [such] patterning, gross statistical methods are neither necessary 
nor possible; what is required, rather, is some method by which things we “really already 
knew” – but only out of awareness – can be more or less systematically dredged up for 
conscious examination. (p. 212) 
 
And Yin (1984), writing on case studies in general, considers case studies to be appropriate for an 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and when multiple 
sources of evidence are used – all of which characterize the present study.  In fact, from the 
perspective of hermeneutics the phenomenon and context under question for this study (or any 
study, for that matter) are inexorably linked. 
 
Hermeneutic methodology 
 As one approach within the family of qualitative research methods, hermeneutics in 
psychology takes the position that the way to understand an action is to bring to light the world 
outlook of which it is a response (cf., Packer, 1985; Packer, 1993; Packer & Addison, 1989) and 
articulate the “rules” or interpretive framework that structures it.  The everyday, practical activities in 
which we engage make sense when viewed in terms of human interests and purposes that are always 
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embedded in social and historical circumstances 8 – conventions that circumscribe the actors’ grasp 
or understanding of a situation and therefore the range of behaviors in which the person is likely to 
engage. 
 Before I can venture any guesses as to why a particular chess player makes a certain move, I 
have to be familiar with the rules of the game of chess.  Once I know these rules and have examined 
the unfolding sequence in which the player moves – what did the other player do before and after 
him/her? –  I can interpret and make sense of the player’s move, with or without using his or her 
own account of the move.  For hermeneutics this kind of engaged, “on-line” activity is the focal 
point of analysis because every human action or practice is grounded in a network of shared, 
“constitutive” rules and conventions that give the action its meaning (cf. Kögler, 1996; Packer & 
Addison, 1989; Taylor, 1971; Thompson, 1981).  Every human action is placed or situated in a 
myriad of other actions that change and unfold over time.  The purpose of a hermeneutic study is to 
make more explicit the scope and character of the rules – often tacit and informed – that make sense 
of the action.   
 Psychotherapy is one kind of game people play.  Psychotherapy is a game in the sense that 
every human interaction is a game: its central feature is communication, it has its own rules, legal 
and illegal moves, positions, field of play, values, and goals (cf., Packer, 1993; Taylor, 1971; Walsh, 
1995; Walsh, Perrucci, & Severns, 1999).  In therapy people make moves towards, away, and, often, 
against each other.  Each participant agrees to meet and interact with the other in the ostensible 
hope that they “get somewhere” – namely, they get to a place where the person in the game position 
                                                 
8  While this underlying assumption was argued nearly thirty years ago (Taylor, 1971) as well as in disciplines outside 
psychology (cf, Geertz, 1976/1979), its history can be traced back much farther.  Its lineage reaches back to Hegel and 
Dilthey (Palmer, 1969), Heidegger (1926/1962), Gadamer (1960/1994), and Wittgenstein (Walsh, 1995). 
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of “patient” no longer needs the help of the person in the position of “therapist.”  Therefore, to 
understand what happens in therapy one must examine what is done by means of words, the 
principle tools participants use to communicate while playing the game of therapy (Watzlawick, 
Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967).  Hence, this study focuses on the pragmatics of the communication 
between the author and the patient included in the study.  Pragmatics is the study of actual language 
as it is used in specific situations (cf., Levinson, 1983).  As Nofsinger (1991) writes: 
The approach of pragmatics thus contrasts with the study of language’s system of sounds 
(phonology), its rules for constructing correct or valid words and sentences (morphology 
and syntax) and its system for representing meaning in linguistic form (semantics).  
Pragmatics is the study of how we use these various aspects of language to accomplish our 
goals and do communicative work (pp. 5 – 6).    
 
Importantly, although the pragmatic approach applies to utterances, it can also be extended to 
emotions, which themselves are communicative acts (cf., deRivera, 1977; Parkinson, 1995).  
Parkinson (1995) describes the basic principle of pragmatic function as it relates to the 
communicative model of emotion:  
What we say when we talk in emotional terms is never intended simply to characterize 
something happening inside us, although such a characterization may be one of the effects 
achieved.  Emotional representations are deployed in specific contexts to serve specific 
social functions.  The nature of the function determines the content of the representation 
that is deployed. (pp. 287–288) 
 
This communicative model of emotion views “getting emotional [as] making identity claims that are 
physically communicated via the various channels of individual emotional expression with socially 
appropriate level of bodily involvement . . . .to influence a specific target person” (Parkinson, pp. 
264, 291).  These claims have a context dependent function which usually involves defining a piece 
of reality or making claims about reality that cannot be maintained simply through supposedly 
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neutral, factual discourse (e.g., “the painting is ugly!” stated with anger as if socially claiming the 
identity of “angry person” legitimizes the speaker’s position).  
 De Rivera’s work (1977) provides a model for understanding how emotions comprise a 
significant part of our continuous, on-line interpersonal negotiations over our rights, obligations, 
and roles with respect to other people and the environment.  Like Parkinson, on this view emotions 
are used to regulate our interactions.  The interpretive methodology employed here draws on the 
work of de Rivera (1977) and Parkinson (1995) to interpret the emotional work that unfolded as a 
part of the clinical interactions.  Recalling Foucault’s (1982, p. 220) definition of power relations as 
those which act on the actions of others, influencing or shaping their experience and subsequent 
behavior, the importance of examining the emotional work of social interactions is clear.  Getting 
emotional is an everyday practice of power that does more to shape everyday social reality than 
direct force. 
  Yet in order to study these actions, they must be “fixed” by some means, such as video, 
audio, or other type of recording.  In this way they can become a text-analogue and can be 
interpreted (cf., Ricoeur, 1971).  The author’s supervisor required the use of detailed process notes 
written during every session and reviewed, line-by-line, during supervision. These verbatim process 
notes provide a record of such fixed actions, written as a participant in the midst of them.  These 
notes, therefore, provided a record of the interactions that were used for the study. 
 This case study concentrates on the notes that were written during one psychotherapy 
session with one patient.  The session was chosen on the basis that it seem to exemplify particular 
aspects of the technique the author had been learning.  The session is analyzed to articulate the 
structure of the therapeutic game the author had been learning, drawing on the literature in the 
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pragmatic analysis of human communication (Levinson, 1983; Nofsinger, 1991; Watzlawick, 
Jackson, & Bavelas, 1967).  First, a pragmatic analysis is done to articulate the moves that were 
made, what the author and patient were  “up to” in terms of the communicative context.  This is 
followed with an examination of how the patient and the author positioned themselves relative to 
each other in the communicative context that was articulated.  This positioning is important because 
it is through the moves that were made with respect to each other and features of the 
communicative context that the constituting or construction of social reality, including the 
maintenance and alteration of identity and subjectivity, occurred.  Taken together these steps 
constitute an interpretive analysis that moves beyond the patterning of the interaction to interpret 
how this patterning shapes the participants – the ontological work that is accomplished (cf. Packer 
& Greco-Brooks, 1999).  As Packer writes: 
In broad terms our hermeneutic approach seeks to uncover and elucidate the ontological 
work that people accomplish in their everyday practical activity, including the interchange 
that takes place in therapy.  This work includes the ongoing construction and reconstruction 
of social reality, and especially the production and reproduction of persons. Much of this 
work is done by means of (through the medium of) language, and so our interpretive 
methodology incorporates the analysis of language pragmatics: the conversational action that 
makes up discourse.  (Packer, 2000, p. 1) 
 
The result is that several aspects of the communicative competence that characterizes CKPP 
are articulated and related to several key technical terms and the tropography employed in the 
Kleinian literature.  Terms and tropes such as central anxiety, transference, development, feeding, 
the breast, etc., will be discussed and explained to show how the theory and its underlying 
metaphors are related and constitute the practice, its “discourse” as defined by Ochs(1990):  “... a set 
of norms, preferences, and expectations relating language to context, which speaker-hearers draw on and modify in 
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producing and making sense out of language [and behavior, I would add] in context” (p. 289, italics in 
original). 
 
Creative nonfiction genre 
 The following study, then, “tells a story” of contemporary Kleinian clinical practice through 
the window of a novice’s supervised clinical work – one who has been intent learning the practices 
and methods of understanding clinical phenomena inherent to this specialized way of working with 
people in psychological distress.  In addition to articulating this form of clinical practice and 
examining its subjectivizing practice, there was the challenge to present the work in a manner that 
both reflects its complexity and communicates this complexity in a way that is accessible for both 
more general and clinical audiences – to offer a glimpse of this world, how it works, and a sense of 
what it is like to work within it.  The creative nonfiction genre was chosen to achieve these aims for 
two reasons. 
 First, creative nonfiction provides a rhetorical style that is appropriate for coping with three 
challenges inherent to this kind of study.  Perhaps the biggest challenge in learning (and 
understanding) clinical practice is integrating and appropriately utilizing a wealth of theoretical 
concepts and constructs to help this particular live-blooded person sitting across from you who 
never fits neatly into psychological constructs.  A second challenge for this kind of study is the 
balance to be sustained between a detailed and specific “first-hand” account of the phenomenon 
under study with the appropriate distance of the researcher-observer who draws on the body of 
academic knowledge to make sense of the details encountered as a participant.  And third, a study 
such as this ought to be rigorous, informative, and interesting.  Unfortunately, reading clinical 
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material overloaded with technical jargon in standard expository format tends to be not only 
burdensome, but often results in boredom and lack of interest. As a rhetorical form, creative 
nonfiction deals with all of these challenges, because it moves between describing concrete, 
historical events and tying them to more general ideas and issues.  It depicts concrete instances of an 
idea, ethos, or aesthetic for the reader to measure what is happening in some part of the world, a 
depiction for the reader’s comparison between what “goes on” in one place and how it “goes on” 
differently for the reader in their own place (cf. Gerard, 1996).   Moreover, it accomplishes these 
things with the underlying aim of offering a gripping account of a real-life event of set of events.  
 Secondly, misconceptions and, I believe, often misguided critiques have been lodged against 
psychoanalysis, because too often psychoanalytic discourse has not done a good enough job of 
linking abstract constructs to concrete clinical happenings.  The “story telling” approach allowed 
each concept to unfold with the clinical material that is presented.  Showing how the terms inform 
practice, the pragmatic use of these constructs, is different from the more typical context-less 
wrangling over abstract terms that characterizes clinical literature.  Moreover, each “school” of 
psychoanalysis has somewhat different ways of understanding the same concepts such as 
transference, projection, etc.  Like the narrator of a film whose cuts back and forth in time, between 
past, present, future, and horizontally across multiple context of the protagonist’s life to present a 
three dimensional character, this study tacks between the concrete to and fro of an actual session, 
the analysis of what is happening in the talk as it unfolds, and a retrospective view of the narrator 
who wants to tie these elements together and use clinical work as the basis for telling “a story” about 
contemporary Kleinian psychotherapy practice and how it works to foster subjectivity. 
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 Gerard (1996) outlines five characteristics of creative nonfiction.  One of the primary aims 
of creative nonfiction is teaching.   “Creative nonfiction contains a sense of reflection on the part of 
the author.” (p. 10).  This reflective exposition, at the heart of creative nonfiction, is part of what 
motivates the reader to read on: “One important distinguishing factor is this teaching element – a 
reader reads on to learn something.  It’s not just personal experience” (Gutkind, quoted in Gerard, 
1998).    I would add that the organizational structure of creative nonfiction, the tacking back and 
forth between moment or event and context, also contributes to its efficacy at teaching readers 
something – helping the reader to see that there might be an alternative to the way they are seeing 
the world, that there may be another way of doing things than the way they are familiar with doing, 
conceiving, and talking about them. 
 Two related characteristics of creative nonfiction are that it tells a story and uses literary 
devices to make it a gripping.  “Creative nonfiction is [also] narrative, it always tells a good story.... It 
takes advantage of such fictional devices as character, plot, and dialogue” (Gerard, 1996, p.9).  This 
study employs different literary devices throughout to achieve distinct purposes.  For example, the 
text includes turns of phrase, metaphor, and the like to enhance the descriptive quality of the setting 
and the story.  Also, technical concepts that figure as “central players” in the game of contemporary 
Kleinian technique are entirely capitalized without necessarily providing immediate explication of the 
concepts.  This is done to mark the special place these terms hold and signify where they are figuring 
into ongoing action.  It is hoped that with subsequent exposures to these marked terms across 
multiple contexts that the reader will develop a sense of the terms through how they are used, where 
they figure into the clinical discourse, the supervisory discourse, and the discourse of the clinical 
literature.  This approach also parallels the process by which the author gradually came to 
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understand and integrate the concepts and theories with the clinical work over the course of the 
supervision.     
 The study deviates from the standard approach to organizing the description of the study, 
including its participants, purpose, development, as well as its place in the current literature.  Rather 
than summarizing this information up front, it is woven throughout the work as it has been done in 
other works of creative non-fiction (e.g., Hersch, 1988).  In general, this information is introduced as 
it becomes relevant to the ongoing story.  For example, informative digressions are used to provide 
additional information on technical concepts as the dissertation progresses.  In this study, and as 
Hersch does, the  “voice” of the participant and the researcher-observer are combined through 
tacking between a description of the context of the ongoing experience and the context of the 
literature that is relevant to the action.  
The fourth and fifth characteristics of creative nonfiction are also related – and perhaps the 
most important from the standpoint of this study.  Creative nonfiction “has an apparent subject and 
a deeper subject” (Gerard, 1996, pp. 7-8).  In her book A Tribe Apart: A Journey into the Heart of 
American Adolescence, (Hersch, 1998) follows the lives of several teenagers through a few years of 
their adolescence.  Yet her book is also a study in the estrangement and isolation that plagues not 
only teens but their families.  There is a duality of focus in creative nonfiction.   
 And the last characteristic, related to the fourth, is that it is “grounded in paradox” (Ibid, p. 
9).  This paradox is between the story as a concrete historical happening and its function as a 
window into subjects that confront people (including the reader) in other places and times. Take the 
following excerpt from The Culture of Desire: Paradox and Perversity in Gay Lives Today.  In it the 
author uses a memory from his childhood (the surface content) as a window into a broader, 
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culturally bound pubescent experience (the “deeper” subject Gerard discusses) of grappling with 
eroticism as a facet of one’s existence, and the role of peer story telling in this process: 
 One image rises from a strawberry field.  Two teenage boys are bent down between 
the rows, boasting to a third, much younger boy about what they’d got and who they’d 
gotten if from.  The younger boy, eager to keep the talk going, hungry to make it more 
explicit (and to expand his own secret library of masturbatory fantasies), plies them with 
dumb questions about body parts and places. 
 “You just find the hardest place on you and the softest place on her, and then . . . 
you know,” the older braggart says. 
 “Like your big toe?”  the little boy ventures. 
 “Haint your daddy learned you nothing with all them books?  the big boy snorts, 
reaching down through the bushy strawberry vines to grope himself.  “This here’s all you 
gotta know,” he says, laughing with his buddy. 
 The mystery of what “this here” was also took in the fantastic and delectable notion 
that if you really knew what to do with it, you magically discover who you were.  You would 
discover that you and your body were in fact one whole being.  You would discover that the 
growing adolescent physicalness of your body was not disconnected from the self that hid 
within that strange gangling thing – and then, privy to the mystery, you would enter into the 
brotherhood of the knowing, the brotherhood of men who knew, men (boys?) whose 
solidarity with one another had guided and released them into the natural bodies of women 
(girls?) – released them from the terror of their aloneness.  All that from a grope and a dirty 
joke. (Browning, 1993, p. 13, italics in the original) 
 
This is an example of the way in which creative nonfiction effectively articulates a foreign event or 
series of events with an interpretation that invites readers to reflect, consider, and use to learn 
something new about themselves and/or the world around them beyond the obvious content of the 
story.  In this case, the occasion of a grope and a dirty joke can provide a window to notice how our 
identities (maleness) become inscribed in our bodies (the phallus) through the sightings/citations of 
others: the “self that hid within that strange gangling thing” (emphasis added).  In Taylor’s terms, it is 
a glimpse into how the self, as “a space of issues for acting” is enlarged as the gangling thing 
becomes a new term for questions of how to act and who one is that incorporates the thing within 
that space of the self.  Importantly, it shows a way that the terms of the incorporation – and hence 
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of one’s identity – are fundamentally dependent on a more powerful Other whose defining 
(symbolic) function is willingly turned to as definitive by the subject under construction, as it were. 
In other words, it shows how our bodily organs – and the sensations of those organs – are 
interpreted in relational terms because they are defined within a relational context.  For example, 
when the boy gets horny he fantasizes someone else who gratifies the urge.  As the following 
chapters will show, this process is not unique to puberty or adolescence.  Within the critical 
hermeneutics of the Kleinian tradition it is the starting point for having a self at all, with its roots in 
infancy – particularly the ongoing process of weaning.  In so far as one’s subjectivity changes 
throughout life – or doesn’t in the case of pathology – weaning is a real and foundational aspect of 
the adult subject.  Clinically speaking, there is always already an infant-in-the-patient. 
Critical hermeneutics of CKPP 
The way of disclosure, in which Dasein [the human kind of being] brings itself before itself 
must be such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner.  With 
what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in 
an elemental way.   
    As a state-of-mind, which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the 
phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis…. As one of Dasein’s possibilities 
of Being, anxiety – together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it – provides the phenomenal 
basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being.  Dasein’s Being reveals 
itself as care.  (Heidegger, 1926/1962, pp. 226-227) 
 
As a philosopher of ontology, Heidegger was interested in the question of Being (capital 
“B”), the fundamental structure of “isness;” he was not interested in the being (little “b”) of any 
particular thing or person.  However, since this philosophical question only exists for humans, his 
strategy was to examine the fundamental structures of human Being.  This is the aim of Being and 
Time (1926/1952), which inaugurated ontological and methodological hermeneutics.  He formulated 
his answer to this question through the interpretation of humans in their “average everydayness” 
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rather than as objects detached from the contexts in which they existed.  His famous answer to this 
question: human Being is being-in-the-world (Dasein), as opposed to defining humanity it terms of 
some inner faculty like reason as had been argued by most philosophers since Aristotle, or “the 
mind” divided into and ego, id and superego as in the case of Freudian psychoanalysis.  Thus, with 
being-in-the-world as the starting point, methodological hermeneutics in psychology examines the 
context in which the person finds him or herself to understand the basis of what they do, think, and 
how they view themselves (cf., pp. 13-16 above).  Importantly, as a method or strategy for 
articulating the structure of an entity, ontological hermeneutics is not concerned with what ought to 
be or not, simply the examination of what is and how it can be what it is.  In other words, its focus 
is on something’s conditions for being-in-the-world, not the conditions for its well-being-in-the-
world. 
Critical hermeneutics, it may be said, by contrast, seeks to go beyond the conditions of 
being-in-the-world to articulate the conditions of well-being-in-the-world for particular peoples: 
Critical hermeneutics refers to work that seeks to expose and criticize ideological underpinnings 
of all social practices, including political and scientific activity.  It attempts, in particular, to 
reveal the sources of domination and coercion that prevent open discourse, the free exercise of 
reason, and the enhancement of possibilities for human self-determination.  (Woolfolk, Sass, & 
Messer, 1988, p. 4) 
 
This concern with emancipation is what led Habermas to examine Freudian psychoanalysis to 
generate guidelines “for the logic of critical science in general” (McCarthy, 1978, p. 201), since Freud 
combined interpretation with a normative-explanatory theoretical apparatus into a method of 
identifying, intervening and correcting oppressive patterns of individual action.  In order to be able 
to evaluate social practices as oppressive, liberating, moral and immoral, there must be some 
framework of values as a backdrop for sighting/citing this or that practice as good or as bad – in the 
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case of psychotherapy, this or that behavior as normal or pathological.  The problem with this given 
the work of Foucault is: who’s to say and to whose benefit is this normative scheme being 
employed?9  Is one person’s emancipatory understanding another person’s oppression?  How do the 
human and social scientist understand the other without assimilating their otherness – understanding 
them primarily in terms of one’s own framework?  An obvious example of the danger of this 
predicament is the grotesque history of trying to convert homosexuals to heterosexuals on the basis 
of traditional conceptions of normal subjectivity by employing various disciplinary technologies such 
as chemical injection, electroshock, castration, emotional manipulation, and so on. 
 Kögler, a student of Habermas, (1996) argues for a critical hermeneutics that allows for an 
understanding of otherness without its erasure by turning every form of life into another version of 
one’s own world outlook.  His solution is an interpretive theory and method that balances the view 
that social power shapes every person’s understanding of themselves and reality without robbing 
them of the possibility to achieve the critical distance necessary to act on and change those power-
knowledge structures for the betterment of their lives.  Engagement in his version of the critical 
dialog is where both participants come to understand more of their own respective preconceptions 
about reality through understanding them in terms of the other’s perspective.  The “subject” in such 
a study, say a person from another culture, may come to learn through the difference between his or 
her world and that of the researcher something about the taken for granted cultural “rules” that 
shape their lives.  And subsequently, they may choose to alter some aspect of these rules once he or 
                                                 
9  Foucault’s work can be characterized as the investigation of the transformation of human subjectivities  
(sociohistorically contingent manifestations of the subject) as embedded within complex relations of power and semiotic 
practices.  The possibilities for relations between subjects are conditioned by the operation of power-knowledge 
complexes, “a moving substrate of force relations” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).  These relations operate within a sphere of 
power that circumscribe its possibilities, shaping subjectivity along lines of specific, historically contingent subjectivities 
(e.g., mad-sane, (Foucault, 1965), the criminal (Foucault, 1979), homosexual-heterosexual (Foucault, 1980), etc.) 
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she has become more aware of its limiting consequences.  Likewise the researcher may learn through 
the differences something about his or her own background that he or she may want to change.  It is 
the encounter with difference that produces the “discursive space” necessary for critical self-
distanciation, not with a master text (normative-explanatory scheme) that captures reality outside of 
the language within which it is inscribed. 
 The following chapters show how the communicative competence of CKPP constitutes a 
critical hermeneutics that uses dialog to provide occasions for emancipatory subjection by means of 
the confrontation with difference in the context of asymmetrical power and dependence.  The 
encounter with difference is necessary for patients to change their background assumptions of 
reality, habits for relating to other people, and gain a greater sense of agency in their experience.  
This confrontation is between who and how the therapist is and who and how the patient wants the 
therapist to be to purge anxiety-producing reminders from his or her experience.  In this view 
pathology stems from inappropriately using other people to help manage one’s anxiety, that is, from 
the inappropriate assimilation of the other to serve a function for the self.   
When patients come in for treatment, they have a problem in their experience, an agitating 
gap or lack in their understanding as it were, something, an it, that they want help to figure out -- 
whether it manifests itself as a phobia (e.g., lack of ease with spiders), depression (e.g., lack of 
fulfillment), sexual compulsion (e.g., lack of restraint on a desire that causes problems), etc.  
Something is felt to be lacking and chronically subverts the patient’s sense of well-being-in-the-
world.  However, since this gap is in their experience it (1) is their way of experiencing that must 
change to include whatever is missing, and (2) means the patient’s experience with the therapist will 
be subject to the same problematic conditions.  Borrowing Butler’s language (1997), the patient 
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when he or she walks in the door of every session is a “subject already formed” and it is the 
conditions of its formation that therapy risks if the subject is to be reformed and include whatever 
human possibility for experience they feel they are denied.  In CKPP the patient is subjected to their 
experience in a different way so that an opportunity is created for patients to gradually assume a 
different kind of subjectivity in relation to their experience.  
While Heidegger the ontologist used anxiety as the window to expose Dasein’s basic 
structural characteristics as being-in-the-world, Klein the psychoanalyst discovered that infantile 
anxiety was the window for understanding the obstacles her child patients confronted with well-
being-in-the-world.  The examination of death anxiety became the path to the truth of their 
experience, and later, the method for laying bare the structure of adult experience as well.  Chapter 
two provides an overview of the Kleinian tradition in terms of the central role it ascribes to anxiety, 
particularly death anxiety as the manifestation of the death (aggressive) instinct.  The chapter will 
begin with a synoptic view of Klein’s life up to her invention of her play technique.    
Chapters three and four articulate eight characteristics of CKPP through the analysis of one 
session’s verbatim record using the interpretive method outlined above.  At the relevant moments 
during the analysis digressions are included to (1) explain some of the technical terms of CKPP and 
(2) point out how the characteristics of CKPP work within the parameters of critical hermeneutics 
as outlined by Kögler (1996).  The overall strategy is to show that CKPP differs as a specialized 
form of communicative competence by examining the difference between the communicative 
patterns of the therapist with those that characterize everyday conversation.  This includes what, 
how, when, and why utterances are deployed and their pragmatic effect on the communicative 
action.  These interpretive utterances are geared to reveal something about the difficulties the patient 
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has taking an evaluative stance on his or her (1) assumptions about social reality, (2) over-practiced 
methods of impacting others, (3) personal experience, and how these ‘unconsciously’ constitute the 
problematic experience(s) the patient recurrently faces, known in the psychiatric community as 
symptoms. 
 Through the close interpretive analysis of the interaction between the author and a patient 
during in chapters three and four, chapter five summarizes these findings to provide a basis for 
studying the subjection process in CKPP.  The work of Judith Butler will be used to augment the 
analysis of the conversation done in chapters three and four, since she provides a language for 
examining the process of subjection in the record.  The critical hermeneutics of contemporary 
Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy is examined as the weaning of subjectivity.  On 
the side of the therapist, weaning is the occasion to provide the conditions necessary for the patients 
to begin to experientially understand themselves and operate differently in relation to anOther.  On 
the side of the patient, weaning is desired and feared as the paradox of subjection.  Weaning is the 
occasion to reunite with a range of experience through another; what becomes a reclaimed 
possibility for the self is possible on the basis of dependency on that Other.  The fear or anxiety of 
weaning is the specter of the dissolution of the self as it engages this project by means of this Other.  
The allure of weaning is a greater sense of togetherness in the world (as in “I do/don’t feel very 
together today”) and with the world (as in less loneliness and isolation).  The implications of 
weaning for subjection will be discussed, as well as an evaluation of the methodology employed in 
the study and its implications for further research. 
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2.  Some context for an induction into the Kleinian tradition 
 
We have never prided ourselves on the completeness and finality of our knowledge and 
capacity.  We are just as ready now as we were earlier to admit the imperfections in our 
understanding, to learn new things and to alter our methods in any way that can improve 
them. 
 
According to Grosskurth (1986, preface) these were “the first words Melanie Klein ever 
heard Freud utter.” 
 
Freud first postulated the conflict between Eros and Thanatos, the life and death instincts, in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).  However, when he died in 1939 he had not decided whether 
the idea of a ‘death instinct’ was central to human existence or as “is felt by many people …a most 
undesirable [innovation] which should be gotten rid of as quickly as possible” (Freud, 1933/1965, p. 
103).  Melanie Klein took the former position.  Her use and development of the death instinct as a 
heuristic devise in theory and in practice is one of the important ways she extended Freud’s work as 
a psychoanalytic pioneer, and made claim to legitimacy in Freud’s own name.  For some like Freud, 
Anna Freud and her followers, Klein’s extensions ultimately amounted to a heretical departure from 
psychoanalysis and made her a target of derision and contempt.  Yet for others, her innovations 
provided an illuminating source of inspiration for extending the reach of psychoanalytic thought and 
practice.   
These contrasting reactions to Melanie Klein highlight the idea that conflict resides at the 
heart of people’s relations with others who are different, and require an ability to tolerate the loss of 
sameness between un-equals for the various forms of good will to prevail in parenting, our 
friendships, partnerships, and professional life.  For Klein the root of a person’s inability to tolerate 
this loss is the hatred of dependence manifested as ENVY of the Other, who has that of which one 
feels deprived.   The aggression over this experienced deprivation is the origin of the anxiety that 
threatens one’s existence as persecution from external sources or the destruction of the
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loved and needed Other at the hands of the self.  Klein’s clinical and theoretical innovations 
developed out of the psychoanalytic play technique that she invented over several years 
beginning in 1919.  10  By 1940 her theories and technique had gained enough social stability 
and currency in the analytic community that a reaction had formed against them as such a 
heretical departure from Freud’s psychoanalysis that Klein’s legitimacy (and that of her 
followers) as an analyst was attacked by Anna Freud and her adherents.  Since Klein and 
Anna Freud had both emigrated to England to escape the rampant anti-Semitism of the 
continent, the tension between them almost proved too much to be contained by the tent of 
the British Psycho-Analytical Society, which led to the Freud-Klein controversies between 
1941 and 1945 (cf., King & Steiner, 1991).  Since there are several biographies of Klein that 
cover her life, work, and the controversies surrounding her technique and departures from 
Freud from different angles (e.g., Burston, 1996; Grosskurth, 1986; King & Steiner, 1991; 
Kristeva, 2001; Likerman, 2001; Segal, 1979), this chapter will not attempt an exhaustive 
account of her life and work or its historical place in psychoanalytic thought.  This chapter 
provides some historical context for CKPP as it developed from Klein and the subsequent 
work of her followers as they have continued to refine the practice of “getting to the root of 
anxiety.”  For Klein this anxiety is proportional to the patient’s inability to tolerate 
deprivation of some kind.   
Given that Klein’s own career as an analyst began with her own analysis as a 
recurrently depressed young woman caught at the intersection of several depriving 
relationships, it is not ironic that her last major paper Envy and gratitude (1957/1997), 
written with the hindsight of a grandmother, struggled with the issue of how such 
deprivations affect the mental health of people.  Perhaps Klein’s unwavering conviction that 
                                                 
10  Except where indicated, the biographical information and quotations are taken from Grosskurth (1986) 
Melanie Klein: Her world and her work. 
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there are innate factors that predispose some people to have more problems with 
environmental deprivations than others came from her own experience as an analysand who 
was confronted with how she contributed to – and therefore could change – the recurrence 
of misery in her own life. 
Melanie Klein 
 
From the envy, aggression, and sibling rivalry within her own family, Melanie Klein 
had abundant material from which to formulate her later theories. … 
    It was a family riddled with guilt, envy, and occasionally explosive rages, and 
infused with strong incestuous overtones.  Melanie’s impending marriage was the 
prelude to Emanuel’s death through disease, malnutrition, alcohol, drugs, poverty, 
and a will to self-destruction.  Melanie Klein was made to feel responsible for his 
death and she carried the guilt with her for the rest of her days – just as Emanuel had 
probably intended she should. (Grosskurth, 1986, p. 20) 
 
 
Melanie’s father Moriz Reizes was born into a strictly Orthodox Jewish family in a 
small town known since World War II as Lvov, Ukraine.  Against the wishes of his parents 
he pursued a career as a physician, hiding his studies for matriculation to avoid their 
interference.  His move towards independence required not only supporting himself 
financially through school, but also severing a prearranged marriage.  He met his future wife 
Libussa Deutch by chance on a trip to Vienna, where they both happened to by staying in 
the same boarding home.  They soon married in 1875 and settled in what is now 
Burgenland, Austria, about 70 miles from where they met.  A year later their first child Emile 
was born.  Emanuel and Sidone were born in 1877 and 1878, respectively.  Melanie, the last 
of their four children, was born seven years after their marriage in 1882.  Given a social 
climate of ramped anti-Semitism, Moriz’s attempts to provide for his family as a physician 
failed and he settled for dentistry, contributing to the family’s financial strains and Libussa’s 
apparent disdain for her husband.  
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Libussa was in her mid-twenties at the time she married Moriz, some twenty-four 
years her senior.  From Grosskurth’s available sources, what seems clear about Libussa is 
that she was black-haired, of fair complexion, and intelligent.  In addition to her native 
Slovakian, she had a adequate grasp of German and French, the latter of which she taught 
herself in addition to playing the piano while Melanie was growing up – facts to which 
Melanie would refer in her idyllic reminiscences of her mother’s influence on her own 
character.  
She had a far closer relationship with her mother, whom she remembered as a 
woman much younger than her father, very beautify, warm-hearted, courageous and 
enterprising.  Not only did she keep a shop – an unusual thing for a doctor’s wife to 
do in those days – but later, when Melanie was finishing school and her father 
became ailing and somewhat senile, it was her mother who supplemented the family 
income and held the family together.  She spent the last few years of her life in 
Melanie Klein’s own home, which was a great solace to Melanie at a generally happy 
time in her life. … Melanie was deeply moved by the serenity and courage with 
which her mother approached her death after a long-drawn-out illness, and often 
spoke of it in her old age. (Segal, 1979, p. 28) 
 
In contrast to the rosy picture of her mother that Klein describes in her unpublished 
autobiography, both Grosskurth and Kristeva (2001) depict Libussa as autocratic, 
manipulative, and overbearing, a sort of parental parasite on the young Melanie.  Kristeva 
writes, “Not surprisingly, the biography of Melanie Klein reveals that the childhood 
experienced by this discoverer of the “object-mother” and of matricide was dominated by 
the imposing figure of her own mother, Libussa Deutsch” (p. 17).  This aspect of Libussa 
will be most evident when she insinuates herself into Melanie’s young family after Klein 
married. 
 About a year after the death of Sidonie, Melanie began her education at a local state 
school with eagerness and dedication: “She had also inherited the family passion for 
knowledge and soon became an ambitious student, very conscious of her marks; it was 
particularly important for her to receive a report with the words wurde belobt (commended).” 
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(Grosskurth, 1986, p.9).  Grosskurth explains this ambition in terms of the competitive 
dynamics and likely childhood resentments Klein faced, motivating her desire to stand out 
and be noticed.  First, Melanie was the youngest of four children, born four years later and 
she was an unexpected child.  Second, her father was fifty years old when she was born, and 
in addition to having publicly told the young Melanie that Emile was his favorite, he never 
seemed to notice her, as Klein could not recall one time he ever played with her – although 
she could remember a time that she tried to climb up his knee and he pushed her away.  
Third, it seems that Melanie’s siblings were generally antagonistic towards her except for 
Sidonie.  Fourth, while Melanie resented and envied Emile’s favored status in the eyes of 
their father, she wanted her father’s approval just as she wanted the approval of her brother. 
 Around the age of fourteen Klein decided that she wanted to pursue a  career in 
medicine.  Apparently, Melanie overheard her father boast that she would attend the 
gymnasium – an event that ignited her decision.  Yet it was her brother’s approval and 
tutelage in Greek and Latin that enabled her to qualify, and provided her with a circle of 
young intellectual and aspiring friends, including her future husband Arthur Klein.  
 The transitional years just before and after the end of the 19 th century brought many 
difficult changes for Melanie to cope with emotionally, and perhaps further predisposed her 
to take an interest in a discipline focused on the suffering of the psyche.  The changes began 
with her father’s death in 1900, adding to the family’s financial burden.  In the wake of his 
death Emile was quickly married, Melanie quit her plans to pursue medicine and was 
engaged, Emanuel quit his studies and departed for Vienna to live his last two years, and 
Libussa’s attempts to control the members of her family put Melanie in the middle of power 
conflicts and resentment between Libussa, Emanuel, and Emile.  Added to the burden of 
mediating these conflicts and suffering their passive-aggressive abuses, Melanie was 
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embarking on a loveless marriage to the wrong man, which she seems to have known as 
soon as they were engaged. 
 Emilie married a young doctor named Leo in December 1900.  Libussa had the 
young couple move into the Reizes’ flat, and compelled Leo to assume Moriz’s dental 
practice despite his own reluctance.  As Leo assumed Moriz’s place to provide financially for 
the family, Emilie became a substitute for the life Libussa so eagerly wanted to leave behind: 
the home-bound wife and mother of a financially unsuccessful doctor-become-dentist, 
confined to a cramped flat.  Emilie resented this and occasionally her envy was subtly 
expressed to Melanie in their correspondence: 
When I read your vivid letter I could hardly suppress certain sadness.  Not that I am 
jealous; you know that I have no strong inclination for traveling, although I would 
not object to it if the opportunity presented itself. … And I do almost get jealous of 
your talent for expressing so beautifully everything you have seen.  Well, that’s an old 
story, and it tells you that there is hardly anybody else who loves you as I do. … 
Then it is spring again, and it draws her [their mother] to her beloved Rosenberg’s 
[Melanie’s in-law’s] and its over with Emilie, Leo, and Otto! [Emilie’s son]  Why does 
she neglect us so?” (Quoted in Grosskurth, p. 45) 
 
 Meanwhile, Emanuel had been traveling when his father died.  His health had 
deteriorated, apparently due to tuberculosis, to the point that he became convinced that his 
death was quickly approaching.  In early 1900 he transferred from the medical school to the 
Faculty of Arts to pursue writing.  Soon after he withdrew from school altogether and with a 
small allowance provided by Libussa, he was able to travel, write, and “seek lands of sun and 
beauty in the traditional pattern of the dying artist.” (Ibid., p.18).  Yet his departure was an 
auspicious occasion for Libussa who wanted to move Emile and Leo into their flat.  In fact, 
just three days after her husband’s death Libussa wrote a letter to Emanuel describing her 
plan, written with enough detail to suggest that it was a well thought out plan in advance 
even though her tone is one of sharing a new surprise.  As Grosskurth explains, his 
romanticized escape may have felt more like an exile:  “Emanuel, in his quest for sun and 
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creativity, brooded constantly on the pittance he was given for an allowance … His dead 
father’s clothes were made over for him, another one of the grievances he was accumulating, 
particularly as he saw the finery bestowed upon his sister [Emilie’s trousseau]” (Ibid., p. 20) 
 Emanuel also disliked Libussa’s increasing emotional and financial focus on Melanie, 
including her dowry, as it diminished both the money and affection he received.  He dislike 
the prospect of her marriage to Arthur – even though it was his endorsement that led 
Melanie to accept the engagement – because it meant that he would have a rival for her 
attention.  Not only did he seem to write letters that preyed upon Melanie’s anxieties about 
her pending marriage and his pending death to secure money from her, he acted like a lover 
who starts a fight with the beloved to test his or her dependence by threatening withdrawal.  
Such a letter of Emanuel’s drew the following response from Melanie: 
But perhaps it is because you are so far away now that I feel so driven to ask you for 
your confidence.  I would, with regard to you, be so much calmer, if I knew that I 
could share everything with you that concerns you … you will never find a more 
loyal friend and person who understands you better than I.  Let me be your 
confidante, and be convinced it will be reciprocal! (Quoted in Grosskurth, 1986, p. 
33).  
 
Apparently her letter is what he wanted.  Emanuel responded to her reply by proclaiming 
that Melanie and Libussa were the true loves of his life and decrying her use of the word 
“friend” instead of “brother”. 
 In addition to using the allowance he received from Melanie and Libussa for 
legitimate expenses, Emanuel spent it on gambling, morphine, cocaine, and other vices.  
Emanuel was in Genoa when he died.  His corpse was found on an April afternoon in 1902 
by a hotelkeeper.  A short card was found, written to Melanie, which complained about the 
“scantiness” of her last letter to him, which he blamed for putting him in a bad mood! (Ibid., 
p. 36).  About a year later on March 31, 1903, Melanie Reizes became Mrs. Melanie Klein, 
and in just under a year she bore her first child, Melitta, in January 1904. 
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 In Klein’s own words, “I threw myself as much as I could into motherhood and 
interest in my child.  I knew all the time that I was not happy, but saw no way out” (quoted 
in Grosskurth, p. 42).  However, the distraction of motherhood could not wholly cover a 
gnawing sense of unhappiness, caught at the intersection of pressures from her mother’s 
impositions, the growing “weakness of [Melanie’s] nerves” and depression, as alluded to in 
correspondence, her unrelenting grief over Emanuel’s death, and the pressure to sacrifice her 
own interests and social life to follow a distant husband as he advanced his career.   
While marriage often means a further separation from the influence of one’s parents, 
for Melanie it came to mean the opposite: the history of her short marriage shows the 
increasing intrusion of a controlling mother as Melanie’s own mental health deteriorates: “By 
May 1909 her fits of weeping and despair had reached such a point that she went to a 
sanatorium in Chur, Switzerland, for two and a half months …” (Ibid, p. 56).  As happened 
during Melanie’s many other departures from home to recuperate, Libussa assumed control 
of the Klein home, which had increased by one two-year old named Hans, born in 1907.  
While Libussa’s willingness to take parental responsibilities from Melanie may seem like the 
support of a caring mother, it should be kept in mind that Libussa’s correspondence 
suggests that she herself engineered some of Melanie’s absences and used them to escape 
from Emile’s household in Vienna.  Grosskurth writes: 
It is a chilling conclusion that Libussa did not want her daughter to be happy, that 
she did not want her to find fulfillment, and that she begrudged her the enjoyments 
of which she herself had been deprived when she was young.  One remembers that 
when Melanie was a small girl her mother had told her that she was a surprise – that 
is, unwanted.  It is not at all unlikely that she was subtly emphasizing that no man 
could ever love her, either her father, her husband, or anyone else.  Perhaps it was 
Libussa herself who had told her that Emile was her favorite.  Libussa had been in 
fierce competition with Melanie over Emanuel [Melanie’s brother].  According to 
Libussa, Arthur [Melanie’s husband] blossomed when she was away, the children 
were much better off without her, and her own mother needed the absence in order 
to achieve serenity.  Melanie was a pampered object, not a loved daughter, but a lap 
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dog, who had been taught to sit up and beg and to lie down passively. (Grosskurth, 
1986, pp. 57-58). 
 
 Perhaps the contrast between this depiction of the relationship between Melanie and 
Libussa with the one cited above (p. 32) can be reconciled through one of Klein own 
memories.  Regarding her sister Sidonie’s death at the age of eight, Klein comments in her 
autobiography, “I have a feeling that I never entirely got over the feeling of grief for her 
death.  I also suffered under the grief my mother showed, whereas my father was more 
controlled.  I remember that I felt that my mother needed me all the more now that Sidonie 
was gone, and it is probable that my spoiling was due to my having replaced that child 
(quoted in Grosskurth, 1986, p. 15).  Where Klein remembers the “spoiling” as having been 
due to becoming a substitute, it seems she does not remember the cost of that spoiling: 
feeling unwanted as a unique person, a failure unless she lived up to expectations designed 
for someone else.  Both Libussa and Klein’s brother Emanuel tended to treat others a s plugs 
to fill a hole of loss within themselves, perhaps leaving Klein with an “unsatisfied longing for 
an understanding without words …  [a] sense of loneliness and derives from the depressive 
feeling of an irretrievable loss” as she would later describe the sense of loneliness (Klein, 
1963, p. 301).  In the case of Melanie and her mother, it was a loss of autonomy, acceptance 
and approval, which foreshadowed her controversial (aggressive?) rise and aspirations within 
the psychoanalytic community.  This sense of “not measuring up” may be one factor that 
predisposed Melanie to strive for excellence and renown, dovetailing with what Grosskurth 
described as competitive family dynamics. 
 Saddled with a yearning for a self free of an oppressive future, Melanie was able to 
persuade Arthur to move the family (now including Libussa) from the stifling provincial 
town where they lived to Budapest in the winter of 1909.  Meanwhile she had befriended an 
older woman, Klara, who became a confidant, ally and source of confidence and inspiration 
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to assert her dominance in the Klein household.  Not surprisingly, it was during this period 
that Libussa suffered the “breakdown” and was sent away to recuperate. “On September 18, 
1911, in a letter to Melanie, Libussa expressed relief that Melanie’s health seemed much 
improved.  She also proposed to ask Klara to go shopping with her to advise her on 
purchases for the children.  Libussa was beginning to realize that she was no longer 
indispensable” (Ibid, p. 59).  Melanie’s recovery was to last until 1914, a year that would 
radically alter the course of her life. 
 In July of 1914 her last child Erich was born.  By October Libussa had become ill, 
dramatically loosing weight, which suggested to Klein she had cancer.  Klein nursed her 
mother during her rapid decline in health until her last week of life.  Libussa died on 
November 6, 1914.  And (coincidentally?) according to Klein’s autobiography, it was “about 
1914” that she read Freud’s paper On Dreams and knew, “that that was what I was aiming 
at, at least during those years when I was so very keen to find what would satisfy me 
intellectually and emotionally.  I entered into analysis with Ferenczi, who was the most 
outstanding Hungarian analyst” (quoted in Grosskurth, p. 69). 
When Klein entered analysis with Ferenczi she suffered from acute depression 
exacerbated by the death of her mother.  She was also struggling with a growing 
dissatisfaction in her marriage and resentment toward Arthur.  Her divorce – finalized 
around 1925 – was precipitated by growing anti-Semitism in Hungary in the wake of the 
First World War, since it forced the Klein’s to leave Budapest.  In 1919, the year of her first 
psychoanalytic presentation and acceptance into the Hungarian psychoanalytic society, 
Arthur and Melanie separated.  Arthur moved to Sweden where he secured employment, and 
later, citizenship.  Melanie and the children returned to her in-laws’ in Rosenberg (renamed 
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Ruzomberok by the new government) until 1920, when she moved to Berlin to pursue a new 
life as a single mother determined to forge a career in psychoanalysis. 
From Crisis to Career 
Accordingly, it is mistaken to view the Kleinian infant as a destructive, schizoid 
being, because he uses aggressive defenses for a purpose, and only becomes 
habituated to them in the event of undue suffering and anxiety.  And yet, even with 
this thinking, there is no complacency in Klein’s vision.  Her infant never becomes 
an ideal heroic fighter against environmental privations or ill treatment.  He 
remains a tragic being, and himself creates some of the worst obstacles to his own 
development.  This becomes especially evident in Klein’s last major paper, her 1957 
work on primary envy.  (Likerman, 2001, p. 170) 
 
Klein’s development as a psychoanalytic pioneer was influenced by two 
psychoanalyst-mentors, Sandor Ferenczi and Karl Abraham. (Caper, 2000; Grosskurth, 1986; 
Kristeva, 2001, Likerman, 2001 #48)  Melanie Klein developed her ideas and expanded the 
field of psychoanalysis with their tutelage, as her personal analysts and teachers, to become 
what Kristeva calls “the boldest reformer in the history of modern psychoanalysis” (2001, p. 
16).  These reforms were made possible by her invention of the “play technique” and its 
theoretical and practical implications during her analysis of her own son Erich, known as 
“Fritz” in The development of a child (Klein, 1921/1975). 
The following is a summary of the “play technique” based on three of her papers 
(Klein, 1926/1975; Klein, 1932; Klein, 1955/1975) First, “it was always part of my technique 
not to use educative or moral influence, but to keep to the psycho-analytic procedure only, 
which, to put it in a nutshell, consists in understanding the patient’s mind and in conveying 
to him what goes on in it” (Klein, 1955/1975, p. 129).  Second, this “conveying” occurred in 
the form of interpretations that were spoken in terms the child understood, that were (third) 
offered from the beginning of the first session and geared towards the level where the child’s 
anxiety was the most active.  However, the graphic and bizarre nature of her interpretations 
40 
 
have led detractors of her approach have accused Kleinian, and particularly Melanie Klein, of 
making ‘wild’ interpretations, particularly when it came to the things she said to her child 
patients.  Likerman characterizes it this way: 
Technique is psychoanalysis is obviously intimately related to the theory that gives 
rise to it, and with Melanie Klein this is no exception.  Her forthright technique, 
based on what she called deep interpretations, consisted in addressing the child’s 
unconscious mind directly, hence talking immediately about the hidden symbolic 
meaning of his play.  This was done without fi rst addressing the child’s conscious 
frame of mind and own version of what his game meant.  This technique still comes 
across as blunt because, as initially described by Klein, it appears to bypass the child’s 
conscious participation in the process of exploration, and so trespass uninvited into 
the child’s unconscious mind…. Klein’s intention was not to barge into her child 
patient’s mind, but to reach its more inaccessible crevices on the basis of carefully 
judged and fully contextualized observations. (2001, p. 49).   
 
 Fourth, one way Klein inferred what was happening in her patient’s minds was on 
the basis of “contextualized observations” – what occurred between the child and herself in 
the immediacy of their ongoing relationship.  In the jargon, her focus was the 
TRANSFERENCE understood as the child’s whole experience of the analysis (and the 
analyst) in the present as the reiteration of the child’s unconscious phantasy originating in his 
or her infantile anxiety situations.  Thus, her interpretations emphasized the present 
transference as related to earlier situations.  With adults one makes use of reconstructions, 
whereas with children their conflicts are “directly represented” through their play.  Thus, 
play became the means for gaining access to the child’s unconscious thoughts as free 
association was used when working with adults: 
Take for instance, the case of Ruth who, as an infant, had gone hungry for some 
time because her mother had little milk to feed her.  At the age of four years and 
three months, when playing with the washbasin, she called the water-tap a milk-tap.  
She declared that milk was running into mouths (the holes of the waste-pipe), but 
that only a very little was flowing.  This unsatisfied oral desire made its appearance in 
countless games and showed itself in her whole attitude, For instance, she asserted 
she was poor, that she only had one coat, and that she had very little to eat – none of 
these statements being in the least accordance with reality. (Klein, 1926/1975, p.136) 
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 This quote also indicates a fifth characteristic of the play technique: that that content 
of the interpretations was derived from the symbolic meanings of the child’s play within the 
context of the child’s relation with the analyst.   Through the use of this technique, first with 
children and then with adults, Klein:  
aroused a good deal of controversy, she assumed from the outset that a child analysis 
was to be conducted in exactly the same way as an adult one – except that the 
analysis of verbal associations was to be supplemented by the analysis of play.  She 
assumed that the transference was possible, observed that a super-ego, though a 
more rudimentary one, was present, and believed that no moral or educative pressure 
was to be exerted by the analyst.  In other words, she adopted Freud’s transference 
analysis both for adults and for children; and if she later introduced any changes at all 
these were in the direction of purer transference analysis, her role becoming more 
and more confined to interpretation.  A characteristic which was perhaps the most 
specific for her technique was that, from the beginning, she always gave preference 
to the interpretation of unconscious anxiety based on unconscious phantasy 
wherever she could see it – even when the first results of this appeared to be an 
increase in anxiety (Introductory remarks of R.E. Money-Kyrle in Klein, 1975) 
 
 What was particularly controversial and disturbing for some about Klein’s ideas and 
technique involved the counterintuitive implications of her work, specifically the intense and 
graphic nature of the aggressive phantasies that she ascribed to infants and children as the 
cause of pathogenic anxiety and therefore pathological symptoms.  Consider Klein’ s 
description of the case of Trude: 
I will now turn to consider the content and the causes of these early feelings of guilt 
by reference to another case.  Trude, aged three years and nine months, repeatedly 
played ‘make believe’ in her analysis that it was nighttime and that we were both 
asleep.  She then used to come softly over to me from the opposite corner of the 
room (which was supposed to be her own bedroom) and threaten me in various 
ways, such as that she was going to stab me in the throat, throw me out the window, 
burn me up, take me to the police, etc.  She would want to tie up my hands and feet, 
or she would lift up the rug on the sofa and say she was doing ‘Po—Kaki—Kuki’.  
This … meant that she wanted to look inside her mother’s bottom for the ‘Kakis’ 
(faeces), which signified children to her.  On another occasion she wanted to hit me 
in the stomach and declared that she was taking out my ‘A—A’s’ (stool) and was 
making me poor.  She then seized the cushions, which she repeatedly called children, 
and hid herself with them behind the sofa.  There she crouched in the corner with an 
intense expression of fear, covered herself up, sucked her fingers and wetted herself.  
She used to repeat this whole process whenever she made an attack on me.  It 
corresponds in every detail with the way she had behaved in bed when, at a time 
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when she was not yet two, she started to have severe night terrors.  At that time, too, 
she had run into her parents’ bedroom again and again at night without being able to 
say what it was she wanted.  By analyzing her wetting and dirtying herself, which 
stood for attacks on her parents copulating with each other, the symptoms were 
removed.  Trude had wanted to rob her pregnant mother of her children, to kill her 
and to take her place in coitus with her father.  She was two years old when her sister 
was born.  It was those impulses of hatred and aggression which, in her second year, 
had given rise to an increasingly strong fixation upon her mother and to a severe 
anxiety and sense of guilt which found expression, among other things, in her night 
terrors.  (Klein, 1955/1975, p. 5) 
 
 Ultimately, the recurrent presence of aggressive phantasies directed at the destruction 
of the parents, a parent, or a part of the parent, led Klein to believe she had found empirical 
evidence of Freud’s death drive Thanatos.  Specifically, the earliest manifestation of this 
drive was figured as constitutional ENVY, the urge to destroy difference and change by 
destroying the differentiator that causes it.  This begins with the mother’s breast as its first 
object, occasioned by the painful frustrations of weaning.  In a state of hunger the infant 
wants milk but there is not any there; there is a difference between what it wants and what it 
has.  This difference is hated and the angry infant blames the breast for causing it.  The 
infant wants to destroy the “withholding breast” and the milk he or she wants inside it.  The 
infant has a grievance over his or her dependence.  In the case of Trude, described above, it 
was no longer her mother’s breast that she envied but her mother’s womb that she wanted 
to destroy by greedily devouring what the mother had but Trude did not – special objects of 
her father’s desire.  However, this hatred was attributed to terrifying imaginary characters at 
night.  Trude’s anxiety of death was anxiety over her own aggression and its ramifications. 
 Either too much constitutional envy (aggression), inadequate mothering to help the 
youngster deal with painful experiences (which also gives rise to envy), or some combination 
of the two, will impair development of the capacities to love, feel secure, and have a sense of 
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confidence and autonomy, since this aggression that has been unmitigated remains a source 
of self-destructiveness:  
In contrast with the infant who, owing to his envy, has been unable to build securely 
a good internal object, a child with a strong capacity for love and gratitude has a 
deep-rooted relation with a good object and can, without being fundamentally 
damaged, withstand temporary states of envy, hatred, and grievance, which arise 
even in children who are loved and well mothered.   Thus, when these negative states 
are transient, the good object is regained time and time again.  This is an essential 
factor in establishing it and in laying the foundations of stability and a strong ego.  In 
the course of development, the relation to the mother’s breast becomes the 
foundation for devotion to people, values, and causes, and thus some of the love 
which was originally experienced for the primal object is absorbed … the feeling of 
having injured and destroyed the primal object impairs the individual’s trust in the 
sincerity of his later relations and makes him doubt his capacity for love and 
goodness. (Klein, 1957/1997, pp. 187-189) 
 
Klein’s work as a whole testifies that she wanted a complicated picture to account 
for the person’s inability to deal with life’s hardships – not just an overly simplistic account 
that blames the environment on the one side or the person on the other.  Her account of 
envy straddles this opposition by accounting for two innate factors that cannot be easily 
differentiated.  One is that the person is born with too much constitutional anti-life force.  
However, this is related to the second, one is born with too weak an ego to deal with the 
same amount of destructiveness that everyone else is born with.  In either case these factors 
contribute to the person’s ability to handle deprivations in their dependency on others and 
the world.  Anxiety is the result of feeling unable to cope with the vicissitudes of having and 
not having what one expects. 
For Klein the capacity to tolerate anxiety and deal with it in the most adaptive way by 
strengthening one’s attachments to depended upon others, depends upon the firm 
establishment of a good object in the ego, the sense that the self is sturdy, creative, safe and 
capable of recreating security and love in the face of events that show these necessities of life 
are missing.  In other words, externally viewed, the good in the world can be lost because it 
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can and will be recreated; internally viewed, one can tolerate one’s shortcomings and 
acknowledge one’s flaws without disproportionate anxiety because the loss of the sense of 
the good in one’s self (i.e., guilt) is also temporary and can be reversed by the self (i.e., 
reparation).   
While it is beyond the scope of this study to fully explicate the complexity of Klein’s 
metapsychology, the point of examining envy is that Klein shifted the definition of analysis 
by articulating a feature of every patient to some extent or another in terms of the anxiety of 
destruction that is built into the person and the importance of analyzing the patient’s self-
destructive tendencies as they manifest themselves in the transference anxiety: 
This leads me to a conclusion regarding technique.  During an analysis the 
psychoanalyst often appears as an idealized figure.  Idealization is used as a defense 
against persecutory anxiety and is its corollary.  If the analyst allows excessive 
idealization to persist – that is to say if he relies mostly on the positive transference – 
he may, it is true, be able to bring about some improvement.  The same, however, 
could be said of any successful psychotherapy.  It is only by analyzing the negative as well 
as the positive transference that anxiety is reduced at its root.  (Klein, 1950/1975, pp. 46-
47, emphasis in original) 
 
Analyzing the negative transference is crucial because as it is traced it will lead to examining 
the patient’s difficulties dealing with deprivation and the habitual ways of not understanding 
and relating they have used to avoid this unavoidable element of any significant relationship.  
Stated differently, beginning with Klein but extending beyond her as the Kleinian tradition 
has expanded, the focus on the deepest source of anxiety has resulted in concepts and 
techniques for examining how a patient’s habitual ways of relating are used to avoid the 
recognition and understanding of the painful aspects of experience. 
Because Klein understood anxiety, that conduit of pleasure, more deeply than 
anyone else, she turned psychoanalysis into the art of caring for the capacity for 
thought.  Attentive to the death drive that Freud had already incorporated into 
psychic life … Klein considered the death drive to be the primary agent for our 
distress, but also – and especially – for our capacity to become creatures of 
symbols….  Under what conditions are the anxieties that tear us apart amenable to 
symbolization?  That is the question that Klein uses as she reformulates the analytic 
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problem, a question that places her work – unwittingly so since she was most notably 
a courageous clinician and in no way a “master of thought” – at the heart of 
humanity and the modern crisis of culture.  (Kristeva, 2001, p. 14) 
 
A story of Induction 
  
As in the case of biographies on Klein, there have been several works within the 
psychoanalytic literature that explicate how her pioneering work has developed beyond her 
into what has been called neo, contemporary, and even post-Kleinianism.11  These texts 
emphasize the evolution of her basic tenants such as the DEPRESSIVE POSITION, 
PARANOID/SCHIZOID POSITION, SPLITTING, PROJECTIVE 
IDENTIFICATION, INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION, PHANTASY through the 
work of her protégées and those who have studied under them, as well as new concepts and 
techniques that they have developed (cf., Caper, 2000; Hinshelwood, 1994; Mitchell & Black, 
1995; Ruszczynski & Johnson, 1999; Sayers, 2000; Schafer, 1997; Spillius, 1988a; Spillius, 
1988b).  Since many of these concepts will be introduced and explained in the context of the 
session to be studied in the following chapters, they will not be explicated here.  This 
section, then, provides a segue to the rest of the study by describing how the author was 
introduced and became involved in the Kleinian tradition. 
 Competence is an “anxiety arousing area for the novice therapist,” as Teyber(1992) 
understated, and probably most clinicians remember.  It has been argued that a central 
feature of anxiety is the ability of the anxiety-provoking situation to “reveal affectively to the 
individual his/her now uncertain power to realize his/her projects and self understandings” 
(Fischer, 1982, p. 75).  Training in clinical psychology offers many venues for facing one’s 
                                                 
11  To date the author has not found a definitive source that differentiates the terms neo, contemporary or 
post-Kleiniansim.   
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abilities in an uncertain light, and one’s sense of one’s self put into question.  “What am I 
doing?” “What just happened in there?”  “Did I do it right?” – whether “it” refers to 
psychotherapeutic interventions, paper presentations, lectures delivered to undergraduates, 
or written reports.  Throughout the first few years of clinical work to become a psychologist 
there are moments of feeling a sense of greater competence, reaching a moment of clarity 
and slightly altered perspective.  Then, self-doubt and confusion set in again.  Learning to be 
a therapist is more akin to dancing on carpet than a vertical climb: each shuffle stirring static 
anxiety we discharge on those around us.  During fleeting moments of savoring pride, we 
may reflect and smile to ourselves,  “I think I’ve finally gotten it.” But what has been gained 
and how are the changes to be understood?   
During the first two years of supervised clinical training I struggled to integrate 
theory and practice to develop my sense of confidence and competence.  The first year was 
strange.  I felt more like a fraud than a therapist – that while I was trying out the role of a 
therapist the identity of a therapist did not yet fit with my sense of who I was.   I did not feel 
I had a coherent way to think and speak about my cases, let alone supervise and guide myself 
through the course of treatment, which I believed being able to integrate theory a nd practice 
would allow.  I had a vocabulary of technical concepts, but I did not have a way to discern if 
what the client was doing and saying was an example of one of these concepts.  Even more 
distressing was the realization that I did not have a way to discern whether what I was doing 
was an example of one of these concepts.   My professor would ask, “Why did you do that?”  
I would think to myself, “How should I know why, I’m not sure what it is you’ve noticed 
I’ve done!”   I wanted a language for understanding my clinical experiences – not to naively 
try and fit the client into a box, but to empower myself to be able to learn from texts that 
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used these concepts and employ the theory to help deepen my relationship with my clients 
and provide more effective interventions. 
While having been exposed to several theoretical orientations, the one I became 
most interested in pursuing was object-relations theory.  During my third year of doctoral 
work I was required to be supervised by a licensed psychologist practicing in the 
metropolitan area.  The department had a list of several psychologists who had been working 
with the department under individual contracts as adjunct faculty.  Near the end of my 
second year of training, I learned that two of these adjunct faculty supervisors were 
resigning.  I saw an opportunity and received permission to contact Dr. R and asked her to 
supervise my work for the following year.  
I became interested in working with Dr. R after hearing secondhand tales of her 
group supervision and staff presentations on working with personality disorders to the 
community mental health center where I had been working for twelve months.  A “yes but 
no” refrain characterized the other therapists’ reactions to her work and her style:  “I was 
really impressed by the level of insight, but I could never say things like that to my clients – 
they’d leave the room!”  “It’s amazing . . . But she’s too direct for me;”  “I’m sure she’d 
make you work hard as a supervisor, but she’s not for the faint-hearted.”  Who was this 
woman who drew such strongly ambivalent reactions from professional clinicians?   My 
sense was that Dr. R was one of those people whose direct manner can put-off some people, 
yet they couldn’t completely dislike her because on some level they liked and respected what 
she had to say.  All I knew at the time was that she had been trained by James Masterson, 
earning certificates in the practice and supervision of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and was 
currently on the faculty of the Masterson Institute for psychoanalytic psychotherapy.  It was 
not until I started supervision that I learned, she had been supervised for six years by 
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Alberto Pieczanski, MD., a Kleinian analyst trained at the Tavistock and Portman Clinics 
and a member of the  British Psychoanalytic Society – supervision that she continues to this 
day.  
Perhaps what appealed to me about this was that I still felt frustration about the 
quality of my work.  I believed I hadn’t harmed any of my clients, but I wasn’t sure I had 
helped them either, let alone be able to critique and redirect my work on my own.  
Retrospectively, I was frustrated that a broad exposure to different therapy schools left me 
without a solid foundation from which to evaluate the relative merits or demerits of the 
different schools of thought and practice.  It’s like the difference between deciding to 
become a martial artist but instead of picking one martial art and devoting years to its 
mastery you train for two years in Judo, two years in Karate, and two years in Kung Fu, and 
then believe you’re a martial artist of six years.  Well, you may be in the sense you can 
practice a little of each, but you’re not going to be able to handle the challenges that a person 
who has spent six years studying one of them will be able to, let alone handle them with the 
grace and artistry that only comes with focused discipline.   
From reading object-relations theory and examples of its clinical application, I had 
come to appreciate it for its conceptual complexity and clinical application for the treatment 
of persons struggling with what are known as the “personality disorders.”  I had developed 
an interest in working with people who struggled with personality issues, but I did not feel 
equipped to work with the unique challenges these clients present.  In short, after two years 
of clinical work I did not feel as though I had a good enough grasp on what I was doing, nor 
how to monitor, learn, and grow more independently as a clinician.  So I thought Dr. R 
might be the right person to supervise my work. 
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“Since we have never met before, what happens if after working together for a while 
you decide to change your mind?”  Dr. R asked, having heard my request and a description 
of the university’s contract.  I told her that the only time I had been angered by a supervisor 
or professor’s ego was when it got in the way of doing the work, and that that was the only 
way I could see things becoming a problem.  We next spoke three or four months later to 
schedule our first meeting.  
I began thinking about this study in the context of my excitement and enthusiasm 
about working with Dr. R: using her suggestions in the treatment of my clients, noticing how 
things changed in the treatment, and noticing the interest of fellow students when I told 
stories about my experience.  After discussing with some of my fellow students her 
supervisory style and some of the Kleinian techniques and conceptual terms I had been 
learning, I decided I wanted to study “what was happening” in my sessions in some way as a 
result of my supervision.   
The following chapters employ an interpretive methodology to articulate “what was 
happening” in one session with one patient after two years of supervision with Dr. R, 
participation in my own psychotherapy, and readings in Klein and contemporary Kleinians 
who: 
differ from Klein in their de-emphasizing and deferring detailed reconstructions of 
early developmental history.  They prefer instead to stay, for as long as possible, 
close to, almost fixed to, the shifts of unconscious fantasy in the here-and-now 
clinical situation and most of all the transference. … These Kleinians further differ 
from Melanie Klein in their emphasis on induced countertransference as an 
invaluable form of communication or least a source of information.  Specifically, 
they try to understand countertransference in terms of projective identification, that 
is, the analysands’s unconsciously allocating to the analyst negative or positive 
aspects of his or her own self or other internal objects in order to get rid of them, 
use them for the control of others, or protect them from internal destructiveness … 
these Kleinians no longer [unlike Klein] consistently or prominently emphasize 
bodily organs as primitively conceived part objects representing total relationships 
(e.g., the devouring breast).  They focus much more on what might be called organ 
modes such as taking in or emptying out, and also on functions such as thinking, 
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understanding, connecting, and remembering.  In general, they use terms that 
correspond closely to conventional experience in human relationships, such as hope, 
despair, dependency, denial, and idealization.  Additionally, they no longer engage in rapid-
fire, symbol-laden interpretations of whatever manifest content comes their way, 
being rather measured in the speed and quantity of their interpretations, as well as 
oriented toward gathering immediate evidence on which to base each aspect of their 
interventions.  They favor “showing” over “telling” what’s what … these Kleinians 
seem to find signs of transference in everything, I shall discuss next this way of 
looking at events in the analytic session.  In order to do so, it will be necessary to 
take up as well countertransference, projective identification, containment … for 
these concepts are intertwined with here-and-now transference analysis.  (Schafer, 
1997, pp. 4-5, emphasis in original) 
 
Likewise, the following chapters aim to examine and articulate “this way of looking at 
events” from the perspective of a novice who has been intent on learning and integrating it 
with his own practice of psychotherapy even though it is not psychoanalysis.  If the 
following interpretive analysis is successful, the reader who is not familiar with the technical 
jargon in the quote above, will, by the end of the dissertation, be able to understand the 
distinctions Schafer is making.  For the reader who is familiar with the technical terminology, 
my hope is that by the end of the dissertation my work bears some resemblance to what 
Schafer is describing. 
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3.  The feed 
 
With regard to the symbolic level, the interpreter has to deal with implicit, deep-
seated ontological assumptions held by the subject she investigates.  These 
assumptions provide a “horizon of intelligibility” for an infinite number of possible 
utterances and applications that are open to subjects within the realm of a specific 
symbolic order. Thus, the target of critical interpretation is this existing “ground of 
possibility” that makes specific beliefs and convictions look rationally acceptable to 
the subjects themselves.   Kögler (1996, p. 259) 
 
In their developed forms, phantasy thinking and reality thinking are distinct mental 
processes, different modes of obtaining satisfaction.  The fact that they have a 
distinct character when fully developed, however, does not necessarily imply that 
reality-thinking operates quite independently of unconscious phantasy … In our 
view, reality-thinking cannot operate without concurrent and supporting 
unconscious phantasies; e.g., we continue to ‘take things in’ with our ears, to ‘devour’ 
with our eyes, to ‘read, mark, learn and inwardly digest’, throughout life. 
     These conscious metaphors represent unconscious psychic reality.  It is a familiar 
fact that all early learning is based upon oral impulses.  The first seeking and 
mouthing and grasping of the breast is gradually shifted to other objects, the hand 
and eye only slowly gaining independence of the mouth, as instruments of 
exploration and of knowing the outer world. …  Perception and intelligence draw 
upon this source of libido for their life and growth.  Hand and eye retain an oral 
significance throughout life, in unconscious phantasy and often, as we have seen, in 
conscious metaphor.  (Isaacs, 1952, pp. 108-109) 
 
 Imagine a home where there is a baby and his mother.  The baby is on a feeding 
schedule and around the time he is due for his next feeding he starts to move and sound in 
such a way that the mother turns to you, her friend, and says, “oh, he’s cranky, he must be 
hungry.  Let me get his bottle ready.”  The mother gets everything ready and sits down to 
feed him, talking to him the whole time as if he understands what she is saying.   She burps 
him, returns to you at the table and continues your conversation while intermittently turning 
to him to keep him entertained.  This vignette is not surprising.  Everything seems 
completely plausible.  Yet what may seem odd is to characterize it as an example of 
Foucault’s definition of power relations: relations where actions act on the actions of the 
participants to influence or shape their experience and subsequent behavior. (cf., Foucault, 
1982, p. 220).  Of course the power relations are asymmetrical since the baby 
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is utterly dependent on his mother for all of his survival requirements, whereas she has other 
sources and resources at her disposal for securing her own. 
 This is one way that the therapeutic interaction of CKPP “is a feeding on the model 
of a baby and its mother” as Dr. R had told me time and again.  It is viewed as an 
asymmetrical relationship where the patient is dependent on the therapist’s specialized 
practices and understanding to examine what he or she needs and is unable to provide for 
him or herself – hence, the reason the patient ends up seeking a therapist.  There are other 
similarities as well.  The times of these feedings are regular – if it were a psychoanalysis they 
would repeat daily at the same time, four or five days a week.  Third, the feedings are 
focused on the requirements of the patient and the therapist’s role is to figure out the 
requirements with the patient and provide them within that role, which, as Segal writes “is 
confined to interpreting the patient’s material, and all criticism, advise, encouragement, 
reassurance, and the like, is rigorously avoided” (Segal, 1981, p. 3).  Fourth, the setting of the 
feeding is set up so the patient, like the baby, is made to feel as comfortable and secure as 
possible – a feeding baby is spared anxieties about being dropped, for example, while feeding  
(the mother holds the baby so all he or she has to focus on is the experience of feeding, as it 
were.).  Likewise, the patient is assured that the room within which the feeding occurs is free 
of outside distractions, including privacy concerns so he or she can focus on purpose of 
their visit.  
Finally, there is the expectation that what the patient and therapist do together is 
based on how they understand what each other is doing.  The mother’s actions depend on 
how she interpreted his sounds and gestures – his communications.  Her interpretation that 
“he’s cranky.  He must be hungry…” is made possible by a backdrop of understanding, her 
preunderstanding that “is internally differentiated into a symbolic sphere of basic beliefs and 
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assumptions [of what constitutes baby reality], a practical sphere of acquired habits and 
practices [how she’s learned to handle feeding], and a subjective sphere that reflects 
biographical events and experiences [he likes to be held this way and not that]”. (Kögler, 
1996, p. 251).   But can the same be said of the infant’s actions?  In what sense can an infant 
be said to have a preunderstanding?  Is not the infant’s “relief” and “pleasure” after feeding 
just a physiological reflex?  Can it be characterized as an understanding?  Within the Kleinian 
tradition, the answer to that question is an unequivocal yes.  The baby is born with an 
apparatus (a PRIMITIVE or early EGO) for understanding what the mother does through 
his or her experience of the mother and a repertoire of “practices” (called PHANTASIES) 
for dealing with its ongoing developing set of basic beliefs and assumptions about his or 
herself, the mother, and the world (called OBJECT RELATIONS).  Moreover, the set of 
basic assumptions of the Kleinian tradition includes the beliefs that these infantile practices 
persist through adult hood, informing or shaping the person’s sense of who they are and 
what constitutes reality between people, particularly the painful realities that motivate people 
to come into therapy.12   
 The following analysis shows that CKPP is a kind of critical hermeneutics in so far as 
critical hermeneutics:  
…undertakes to lay out a concept of reflexivity-in-interpretation that allows the 
individual to distance herself from the taken-for-granted background of symbolic 
assumptions and social practices.  The critical practice of self-distanciation is to bring 
about a heightened sense of self-understanding, and enlightened insight into usually 
hidden linkages between symbolic relations and social networks of power.  Such 
critical practice aims at a reflexive understanding of the usually unnoticed 
implications of meaning in the reproduction of social power mechanisms. 
(ibid., pp.251-252) 
 
                                                 
12  As Segal writes regarding a primary difference between classical Freudian technique and Kleinian technique: 
“All the patient’s communications in the session are viewed as containing an element of unconscious phantasy, 
though they may seem concerned with incontrovertible external facts” (Segal, 1981, p. 8) 
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In this citation, Kögler is referring to “social networks of power” in the sense of macro 
social networks that regulate entire cultures or subcultures.  However, social relations of 
power exist at the level of two people, like the mother and the infant and the patient and the 
therapist.  The way CKPP employs “reflexivity-in-practice” that allows the patient to self-
distanciate is through the communicative behavior of the therapist; the therapist performs it, 
embodies it – feeds it to the patient as a practice by making assertions about the patient’s 
sense of herself as she experiences her interaction with the therapist, providing an occasion 
for her to notice how she participates in constructing and relating the identities that structure 
her experience.  In other words, by communicating as a certain kind of Other, the patient 
has the opportunity to gain potentially emancipatory insights into him or herself.  In 
Kögler’s language, “With the loss of the Cartesian and Hegelian subject, the other becomes 
the point of departure for critical insights into the self” (p. 252). 
 Specifically, the analysis below shows how the author, as therapist and novice of 
CKPP, communicated or “fed” such “critical insights” to the patient, Mrs. P, about herself.  
The “insights” are sightings/citations of alterity, which ultimately raised the saliency of a 
fearful voice that belongs to a dying orphan-self, which, ironically, perpetuates its 
orphanness (self-understanding/experience) through employing a practice of power – 
deflecting speech practices to distance the Other.  The how of this citation making is broken 
down into three aspects: the setting or ‘scene’ of the feeding, ‘the food,’ and the manner or 
approach of ‘the feeding’ – how it was adjusted for consumption.  While all three of these 
aspects were operative throughout the session, overlapping with one another, it would be 
too cumbersome rhetorically to examine them all at once.  So, as is the case with many 
things, what can be separated for purposes of analysis cannot be in practice. 
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The scene 
It’s about 2:55 on a late September afternoon, 2001, barely a few weeks after the 
disastrous attack on the World Trade Centers.  I will be seeing Mrs. P in a few minutes for 
our 6th meeting together since she started treatment.  It’s our last session before she takes 
time off to attend her daughter’s wedding out of state.  It is also our last week of once- a-
week therapy as Mrs. P agreed with my recommendation that she come for therapy at least 
twice-per-week.  Outside the office I hear the outer door open and some wheels roll into the 
waiting area.  The rolling wheels belong to a medium-size suitcase Mrs. P uses as a portable 
office, pulling it to and fro from one end of the campus to another – highlighting her hurried 
look, like a stewardess crossing from one late plane to another, putting out customer 
complaints along the way with pressurized warmth and smiles. 
The office is rectangular in shape, with an east-west orientation – when the doors are 
open to the outer hall I can see the morning sun as it rises in the east.  The desk faces north 
at one end of the room, opposite the door.  The chair Mrs. P uses faces me but not directly.  
Her direct line of sight intersects mine at an obtuse angle, such that she must turn her head 
to the right at about 2 or 3 o’clock to make direct eye contact.  Mrs. P, a thin, handsome, 
late-middle-age woman, mother, and intern in pastoral counseling, works for the same 
university based hospital that sponsors the psychology internship program where I am 
working. 
I open the door and call her name, leaving the door open as I return to my chair 
behind the desk.  Propping one ankle on the other knee while leaning back in the chair 
creates just enough room for my arms to rest comfortably on the tablet in my lap.  Mrs. P 
rolls in her carry-on office, sits down, and then gets up, remembering that she has something 
she wants to give me.  Following Dr. R’s instruction some two years earlier, I say nothing 
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once I sit down and wait for Mrs. P to start talking – or doing whatever she feels the urge to 
do.   
Mrs. P found the envelope she’s been looking for and hands it to me, explaining: 
 
001 The three or four of these are the silences that I wasn’t able to come up with anything for.  I’m trying 
002 to survive his week. 
 
After writing down what she says, I open the envelope and see that she has handed me a 
‘Sentence Completion’ form – two pages of incomplete sentences that require the 
respondent to write in the answers.  The “silences” Mrs. P mentions (001) refer to three 
blanks or sentences that she did not complete, even though she had the form for three 
weeks.   
 Mrs. P, by taking the initiative to talk, shows that she understands my silence as a 
sign that she should begin the session by taking the first turn.  Her opening utterances (001-
002) are explanations for the incompleteness of the form – much like the fact that one feels 
the need to explain a “no” when invited to do something, but not a “yes” since “yes” is the 
culturally preferred response to a request.  It is as if Mrs. P is saying, “I’m too busy to do 
them.”  After all, in work settings the expression “I’m trying to survive” is usually taken as 
an expression of busyness.  Emotionally, it is not clear how she is grasping the form, herself 
or myself.  Is she too busy as in too busy to bother with such a stupid request, or too busy as 
in I’m sorry I’ve failed and feel bad?  In any event, her second utterance is unclear with 
regard to the context against which “I’m trying to survive” is to be understood.  Is she trying 
to survive at this moment, yesterday, the last two days, etc.?   
“One of the easiest ways to hurt me is…,” “In relationship to me I wish men would 
…,” “In relationship to me I wish women would…”  I read over the sentences she left 
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blank.  While I don’t recall what I thought, here is what I wrote down before I said it to Mrs. 
P: 
003 I think you’re feeling overwhelmed inside and don’t know quite how to deal with the feelings of   
004  being scared inside. 
 
In conversation analysis (CA) one examines a subsequent utterance to discern how 
the participant understood the prior one.  This response shows that I understood the topic 
Mrs. P forwarded for discussion was something about her state-of-being at the moment – 
the temporal context is the on-going moment of “you’re,” the second-person singular 
contraction, present tense of ‘to be.’  This state – or identity – was understood as being 
desperate, based is seems on her identity claim, “I’m trying to survive this week.”  However, 
it should be noted that this is an unconventional move, since most of the time if one hears 
comments like Mrs. P’s one interprets them lightly, as if mere tongue-in-cheek hyperbole, 
particularly if one is speaking in the work setting to a coworker. 
In terms of the interpersonal movements or pragmatics of emotion, my move shows 
interest in who she is as the focus of my attention, an attempt to move closer to her concern.  
However, as an initiate of CKPP there is a body of knowledge and tradition of technique 
that talks about what I was doing in a highly specialized way.  Specifically, part of my role as 
Mrs. P’s therapist is to maintain the optimal conditions thought necessary for therapy to 
occur; these optimal conditions are called the FRAME of therapy.  The rules that make up 
the FRAME include the fee, time of regularly scheduled appointments, privacy, and 
guidelines for when, what, and how to speak, as well as guidelines for when, what, and what 
not to do.   
One of the first ‘rules’ I learned from Dr. R was to stop saying anything at the 
beginning of the session and to let the patient begin, unless there is something I need to 
mention that requires an exploration of the patient’s reaction – as in the case of having to 
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cancel an appointment.  The reason for this is that even something that seems benign, like, 
“How are you today?” can impinge on the patient, since it invites an “fine” or could invite a 
report on things, which some people (including the therapist) can use to avoid talking about 
what is really bothering them (and may be upsetting for the therapist to hear).  So, if I were 
to start the session by speaking it may restrict Mrs. P’s freedom to begin wherever she 
wanted to begin, which is what I was interested in – because where she begins and what she 
begins with provides the entry point for examination.  In the event I have something to tell 
Mrs. P that alters the frame (like changing appointments) that warrants exploration, her 
response to what I have introduced becomes the entry point.  In the jargon, by refraining 
from speaking at the outset, I minimize possible “contamination” of the patient’s presenting 
MATERIAL – whatever they say and do, in this case at the beginning. 
In other words, the FRAME I have learned is made up of rules; it is an apparatus of 
controlled conditions – for the operation of establishing and testing hypotheses or 
preconceptions as they structure the “horizon of intelligibility” in Kögler’s language. 13 They 
are the conditions that allow the phenomenon to be examined, just as scientific experiments 
require controlled conditions.  In the laboratory of therapy, however, it is about exposing 
through trial-and-error hypothesis testing the regime that governs the occurrence of misery 
in each unique patient’s life, component by component.  And by exposing these 
components, patients have the chance to recognize them, how they figure into their 
problematic experiential present, and to decide what they want to do about them now.  In 
short “maintaining the frame” as the topic is called in the literature, is about maintaining the 
                                                 
13 Of course, this is not to say that the manner of speaking is not important.  The statements I make in the 
following sessions can be said with a soft tone, for example, while still not conveying either approval or 
disapproval of the patient’s experience, beliefs, or behavior.  The tightrope here involves showing acceptance 
(interest + compassion = acceptance) without indicating either approval or disapproval. 
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conditions necessary for examining together at the edges of the unknown in the person’s life 
(the UNCONSCIOUS), so it can be thought as it is experienced. 
Early in my training with Dr. R she gave me a sheet of paper entitled Case 
Presentation, which has been scanned into this document (Figure 1, p. 60, below).  This 
sheet provides an outline for formally presenting a psychoanalytic case.  Dr. R told me that 
our supervision – and my therapeutic practice – would focus on the questions listed under 
section 6, the “Description of the therapeutic relationship.”  Although listed as four items, 
over the last two years I have memorized them with slightly different wording and broken 
the first question into two separate questions to make remembering them easier, I suppose: 
“What is the main anxiety?” is one of the questions.  The others are: “How does the person 
see you?,” “What does the person do with what I say?,” “How are they trying to use you?,” 
and “What does it feel like inside to be with this person?”  These questions provide a 
structured entry point for examining the patient’s PSYCHIC REALITY and how it is 
organized – created, recreated, maintained, and perpetuated. – outside their everyday 
awareness.  
In the lingo of contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic psychotherapy (CKPP), the 
phenomenon to be jointly examined is the patient’s PSYCHIC REALITY ( cf., Caper, 1999; 
Hinshelwood, 1994; Segal, 1964; Spillius, 1994), specifically, the part of PSYCHIC 
REALITY that causes misery, the PATHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (cf., Steiner, 
1993).  While there terms will be defined more fully as this interpretive study proceeds, a bit 
more detail is in order to explain why my speech specified (003-004) “inside” as the context 
for the topic of Mrs. P’s feeling “overwhelmed” and “scared.” 
As I have learned from Dr. R, the opening speech of the patient is very important, 
since it gives the clearest indication of the patient’s MAIN ANXIETY of the moment, prior 
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to any input from me during the session, an anxiety that shapes whatever the patient says or 
does during the session and therefore provides the touchstone for the therapist’s 
interventions.  This anxiety is based on the patient’s INTERNAL OBJECTS – his or her 
early ways of experiencing states-of-mind in relation to important people (a.k.a. 
EXTERNAL OBJECTS) that are felt to be inside, what we “contain” within the boundary 
 
Figure 1 
Psychoanalytic Case Presentation 
Document 
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of the “me” – the “parts” of ourselves that make up our sense of identity.  PSYCHICH 
REALITY is made up of INTERNAL OBJECTS that mediate how events and people are 
experienced (interpreted, understood, and related to), because: 
Our internal objects are manifestations of both how our objects feel or act towards 
us and how we feel and act towards our objects.  The two combine to produce an 
object that we unconsciously experience as being inside us in a very specific state; we 
are in a very specific relationship to them, and they are in a very specific relationship 
to us.  That is, we are doing something to them and they are doing something to us 
in kind to us. … while what we call a state of mind may be the same as an internal 
object, our internal objects – detailed unconscious phantasies of what we contain – 
are far more vivid, detailed and varied than our ordinary vocabulary for states of 
mind – such as depression, guilt, love, security, elation, and so on – can convey.  A 
large amount of the time consumed by psychoanalysis is devoted to capturing the 
very details, nuances, and ramifications of the states of mind so crudely represented 
by these terms. (Caper, 1999, p. 56) 
  
PSYCHIC REALITY, then, is made up of INTERNAL OBJECTS which are far 
from static, discrete things; they are made up of micro, narrative-like structures called 
PHANTASIES (spelled with a PH to denote that they are unconscious) that are graphic 
recordings of (1) our external objects existing inside us in (2) some condition or other as a 
result of our relationship to them, displaying (3) some intention towards us on that basis. 
(cf., Isaacs, 1952)  In other words, INTERNAL OBJECTS refer to our dynamic and 
recycling identity dramas – our shifting “states of mind” as people say – with self-part A 
doing something X to object-part B, which in response wants to do Y to A, and so on, all 
linked by a logic of emotion that predates linguistic understanding.14 
                                                 
14  Hinshelwood(1991) offers the following definition of the UNCONSCIOUS as it is understood by Kleinian 
in terms of PHANTASY and OBJECT RELATIONS: 
The unconscious is structured like a small society.  That is to say, it is a mesh of relationships between 
objects.  And unconscious phantasy is a state of activity of one or more of these ‘internal’ object -
relations….  Thus a somatic sensation [instinct] tugs along with it a mental experience of a 
relationship with a object that causes the sensation, is believed to be motivated to cause the sensation 
and is loved or hated by the ego according to whether the sensation is pleas ant or unpleasant.  In this 
way a sensation that hurts becomes a mental representation of a relationship with ‘bad’ object that is 
intending to hurt and damage the ego.  The unconscious – and, indeed, the mind, – is constructed of sensations 
interpreted as relationships with objects.  This concept eventually departed from the classical psychoanalytic 
theory of mental energy. (pp. 467-468, emphasis added) 
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Continuing the example of the mother feeding her baby can illustrate how this 
process might occur.  Suppose the baby is a six month old, lying in his crib around feeding 
time.  His mouth is puckering and he is making a sucking motion with his lips.  After some 
time he starts to cry for food, but his mother is too busy to come for some time and when 
she finally does he continues to cry even when presented with the bottle.  After some cooing 
and comforting, he finally settled in for a good feeding.  From the Kleinian view, we could 
say he initially soothed his hunger (urge or INSTINCT) for food by hallucinating the 
experience of being fed by the gratifying breast (hence, sucking at the air is the bodily 
expression of the phantasy).  However, as the pain grew in his stomach, this distortion of 
reality no longer worked (his mother was not really there) and in his pain he began to feel as 
though he would die.  Outraged, he phantasizes that he was pained on purpose by a nasty, 
withholding breast (persecutory object) that he hated.  When his mother finally arrived (the 
external object) was resisted at first because within the context of pain and anger she was 
grasped as bad and persecuting (a distortion of her identity).  The language of phantasies and 
internal objects is thus a way to articulate in language what was a sequential chain of 
experiences before language that constituted the infant’s experience based on his sense of 
himself (identity) in relation to his sense of his mother (how he sighted her identity).  “The 
earliest phantasies, then, spring from bodily impulses and are interwoven with bodily 
sensations and affects. They express primarily an internal and subjective reality, yet from the 
beginning they are bound up with an actual, however, limited and narrow, experience of 
objective reality” (Isaacs, 1952, p. 93). 
Hence, while Mrs. P’s speech was vague in regard to the context to which she was 
referring in her opening utterances, mine was not.  I sighted/cited “trying to survive” as her 
state of mind tied to her insides (“inside you” 003) as she sat across from me, invoking that 
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elastic, vague, and invisible yet experientially real boundary line that divides the sense of 
oneself from someone else, the “me” from the “not me” – referred to in the jargon as one’s 
PSYCHIC SKIN (cf., Bick, 1967/1988).  In regard to the question of what is Mrs. P’s 
MAIN ANXIETY, my utterance, an assertion, was positing the theory that it had to do with 
“feeling overwhelmed” and “scared,” although it could not be more specific without further 
MATERIAL to interpret. 
005 Mmmhmm…[T] Yeah, and it’s ironic too because at the same time I feel like I’m making progress 
006 in my new post and in a way my confidence in growing.  In one sense it’s all brand new and in    
007 another it’s what I’ve always thrived on – it’s like crisis.  It’s not always successful – the visitations 
008 with patients.  When people in crisis or end of life issues, but it somehow works out – but it’s a  
009 success when I make out a report and evaluate my work, but I guess at the same time I go with      
010 whatever is my fear or maybe I’m making someone else’s fear my own.  Oh, in chaplaincy I saw it 
011 addressed this week on television this whole things of counselors being sought out like madmen doing 
012 all these services and work.  It’s what people demand or ask for.  But the chaplains are probably the 
013 most pathetic ones when you get a group together you say, “I don’t know what to say,” which gets 
014 people to talk about fear.  Whatever I’m afraid of when someone is going to get in there, on my fear 
I 015 deflect them. 
 
016 And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of you got 
017 scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept.  It’s like you drop your feelings 
018 that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them. 
 
 Initially, Mrs. P ratifies my understanding (003-004) and interest in her fear about 
being overwhelmed – the [T] in my notes indicates moments where Mrs. P began to tear.  
She then describes something (her state, her identity, her week, both?) as “ironic” (L 005), 
not what it seems.  Given the “it’s” point of contrast is “progress” and “confidence,” (L 
005-006) she seems to be elaborating on “overwhelmed” (L 003) and “scared” (L 004).  
However, she has shifted the context from the here and now of the relationship with me to 
the context of her work – her “new post” (L 006).  She continues the parallels of progress-
confidence with “not always successful” (007) – “somehow works out” (008) to my original 
overwhelmed-scared.  Schematically, Figure 2 (below, left) shows the progression of these 
topics in three different contexts.  My comment was geared at context A, the here and now 
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concern of Mrs. P and her emotional state.  She shifts to her work context in the hospital 
(B), in which case lines 006-007, “In one sense it’s all brand new and in another it’s what I’ve 
always thrived on – it’s like crisis” may be a narrative abstract, summarizing the point of the 
story(ies?) she wants to tell (context C, the 9/11 crisis).  However, her utterances never tell a 
complete narrative; they offer fragments of narratives – a character here, a situation there, 
but nothing complete. 
Indeed, with the speed of 
an on-line conversation, or even 
an initial reading, her responses 
produce a dissonance of 
understanding.  If this were said 
in an everyday conversation the 
expected reply might be, 
“What?” even though Mrs. P 
returns to the topic of her fear at 
the end.  So, the pragmatic effect of her speech practice is to derail understanding or 
“alignment” in the terms of CA. 
 This is important, because Mrs. P’s move in response to mine is to produce speech 
that cannot be interpreted using the basic set of conversational principles that make everyday 
conversation possible – Grice’s cooperative principle and maxims: “say no more or no less 
than is necessary,” “be relevant,” “say what you believe to be true and can back up,” “be 
clear” (cf., Nofsinger, 1991, pp. 36-39).  Yet the conversation continued.  I made a response.  
So, there must be a conversational principle governing CKPP that informed how I made 
sense of her extended turn. 
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My response to her extended turn shows that I understood her utterances in the 
context of her experience of herself and myself in the therapy – “And I’m seeing it in 
here…”  I understood the “people” in “gets people to talk about fear” and the  “someone” 
in “when someone is going to get in there on my fear” to be my references to myself.  I’m 
the one who brought up the topic of fear and the one who is posing the subject as 
something “inside” her while she is sitting across from me.  
Again, this indicates that another conversational principle is at work that 
differentiates this kind of therapeutic conversation from an everyday conversation.  In an 
everyday conversation someone listening to Mrs. P would probably initiate some kind of 
repair, perhaps saying something like “What? I didn’t follow you.”  Utterances in everyday 
conversation can certainly have more than one meaning.  This is the assumption of symbolic 
expression that calls for interpretation, as defined by Ricoeur (1970, p. 18):  
A symbol exists …where linguistic expression lends itself by its double or multiple 
meanings to a work of interpretation… No doubt a symbol is, in the Greek sense of 
the word, an “enigma”… Enigma does not block understanding but provokes it; 
there is something to unfold, to “dis-implicate” in symbols.  That which arouses 
understanding is precisely the double meaning, the intending of the second meaning 
in and through the first. 
 
However, to respond as I did requires the assumption that these meanings are not 
randomly organized.  In this case they seem to be viewed as able to designate a second thing 
(our relationship) through a first (what she does with some other).  Thus far, the scene is a 
set up for a conversation where Mrs. P’s identity and the practices subtending that sense of 
herself are the subjects to be understood in the context of our ongoing relationship, in the 
here and now context.  So, in addition to the other elements of the FRAME discussed 
above, a central part of the scene of feeding might be stated as the following conversational 
principle: “listen to what the patient says as though he or she were talking about herself, you, 
or the two of you.”  In other words, the second meanings inferred from this are presumed to 
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have a direction as a response to the “feeding situation.”  Perhaps Mrs. P’s response has to 
do with the food and the elements that make up its formulation. 
The food 
Retrospectively, Mrs. P’s extended turn shows that she ratified or showed agreement 
in another way – she performatively showed me herself as “overwhelmed,” projecting it as 
an actor projects a persona.  She did being-overwhelmed by speaking in a way that was too much 
to understand, a cul-de-sac of thought that, a few months later, she would come to call her 
“curlicue thinking.”  In terms of the feeding trope, the question might be: what was she 
reacting to in the food?  Just as people sometimes say, “he was feeding me a line” or “I’m 
not going to swallow that,” what was I feeding her that she had a hard time swallowing?   
This section addresses the question through analyzing the turns we took in more 
detail.  First, through a closer examination of her response to my first speaking turn, the 
interpretive analysis shows that it was the notion that I as needed Other might understand her 
as fearful-in-a-state-of-crisis, a notion to which she reacted with anxiety manifested as deflecting 
speech.  In other words, her extended turn reveals that she understood my utterances as 
identifying her in relation to myself, a move to which she has a reaction.  In the jargon, what 
was upsetting was a kind of OBJECT RELATION that she understood me to be talking 
about in my response to her.  This communicative move is one characteristic of CKPP.  
Second, analyzing my subsequent response and comparing it with the first yields six other 
characteristics of CKPP.  These elements make up the ingredients, so to speak, of the food I 
have been learning to feed as an initiate of CKPP; they allowed me to “formulate” my 
INTERPRETATIONS.  Finally, a closer look at her next turn reveals the pragmatic effect 
of this kind of feeding: it puts the patient in a self-distanciated position for examining her 
experience as a self – a linguistically embedded subject or perspective in a field of issues.  My 
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interpretive utterances provided an opportunity for noticing how her own social practices 
contribute to that self, which, in turn, provided an opportunity to be some other way in relation 
to the Other in that field of issues as a subject.  However, this opportunity is not easy to take 
in practice, as the remaining section of the analysis will show. 
Contrary to the apparent senselessness of Mrs. P’s first extended turn, her utterances 
were an attempt on the part of Mrs. P to swallow (or not) an identity that is disturbing – a 
struggle, or conflict of identity.15  Based on her responses, my utterances 003-004, in effect, 
project an image of Mrs. P as a person facing questionable survival and desperation, who 
needs help – and implied by the therapy context, one who is there for my help as the needed 
Other. 
In response to my move, Mrs. P shifts from a focus on a familiar “crisis” (007) 
aspect of her life to another person who is in crisis, the crisis of facing the loss of losing him 
or herself (“end of life issues”, 008).  In picking situation C, she is choosing a context where 
she is in the role of helping the person in crisis – Mrs. P uses her speaking turn to shift from 
talking about her crisis with me as her therapist, where her identity is patient, to a situation 
where she is the needed one helping someone else in crisis – that “works out”(008), is a 
“success” when she reports on it (009), where her identity is that of healer.  Adding to this 
successful healer identity is the notion of one who is needed, having, “what people demand 
or ask for” (012) as she shifts tracks again to a context where ministers are sought after (in 
the wake of September 11th).  In other words, she moves from so-so healer, to successful 
                                                 
15  The notion of “swallowing identity” is purposely left ambiguous here.  On the one hand, the expression 
indexes a variant of colloquial expression, as when someone says, “he’s trying to feed me a line” or “I’m not 
going to swallow that bull shit.”  On the other hand, the deployment of the expression here anticipates the 
further explication in the following chapters of Kleinian discourse as a symbolic system circumscribed by the 
bodily tropes of the infant-mother dyad (the tropography of CKPP).  The fullest explication will be addressed 
in the final chapter of the study, where the swallowing of identity is argued to be a very material discursive 
accomplishment: the appropriation of a new or altered sense of the self – the understanding of bodily 
experience as it is brought into language and interpreted relationally.   
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healer, to needed-healer-in-demand, inverting the valence of the identity she herself agreed 
with at first (005), from “one down” to “one up,” as it were, as if my observation and the 
identity put forth registered as an affront or risk to her sense of status. 
In terms of emotional work, de Rivera contends that anxiety is the emotion we 
employ when facing an identity that exposes us to danger, in the attempt to deny the new 
identity and hold on to the previous one that promises interpersonal security.16  Perhaps, 
then, Mrs. P’s opening lines and hurried behavior were pragmatically geared to argue or 
make the communicative case for an identity of the too-busy-needed-successful-healer-to-those-in-
crisis, to which my opening remarks would fly in contradiction, leading her to expand her 
case, so to speak, in her subsequent talk by providing evidence through shifting contexts to 
B and C.17 Yet, she also agrees with my assessment both verbally and non verbally, 
contradicting her own identity-argument. And it is the identity of overwhelmed-fearful person that 
she returns to, “But the chaplains are the most pathetic ones when you get a group together 
you say, “I don’t know what to say,” which gets people to talk about fear.  Whatever I’m 
afraid of when someone is going to get in there on my fear I deflect them.” (lines 013-015)  
This return provides some important clues for interpreting her difficulty with the identities I 
forwarded in 003-004 relating who I was in relation to who she was as fearful-in-need-of 
help.  
                                                 
16  De Rivera writes, “Later the experience of anxiety occurs when the person considers accepting responsibility 
for actions and emotions that would lead to an identity that, he believes, would occasion withdrawal of the 
other.  The anxiety essentially instructs the person to deny this responsibility, to say “that isn’t me,” and thus 
hold on to the old self and relationship whose abandonment is threatened.  While this moves the person away 
from the new identity, it defends him against a loss of belonging to the other.” (deRivera, 1977, pp. 49-50) 
17  In CA an argument is viewed as interactive disagreement over either (1) the failure of one participant to 
respond in the desired way to a preceding action, for example, getting a “no” instead of a “yes,” or (2) the 
propositional content of a turn.  (cf., Nofsinger, 1991, pp. 146-154)  Applying this view to the communicative 
account of getting emotional, then, suggests that non-verbal arguments can occur over identity claims since 
emotionality is motivated by “identity goals” using “identity claims … to influence a specific target person” 
(Parkinson, 1995, pp. 274-291). 
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The interpretive analysis shows that Mrs. P grasped my initial utterances anxiously, 
not wanting to be grasped by me as the-needed-other by her as fearful-in-need-of-help, and she tried 
to hold onto her identity as overworked-in-demand-healer-to-others to “deflect” me and her 
own grasp of me as her needed Other.  First, her utterances (013-015) are vague regarding 
the context to which they refer – is Mrs. P still talking about the chaplains attending victims 
of the World Trade Center crisis?  Is she referring to her work at the Hospital?  The last 
comment is an expressive utterance that brings the subject and object of the action back to 
herself – “I’m afraid …” – although the time and place of the situation is not clear, since 
“whenever” is not spatio-temporally specific.  Second, Mrs. P belongs to the category of 
chaplains; it is her “new post” (006), while I belonged to the category of “people” who talk 
about fear.  Third, consider that the sequence of the events she describes mirrors the events 
that happened in the session so far: she starts the session talking about some “silences” 
(moments where she doesn’t know what to say), then I talk about fear that is “inside” her 
(004), and then she reports on a general rule of certain – but vaguely situated – times of her 
life that she is afraid of people getting “in” there “on” (i.e., sighting/citing) her fear and 
responds by “deflecting them.”  What I am arguing is that these last two lines are a 
metacommunication, as if Mrs. P shifts concern from her identity in the moment to what 
just happened between us in our communication.  Stated differently, Mrs. P indexes the here 
and now context by virtue of the sequence of events and general (vague) categories she 
describes, rather than the usual indicators of time, space and person (in here, over there, this 
here, that there, you, me, and so on), resulting in the apparent lack of contextual referents.  
Furthermore, to the extent these lines describe what has been happening in the here and 
now, Mrs. P believes that she herself is “pathetic” for not having completed the sentences – 
a chaplain who produced “silences” rather than living up to some expectation.  
70 
 
To feel pathetic is to feel inferior, to fearfully grasp the world as looking down on 
one as imperfect with an urge to hide from view; it is a species of shame.  It is not a pleasant 
way to view the world and oneself; particularly compared with viewing the world as 
applauding one for successfully living-up or exceeding what is expected.  In other words, it is 
the opposite identity to that Mrs. P tries to project in lines 006-012.  And since – from the 
pragmatic view – every emotional grasp of situation implies an other to whom it is 
experienced as a response, we can hypothesize that Mrs. P sighted me as a contemptuous-needed-
Other, looking down at her identity of fearful as insignificant, without legitimacy – one from 
whom she should hide her identity as unacceptable to a dangerous, rejecting Other.  18  The 
way she ‘hides’ herself – how she ‘does’ shame in this instance – is to try to maintain the 
opposite identity of too-busy successful-needed-healer-to-those-in-crisis and to produce 
speech that would not make sense, preventing her from being understood – sighted/cited – 
as someone fearful-in-need.     
To recap, the interpretive analysis shows that Mrs. P became anxious at the prospect 
of being identified in a way that felt shameful as if she sighted/cited me as a rejecting-needed 
Other rather than a helpful-needed-Other.  Considering this opening section of conversation 
spans but minutes in the on-line interchange of the session, a considerable amount of work 
has been accomplished.  Schematically, this can be summarized in the following way (Figure 
2, below).19 
                                                 
18 Regarding this point, de Rivera (1977, p. 48) writes, “I shall postulate that this is so, that in each of the 
emotions where the self is an object of the emotion [anxiety,  guilt, panic, security, humility, serenity, 
depression, shame, sorrow, confidence, pride, and joy] the self is the object for the movements of an implicit 
other.”  Importantly, in a footnote to this passage he remarks, “As Dahl (see p. 6) suggests, such a 
conceptualization is related to the Freudian conception of internalization.  Hence it may possibly serve as a link 
between psychoanalytic thought and the ideas of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionists.” 
19  This figure is an adaptation of The Ontological Blueprint (Packer, 1993) used to visually represent how 
experience is structured based on Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics.  To summarize simplistically, the 
emphasis is that experience is based in the structure of understanding.  To apprehend something is to do so in 
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Mrs. P forwards or projects (again, as actors “project” a persona) the identity (       ) 
of important-busy-minister-to-the-fearing-death-needy T1 (time 1).  My opening speech 
forwards a contrary identity; I showed her that I understood her as needy-one-trying-to-
“survive”-at-the-moment T2.  In response to my move, she agreed then repositioned or 
“resubmitted” her initial claim, so to speak, out of anxiety about a shameful or humiliating 
identity by shifting the focal point for alignment (èT2) to her identity as a more-or-less 
successful healer (m.) to the fearing death needy (n.) in the context of her work in the 
hospital (End of life ministry context).  However, this attempt to ‘justify’ the initial 
identity she argued leads her to shift again.  This time it is an appeal to the category to which 
she belongs as minister-in-demand-by-those-facing-death-crisis (m to n, 9/11 ministry 
situation).  This move leads to a shift in the meaning of chaplain identity from 
“counselors being sought out” to “pathetic” and unable to lead a discussion about fear (è 
T3   ), and how she hides (“I deflect them”) when someone is going “get in there on” that 
identity.  In a way, it is as if Mrs. P 
started to tell parables about her 
own two contesting identities – 
stories that depict qualities or 
attributes of the characters, geared 
to encourage the listener/reader to 
make comparisons between the 
details of the story to the details of 
                                                                                                                                                 
some context of activity, which, along with one’s aims and the concepts at one’s disposal, structures the entity’s 
meaning.  
Figure 2 
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some other system of relations.  At least this is one way to understand interpreting what she 
talks about as an allegorical or symbolic way to communicate about the therapeutic context. 
In CA terms, part of the ongoing work of conversation is “topical coherence” and 
my subsequent utterances in the session (T4  ) function – in part – to mark the topic as her 
behavior of the moment as it was related to her ongoing experience by means of a 
“collaborative completion.”  In effect, I complete her utterance in 015. 
016 And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of you got 
017 scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept.  It’s like you drop your feelings 
018 that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them. 
 
Collaborative completions are a conversational device that “displays alignment 
[understanding] between participants.” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 122) through the completion of 
the first speaker’s utterance by the second speaker, followed by an acceptance or rejection in 
the next turn.  My speech indicates the nature of my understanding such that I was able to 
anticipate what Mrs. P could recognize about her action and experience closely enough that 
it might be accepted.  Whether or not Mrs. P would have completed her assertion as I did, or 
related what she said (as if to herself) to her current relationship with me, she does agree 
with the prepositional content of my speech: “Yeah, I’ve always done that [Tears streaming] 
Yeah, I…” (lines 019, below).   
 Thus far, seven patterns characterize my speaking turns during the session – what I 
was feeding.  First, they are made in the form of assertions that show my beliefs about Mrs. 
P’s reality of-the-moment.  They are not directives that operate to commit the addressee to 
do something, either in the form of questions, such as the cliché  “so, how do you feel about 
that?” or mild orders, like “tell me more about that.”  Second, they are more or less strongly 
anchored to the here and now context – in lines 016-018 “I’m seeing,” “in here,” “when I 
just approached,”  “you got,” etc., point to the immediate on-line relationship between Mrs. 
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P and myself.  Third, their topic is selected from what Mrs. P has either said or done first.  
Fourth, this topic is selected either from the concepts she employs directly or indirectly.  An 
example of the latter is “feeling overwhelmed” (003), which describes one way people 
belonging to the category of survival-mode would grasp their situation, just as “panicked” or 
fear of things “falling apart” (Cf., line 016) might also capture their experience – particularly 
if they witnessed the twin towers collapsing.  And fifth, these assertions can also take the 
form of short narratives in so far as narratives involve the telling of how two or more events 
are logically, causally, chronologically or experientially related. Again: 
16 And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of you got  
17 scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept.  It’s like you drop your feelings  
18 that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them. 
 
In this case the plot involves something that happened in the moment between the 
participants; this is also the first time the first person plural forms (“we,” “us”) are used.  
And the final assertion proposes a theory linking how she experiences with what she did. 
Summarizing the story: You grasp our identity (“we”) as excluding (can’t “tolerate”) so you 
disconnect (“drop”) from an experience (“feeling …overwhelming”). 
 Sixth, as done previously, this response reflects some of the specialized knowledge I 
have learned about CKPP as an initiate.  As noted above, my assertion was in the form of a 
small narrative articulating or joining her way of getting emotional (marked as “inside” her in 
line 003) with her manifest behavior towards me, her object, on the basis of how she may be 
grasping my identity as a participant with her.  Stated technically, I was marking an OBJECT 
RELATION pattern for her and I to talk about – that is, MAKING IT CONSCIOUS by 
pointing out how it happened in the room. 
 In the parlance of CKPP what I did with my speaking turn was to INTERPRET her 
DEFENCE against feelings that she was not able to grapple with, “as if we couldn’t tolerate 
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them.” (018).  This interpretation shows the heuristic application of the questions I learned 
from Dr. R (cf., pp. 58-59, above).  It consisted of tentative answers, hypotheses, to several 
of the questions that shape the investigative apparatus of CKPP.  Mrs. P’s MAIN 
ANXIETY was cited as “fears of falling apart” (016).  What she did with what I said was to 
change the subject, “you got scared and deflected us” (016-017).  How Mrs. P seemed to be 
trying to use me was to help her talk about something else, to avoid feeling shame.  She 
seemed to be seeing me as one who can’t help her with the magnitude of her upset, “as if we 
couldn’t tolerate them” (018).  And what it felt like to be with her?  I felt anxious about 
being able to hold onto her as a patient.  Since she had told me that she was taking a week 
off I was worried that she was going to terminate therapy.  Yet while speaking with her I, at 
times, like when Mrs. P would tear, felt that she also needed me.  The way I described it for 
a case conference presentation was that if there were a caption to the first few sessions it 
would read, “I don’t need you please don’t leave me.” 
 The purpose of these questions about the therapeutic relationship is to provide an 
entry point for the on-going elucidation of the problems Mrs. P has dealing with 
unmanageable anxiety, “After all, the reason which brings patients into analysis is 
fundamentally that they cannot manage anxiety, though it does not mean of course that the 
patient is consciously aware of this” (Joseph, 1977/1989, p. 106).  And it is through 
participating, observing and making judgments about how the patient doesn’t deal with 
anxiety in the live, pulsating, on-line relationship with the therapist that each component of 
the misery regime can come to light.  “In this view, the analyst is not someone who 
maintains a ‘neutral’ stance above the fray, but someone who is always being drawn into the 
fray, could not do analysis if he were not in the fray, and who does analysis largely by 
figuring out what kind of fray he is in.”(Caper, 1999, p. 28). 
75 
 
The technical term for “the fray” is the “TRANSFERENCE AS THE TOTAL 
SITUATION” as articulated by Joseph (1985/1989, p. 167):  “…a living relationship in 
which there is constant movement and change… [where] everything of importance in the 
patient’s psychic organization based on his early and habitual ways of functioning, his 
phantasies, impulses, defenses, and conflicts will be lived out in some way in the 
transference.”20  “Total situations” are whole experiences or an experience as a whole.  
Whole experiences are the stuff of transference – what the patient perceives and believes 
about him or herself and the therapist in relation to that self – as manifest in the patient’s 
communicative behavior and the therapist’s experience of the patient.  As Hinshelwood 
writes: 
Joseph’s (1985) idea of transference as the ‘total situation’ is not simply restricted to 
isolated references to the analyst about which the patient and analyst converse.  The 
very function of cooperation between them, the arena in which the psychoanalysis 
works, is a fulcrum of the patient’s conflicts… In everyday social contact, people 
say things ‘for effect’, and this is no less prevalent in the fraught world of the 
psychoanalytic consulting room.  What the patient does to the analyst, the effects 
his words have, have a long history in the patient’s life with his objects.  In this sense 
there is ‘always something going on’.  And so we are more concerned with the 
kind of use to which the patient puts the object in order to still anxieties and 
conflicts.  The patient’s use of the analyst replicates the use of objects in 
infancy and childhood.  (Hinshelwood, 1994, p. 193, emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
20  The trope of therapy-as-mother-feeding-infant has its origin in the assumption that transference (i.e., 
experience) is first structured in infancy, therefore adult experience as the superstructure on this primordial 
base is conditioned by its structure.  Klein writes: 
    I shall now draw a conclusion on which the present paper rests:  I hold that transference originates 
in the same processes which in the earliest stages determines object-relations.  Therefore we have to 
go back again and again in analysis between objects, loved and hated, external and internal, which 
dominate earliest infancy.  We can fully appreciate the interconnection between positive and negative 
transferences [experiences of the analyst] only if we explore the early interplay between love and hate, 
and the vicious circle of aggression, anxieties, feelings of guilt and increased aggression, as well as the 
various aspects of objects towards whom these conflicting emotions and anxieties are directed. (Klein, 
1952, p. 53) 
  Furthermore, it is this assumption that underlies the interpretive tactic of listening to the patient’s current life 
stories “as containing an element of unconscious phantasy, though they may seem concerned with 
incontrovertible external facts … To say that all communications are seen as communications about the 
patient’s phantasy as well as current external life is equivalent to saying that all communications contain 
something relevant to the transference situation.  In Kleinian technique the interpretation of the transference is 
often more central than in the classical technique” (Segal, 1981, p. 8) 
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Transference TOTAL SITUATIONS occur in a repetitive fashion and are the 
attempt to maintain and repeat being a certain kind of subject that involves actions to get the 
therapist to be (act, feel, talk) a certain way that enables the repetition.  The therapist’s job is 
to be able to apprehend and effectively show the patient what they are up to, how they do it, 
and how it relates to their difficulties.  In this sense, the relationship between the patient and 
therapist, their respective experiences and communicative behaviors act as a prism to refract 
the patient’s OBJECT RELATIONS for careful analysis and interpretation.  The Kleinian 
conceptions of SPLITTING, PROJECTIVE and INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION, 
The PARANOID/SCHIZOID and DEPRESSIVE POSITIONS, ATTACKS ON 
LINKING, OMNIPOTENCE, PATHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS, and so on, are 
heuristic tools that inform one’s attempt to grasp CLINICAL FACTS – the time sensitive 
emotional realities of the session (cf., Caper, 1997; O'Shaughnessy, 1994; Riesenberg-
Malcom, 1995). 
 In technical terms, for example, the notion of an ATTACK ON LINKING was 
invented by (Bion, 1957/1988) to point to a primary means people can use to not 
understand and remain unaware of their reality.  He conceived of these as attacks on 
anything that joins any couple – two thoughts, two feelings, a  thought and a feeling, a feeling 
and a person, a feeling and a behavior or perception, two people, a mother and a child, a 
patient and their therapist and so on.  The therapeutic encounter is ripe for these attacks 
because the whole point is for two people to come together and jointly solve problems.   
And while I never said either “you’re attacking a link” or “you’re experiencing a 
paranoid/schizoid anxiety” the assumption of these terms – implicit ontological assumptions 
of Kleinianism – did inform what I said.  Mrs. P’s speech (007-015) was an example of an 
ATTACK ON LINKING in that she had trouble putting her thoughts together, linking 
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them, which would simultaneously prohibit someone else from being able to put their 
thoughts together with hers – resulting in unintelligible speech.  And the notion of “fears of 
falling apart” draws on Klein’s exposition of the PARANOID/SCHIZOID POSITION, 
since the danger of ‘falling to pieces’ might have been a manifestation of “the primary 
anxiety of being annihilated” (Klein, 1946, p. 5) due to the defense of SPLITTING off 
“parts” of her self (her identity). 
Klein’s most innovative works came through her psychoanalysis of children, where 
she developed beliefs about infantile experience and development – her innovations are 
based on an infant ontology, as it were.  According to this ontology, the infant’s sense of 
himself lacks coherence; he begins life in a state of primary unintegration; he has experiences 
but at first these are not integrated into one “I.”  The  “I” or ego begins to integrate around 
positive or pleasurable experiences, like the satiation of a good feeding.  Painful experiences 
like hunger, excessive gas, burning diarrhea, etc., threatens this collection of “good” 
experiences and therefore must be kept separate.  In normal development the mother does a 
good enough job helping the infant manage his anxieties about integrating the “good” and 
“bad” senses of himself.  The mother, or part of the mother since the infant cannot yet 
perceive her as a whole, is central to this process: 
As regards splitting of the object, we have to remember that in states of gratification 
love-feelings turn towards a gratifying breast, which in states of frustration hatred 
and persecutory anxiety attach themselves to the frustrating breast.  Idealization is 
bound up with the splitting of the object, for the good aspects of the breast are 
exaggerated as a safeguard against the fear of the persecuting breast.  While 
idealization is thus the corollary of persecutory fear, it also springs from the power of 
the instinctual desires which aim at unlimited gratification and therefore create the 
picture of an inexhaustible and always bountiful breast – and ideal breast. (Klein, 
1946, pp. 6-7) 
 
In his attempt to control the ‘bad’ experience the infant mobilizes aggression to eliminate the 
painful experience, to get rid of it, by means of a PHANTASY of SPLITTING it off from 
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the self and PROJECTING the self-experience (part of the self) into the mother and thereby 
identifies her as a dangerous being that contains these dangerous parts: the persecutory 
breast.  So, the primary anxiety of this early position is paranoid in nature – the fear of a 
persecutory, annihilating object – and the self is split by the schizoid mechanism of splitting; 
hence, the PARANOID/SCHIZOID position and its “fear of falling to pieces.”  Klein 
refers to this as a “position” because it is an always-available state rather than a “stage” that 
is traversed once and for all. In its garden-variety manifestation: someone hurts us, we get 
mad and feel as if they did it on purpose, like a persecutor.  This question is not that an adult 
deals with this position; the issue is how and to what extent is the anxiety unbearable.  
Where Freud gave priority to castration anxiety in the etiology of neurosis Klein traced its 
origin to the PARANOID/SCHIZOID position as the ground of its possibility.  Castration 
anxiety is but one manifestation of a persecutory anxiety based on projective identification.21 
In this way all infant experiences begin to be organized around the poles of good and 
bad or painful and pleasurable by means of SPLITTING, PROJECTIVE 
IDENTIFICATION and its inverse INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION– the early 
means of discriminating what belongs “to me” or “not to me.”  Under normal conditions 
the good experiences become the context for the bad; in adult terms one may have bad 
experiences but within an overall sense of security and confidence in one’s basic goodness 
and worth as a person. 
                                                 
21  Likewise, the “renunciation of Oedipal strivings” is but one manifestation of the DEPRESSIVE 
POSITION where fear of the loss of the Other motivates INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION.  The terms 
DEPRESSIVE POSITION and INTROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION will be explicated in chapters 4 and 5.  
The point is that the Kleinian tradition has historically aimed to identify and conceptualize features, processes, 
and technical strategies that are common to all pathologies rather than focus on character types.  For example, 
in the contemporary Kleinian literature the notion of PATHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS is used where 
others might specify “borderline,” “narcissistic,” “obsessional,” and other types.  Rather than focus on how 
they are distinct and mutually exclusive, Kleinians may focus on how each one as a PATHOLOGICAL 
ORGANIZATION manifests a common problem such as resistance or difficulties making “contact” with the 
object as displayed in their particular manner of deploying projective identification and so on. 
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This brief and oversimplified exposition of some Kleinian terms, then, can help 
contextualize not only my comment about “fears of falling apart,” but also my opening 
utterances and why I took Mrs. P’s comment “I’m trying to survive this week” (002) more 
literally that she seemed to intend it.  And from the Kleinian angle, an ATTACK ON 
LINKING is a manifestation of SPLITTING since a part of the self, an identity, cannot be 
verbalized if it is split off.  Hence, I interpreted her speech (007-015) as a DEFENSE 
(attempt to deny an emotional reality) by “linking” the fear of fragmenting (“falling apart”) 
to her communicative behavior. 
 Of course, there is a seventh common element to my response that is not mentioned 
in the talk – the note taking.  At the time of this session I had been taking detailed process 
notes – writing down every word (more or less) spoken during the session while in the 
session – for two years.  I write down what I am going to say before I say it to (1) foster the 
discipline of carefully choosing my words based on (2) what has just been said and happened 
in the session as I have recorded it – it’s a way to “fix” the action of the session so I can 
analyze and try to formulate it while writing my response, or, later after the patient has left to 
review the session.22  (3) Writing my responses ahead of time allows me a few extra seconds 
to watch the patient as he or she hears what I say and reacts to it, so I can monitor or track 
how what I say registers (or not).  And while the reaction of many to my note writing 
(expressed by colleagues) is that they would feel it takes away from their ability to “be 
present” or “pay attention” to their patients, I have found that – once I became used to it 
                                                 
22  The idea of “fixing” action so it can be read as a text or text analogue is central to interpretive inquiry.  In 
short, since social interaction is fleeting it must be fixed for its patterns to become the object of scientific study 
(through audio taping, video taping, etc.), as writing fixes speech and makes it available for interpretation. (Cf., 
Ricoeur, 1971; Taylor, 1971).  This fixing provides the kind of distanciation that Ricoeur had in mind when he 
wrote, “This way of putting my action at a distance in order to make sense of my own motives paves the way 
for the kind of distanciation which occurs with what we called the social inscription of human action and to 
which we applied the metaphor of the “record.”  The same actions which may be put into “records” and 
henceforth “recorded” may also be explained in different ways according to the multivocity of arguments 
applied to their motivational background.” (1971, p. 552,) 
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and worked out my anxieties about it – the opposite is true.  The note writing slows the 
process down and provides a record of what happens, which makes it easier for me to 
formulate my interventions by paying close attention to everything the patients says and does 
in reaction to what I say and do.  While it’s true that less gets said in the sessions and that my 
writing slows the pace of talk, I think too often one can equate the quantity of talk with 
quality, or the quality of it “feeling good” or “feeling right” can obscure what is going on 
through the talk.   
Indeed, the first hurdle I faced trying to write during the sessions was my anxiety 
about not maintaining eye contact. When we discussed this during supervision, Dr. R 
summarized by saying, “Let’s put it this way, eye contact may be gratifying but it is not 
necessarily therapeutic.”   She continued, explaining that the writing “communicates that you 
are there to do your work, and doing your work means having a separate mind to think 
about their problems …which patients don’t like because they want you to think about their 
problems the way they do.”  In another supervision session where my anxiety about the 
writing came up, she remarked: “so, it creates a distance, a separation, between you and the 
patient that makes both of you anxious.”  And in response to my other big concern about 
the note taking, that it took away from the freedom of the patient and that I was being too 
controlling and calculating by writing things out, she responded, “and what’s wrong with 
being calculating?”  I told her what the patient had said – a view that made sense to me at 
the time – and Dr. R stated, “So, it’s as if your patient thinks you’ll be more help to her if 
you say the first thing that comes into your head rather than taking your time to think about 
what’s happening before you say it … and I’d tell her that.”  Dr. R maintained a position 
that the note writing was as necessary for the job my patients were hiring me to do as a 
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hammer is necessary for a carpenter.  Some three years later, I can agree whole-heartedly 
with that.  I would only qualify her statement by saying if you want to do this kind of work. 
Mrs. P has not mentioned the note taking in her response.  At times she sees me 
starting to write and waits for me to finish and say what I have come up with.  At other 
times she keeps talking and I hold up my hand or say “hold on a moment” so I can finish, 
because I believe what I have to say too important to be glossed over.   
Mrs. P ratifies my hypothesis linking what she has just said and done to me with her 
previous speech – ostensibly about some other context than the therapy: 
019 Yeah, I’ve always done that. [Tears stream] Yeah, I’m probably going to be processing 15,000  
020 different things.   Yeah, processing things to do with my daughter’s wedding all this introspective stuff 
021 between now and Tuesday when I leave.. . . .   
 
 Mrs. P is moved by my speech.  It seems that I have “touched” on something as 
people say.  This turn of events is one that is and will be repeated many, many times during 
our work together.  She wipes the tears from her eyes as she talks and reaches for a tissue – 
hospital stock tissues she has often complained about, saying they are not soft enough for 
“people with alligator tears.”   
In the terms of CA, her response here (019-021) constitutes a positive assessment 
secondary to the previous assessment (what I’m calling the theory I proposed in CA is an 
assessment, an utterance of evaluation).  Her second utterance (020-021) specifies or 
expands on what she is going to be processing, introducing another topic and context into 
the conversation: “my daughter’s wedding.”  Notice, however, that her expression both 
confirms “feelings that feel overwhelming” (trying to process 15,000 different things would 
be quite overwhelming to say the least) yet negates the here and now indicators of “you 
drop,” “you’re,” and “we couldn’t” by shifting to the future conditional of “I’m probably 
going to be” (019) “between now and Tuesday” (021) as if it’s not what she was just doing in 
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the moment.  Although her previous speech did not contain 15,000 different things, it did 
contain that many in the sense that the point of the remark is (005-015) “too many things to 
make sense of at once.” 
 The third time that Mrs. P spontaneously began tearing occurred right after she 
mentions the date of her departure for her daughter’s wedding.  The first two incidents of 
tears followed comments I made, but not the third, which began with her self-selected turn 
(021, below).  What all three tear events have in common is that they coincide with shifts to 
the here and now situation – Mrs. P’s experience and reaction to that experience of herself 
during the therapy, either when she aligns her grasp of things with my grasp of the here and 
now or reintroduces it herself.  In this last case, Mrs. P gets emotional and does getting 
emotional by tearing after she shifts her own grasp back to the here and now, focusing on 
something “deep” for herself.   
The pragmatic function of getting emotional in this way is not clear as I report on it 
now.  At the time – and currently – I take Mrs. P’s tearing as, at the least, an indication that 
what I’ve said has touched on something, as an indication that I’m on the right track, so to 
speak.  Are they tears indicating sadness, relief from being understood or what?   
However, this temporal shift that provokes tearing does not last.  After Mrs. P 
begins tearing she self-selects a turn to continue talking, and my silence indicates that we 
both share the sense that it’s her turn to continue.  “This isn’t very deep … I’m feeling guilty 
because” (021-022, below) indicates a return to the here and now before another shift to the 
wedding context (022), and finally the context of mothering and being a child in the distant 
past of “ it goes way back …I can’t remember anyone in my family who...”(023). 
                                                              . . .  [Tears stream] This isn’t very deep -- no for me it is -- I 
022 think one of these things is I’m feeling guilty because I haven’t been able to help out too much with 
023 my daughter’s wedding and it goes way back because I can’t remember anyone in my family who 
024 hasn’t really been totally involved in their daughter’s wedding plus the problems I have with the need 
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025 to control, usually mom’s do their daughter’s weddings.  But I’m still from that tradition, so I’m 
026 probably feeling a lot of conflict about -- emotionally I have some input into this.  Intellectually I’ve 
027 tried to let my children make all the major decisions on their own.  I think maybe I’ve identified 
028 with my own mother who was major controlling, which is what dynamic women are.  And the sister 
029 I was in the arms of -- I think I used her or she filled the shoes of my mother.  I think I haven’t 
030 looked enough at the input she [the sister] had on my life because she went off when I was ten.  I still 
031 have my own mother [her mother died in the 80’s] but she was -- I don’t know -- an institutional 
032 mother.  It was an institutional type relationship a parallel between my mother sending me off to 
033 school at an early age and my sending my kids away. 
 
034 I think one way you are trying to keep some powerful feelings away is by turning our conversation to 
035 events in the past that are easier to talk about. 
 
 My response to her extended turn indicates that I understood her speech to be an 
agreement with the theory I had previously proposed, tying her practice of “turning our 
conversation” to her emotional grasp of the moment.  Her turn constitutes a collaborative 
completion of my assessment by doing what I (and Mrs. P herself in 014-015) had described.  
Although worded a bit differently (“powerful” instead of “overwhelming” and “events in the 
past” instead of “like an abstract concept”) the point is the same.  She disengaged from the 
experience by changing topics and contexts.  In her first extended turn she “dropped” her 
feelings by changing logical levels from particular to general; in this turn she changed from 
an approaching specific event to specific and loosely linked events in the past.  Both of her 
extended turns are characterized by speech that is confusing when heard in a real-time 
discussion, which affect communication by disrupting what one experiences as the seamless 
and transparent “exchange of information” or “flow” of words, as talking is often described.  
As noted earlier, this kind of speech Mrs. P and I have come to call her “curlicue thinking;” 
it is a kind of speech that disrupts both understanding the speech and the identity of the 
subject behind the speech.  In stark contrast, her response to my second interpretation is 
tight, to the point, and focused:  
036 Yeah to make the comparisons.  I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad.  I’m in extreme           
037 circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism. 
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So, what happened?  In other words, what’s the pragmatics of making a pragmatic comment 
in therapy – proposing a theory to explain why she produced talk that had the pragmatic 
effect of shifting the focus of the conversation to change her experience? 
Here, and in preceding instances, “Yeah” is an “agreement token” that also serves to 
indicate the speaker’s desire to take a turn (cf., Nofsinger, 1991 p. 74).  “… to make the 
comparisons.  I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad …” This utterance is another 
assessment, an explanation, to account for “turning our conversation to events in the past” 
(034-035).  Importantly, it differs from her previous assessment (019-020) in that at this 
point she has turned to assessing herself in the context of talking to me in here and now 
situation, rather than about some upcoming one.  Her sadness is active in the moment and 
not one among “15,000 things” to be “processed” in the coming week.  Let’s call this an 
assessment-explanation adjacency pair,23 where the explanation part of the pair is maximally 
relevant to the first-part assessment.  In other words it is as if I said, “you’re changing topics 
again” and she explains, “yeah, to figure out how I’m feeling” versus, “Yeah, and two weeks 
from now I’ll be upset.”   
So, the pragmatic effect of pointing out to Mrs. P the pragmatics of what I believed 
she had just done is (1) to move Mrs. P into selecting the position of sighting/citing herself 
as the subject of action in the here and now, an action that is the correlate to her immediate 
sense of herself and what was happening (her position as a perspective facing a field of 
issues, in Taylor’s (1998) terms), and (2) from this position Mrs. P explains what she’s doing 
(“trying to figure out”) and identifying the who she is that’s doing it (“I’m so sad”), which, 
                                                 
23 In CA adjacency pairs have the following characteristics, “(a) It is a sequence of two communicative actions; 
(b) the two actions occur adjacent to each other; (c) they are produced by different speakers; (d) one action is a 
first pair part  and the other is a second pair part , that is, they are sequentially ordered; and (e) they are categorized 
or type-connected so that any given first pair part must be matched with one of a relatively few types of 
second-pair parts.” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 51) 
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overall, (3) tightens her sense of a few things – rather than 15,000 – so they can fit into three 
utterances that comply with Grice’s cooperative principle.   
In the language of critical hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault, the effect of 
this power play, where my speech has the effect of inviting Mrs. P to respond by explaining 
herself, is to insist on practicing the “concept of reflexivity-in-interpretation.” (cf., Kögler, 
pp.251 –260).  Mrs. P’s response to my speech is to interpret her own action in the here and 
now, to say that her confusing speech was not just a sign of an attempt to avoid powerful 
feelings, but was a sign of working on her problem, “trying to figure out.” Her responses 
(036-037) are a reflexive explication of meaning – the meaning of her behavior and her 
identity.  By assuming this position for the first time in the session, Mrs. P engaged me as a 
dialogic partner – a “cosubject” or co-interpreter – on the topic of who she is in the context 
of what she is doing: 
In the ethical dimension [of the critical dialogic model], the subjects are dialogically 
constituted as autonomous cosubjects and are thereby seen as having a right to their 
own conceptions of self-realization.  The conceptions, however, may be undermined 
or constrained by the concrete contexts in which subjects find themselves….  The 
critical-hermeneutic objective consists precisely in correlating these concrete visions of 
the good and just [i.e., of self-realization, of identity] with contextual practices of 
power. 
        Thus, although the interpretive practice of critical dialogue pursues the goal of 
subjective self-distanciation so as to make possible greater self-realization, it leaves it 
to the subjects themselves the actual use of critique in terms of enhanced self-
determination. (Kögler, 1996, p. 253, emphasis in original) 
 
Part of speaking as a cosubject in our critical dialog was trying to shape my 
understanding of her identity and the identity of what she does.  Mrs. P’s utterances in this 
turn are qualitatively different from her previous speech and my response, a difference that 
is reflected in my subsequent turn. 
Mrs. P’s utterances were aimed specifically to me in response to what I said, less 
stream of consciousness – more about what I just noticed as another person in the room and 
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less like I am confined to be a spectator of different things going on in any number of 
situations where she is not with me.  Better yet, in her previous speech it’s as if I functioned 
as a chronicler (cf., “what you record” line 059, below) of different things she’s dealing with 
in her life rather than an interlocutor – just a sounding board for the happenings in different 
areas of her life.  The explanation Mrs. P’s offered was geared to shift my understanding 
from sighting/citing her previous speech as merely another deflection to an attempt on her 
part to make further sense about her “extreme circumstances,” (her words) of “falling apart” 
(my words). 
038 Perhaps a part of you is feeling sad, scared, and angry at your daughter for getting married as if    
039 she were deserting you now like you felt by your sister, and the problem is you don’t feel you have a 
040 way to contain these feelings inside. 
 
These utterances show that her move to repair alignment by explaining and thereby 
shifting my understanding of her prior move worked.  I changed from speaking about what I 
understood her to be doing to avoid a feeling to commenting on her identity as it struck me, 
as if she had said, “what kind of person am I that I am in this state?”  In my response I 
aligned with the topic of her identity in relation to her daughter, her sister and her feelings, 
an identity textured with “feeling a lot of conflict” (026) – “part” “sad,” part “scared,” and 
part “angry” in relation to her daughter’s wedding.  Mrs. P’s self-initiated repair worked.  I 
realigned my understanding of the topic and added to it.   
In terms of CKPP her move was an example of speaking from the DEPRESSIVE 
POSITION.  This will be addressed in the next session, since it is related to how the 
“feeding” is adjusted during the course of the session.  The task of this section has been to 
articulate the characteristics of “the food” offered in CKPP in the form of interpretive 
utterances.  The examination of these utterances led to the inquiry into their pragmatic effect 
to understand “the food” in terms of its communicative purpose. 
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The interpretive analysis reveals that the pragmatic effect of the food I was offering 
as an initiate of CKPP is a self-distanciated position for the patient to assume that involves 
critical reflection on the identity she adopted, which involves communicative behavior in the 
form of speech and emotional states, bound up with contextual social practices of power – 
social practices geared to act on the actions and understanding of another.  Moreover, 
adding to the findings from the first section that CKPP requires the assumption of a 
principle of symbolic expression as a part of its frame of controlled conditions, this 
“formula” has seven characteristics: 
· The use of specialized technical knowledge to inform how one understands and 
responds to the ongoing therapeutic conversation, stated in experience-near terms 
(i.e., without technical jargon) 
 
· The use of more or less verbatim note taking to “fix” the to and fro action of the 
conversation, and provide data or MATERIAL from which understandings are 
formed before being offered to patients in the form of: 
 
· Interpretations.  These interpretations are assertions that show the therapist’s beliefs 
about the patient’s experiential reality of: 
 
· The moment.  The here and now is the context the assertions index, usually through 
very explicit references, and 
 
· These assertions often take the form of a hypothesis or theory, in so far as theories 
involve a proposal telling how two or more events are logically, causally, 
chronologically, or experientially related. 
 
· The topic is taken from what the patient says or does first, 
· Either implicitly or explicitly – the principle of symbolic expression 
 
In one way this finding is unexpected, for the guiding metaphor of a mother feeding 
an infant would seem to suggest that the speech of the CKPP practitioner would be 
infantilizing, talking to the patient as though he or she were an infant.  In one sense this is 
accurate, since the fostering of infantile dependence is necessary for the “infant-in-the-
patient” to be addressed, be seen and understood by the therapist as a participant of the 
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therapeutic conversation.  However, it is not accurate in the sense that the practitioner of 
CKPP is somehow making the patient into an infant, anymore than a good-enough mother 
is bent on deforming the subjectivity of her children that she raises in a relationship of 
asymmetrical dependence. 
The paradox seems to lie in the approach of addressing or feeding the infantile-in-
the adult as the subject of his or her experience, with the ability to critically reflect on painful 
experience and do something about it now.  As Mitrani writes: 
Such experiences, as I have attempted to convey in this chapter, have convinced me 
that careful analytic listening and consistent interpretation of the ordinary patient’s 
experience in the here-and-now of the hour facilitate the emergence of the infantile 
transference, bringing it out into the open while at the same time mobilizing and 
mitigating certain anxieties and those protections constructed to deal with them. 
(Mitrani, 2001, p. 18) 
 
This paradoxical quality will be examined further in the next two chapters, since it requires a  
fuller articulation of CKPP’s approach to “feeding identity” that mobilizes anxiety (Chapter 
4) before examining (Chapter 5) how the “infantile transference” is fostered and examined 
simultaneously through interpretive utterances that convey a sense of being “understood 
without words” (cf., Klein, 1963/1975, p. 301). 
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4.  A formula for recognition 
An interpretation should convey no more exhortation or suggestion about what the 
patient should feel or do than a line call in tennis.  The linesman should simply 
report on whether the ball looked in or out from his point of view, with no claim to 
omniscience, and with no implication of what it should have been.  The impact that a 
good interpretation has on a patient is partly due to the fact that it is so free of 
exhortation, a fact that contributes to it being such a unique way of talking about 
intimate matters.  (Caper, 1999, p. 135, emphasis in original) 
 
This chapter addresses how CKPP uses the content of the patient’s speech and the 
sequential turn taking of the dialog to comprehend the patient’s situation and formulate 
interpretations.  These interpretations do not come from a “god’s eye view.”  They are 
formulated and evaluated on the basis of their effect on the joint exploration of the 
incomprehensible problem the patient seeks help with in each session.  Caper continues: 
The reason that something about the patient is obvious enough to be detected by the 
analyst, but unobserved by the patient is not that the analyst is especially perceptive 
or intellectually acute, but because the patient is especially unperceptive in the area 
needing to be interpreted.  The patient’s lack of perceptiveness is connected with his 
being in the grip of unconscious delusions, which makes critical, perceptive thought 
about them impossible.  (Caper, 1999, p. 135) 
 
Framing our question within the tropes of the feeding infant, the mother has an 
approach to feeding that takes into account the state of her baby.  She doesn’t try squirting 
the formula from a distance into her baby’s mouth or offer it with ice, for example.  Nor 
does her set of feeding practices include the act of holding her child upside down over the 
bottle.  And she doesn’t try – hopefully – feeding her crying baby if the cries are a response 
to a soiled diaper.  Feeding requires a process of adjustment: the right temperature, head 
held at the right angle, intervals between putting the nipple to her child’s mouth and letting 
the baby ingest, and so on.  Moreover, as the last example implies, it requires the mother to 
adjust her interpretation of what the baby needs based on her infant’s means of 
communicating (cries, gesture, etc.).  From the Kleinian perspective there is more 
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involved than the physiological pleasure of being fed; there is the matter of how the 
experience registers for the infant: the primordial feeling of being understood by the mother 
without words – the prototype for the capacity of enjoyment and a circumstance where the 
self gains a sense of security, belonging and meaning through being grasped by anOther.  
Beyond, or better yet, along with the milk formula is a formula for recognition that is 
required for the nascent person to develop a sense-of-self and its contents (possible 
meanings or identities), as much as proteins, vitamins, and minerals are required for his body 
and its contents (physical organs) to grow.  This recognition is required for the infant to 
develop sufficient capacities for managing existential anxieties: anxieties about having and 
not having, loving and hating the same person, making up and repairing its loving 
relationships, being and not being, and so on. 
Likewise, formulating interpretations requires a process of adjustment based on the 
responses of the patient – literal, symbolic, and nonverbal.  This section takes a closer look 
at this adjustment process, particularly as it relates to the aims of CKPP, which have now 
come into focus as (1) engaging the ‘infant-in-the-patient’ in a way that (2) fosters the 
capacity for reflection on the self in the context of its Other-relating practices that shape the 
self’s experience.  Specifically, the interpretive analysis will show that the adjustment process 
relies on (1) the symbolic inference of the emotional difficulties that Mrs. P confronts that 
are tied up with conflicts of identity, and (2) determining when she is engaged in 
understanding his or her problems – a self-distanciated position.   
In the terms of Habermas, this adjustment process leading to a self-distanciated 
position is the occasion for the “emancipation” of the patient by “becoming a subject.” 
Analytic insights possess validity for the analyst only after they have been accepted as 
knowledge by the analysand.  For the empirical accuracy of general interpretations 
depends not on controlled observation and subsequent communication among 
investigators, but rather on the accomplishment of self-reflection and subsequent 
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communication between the investigator and his “object,” … In the case of testing 
theories through observation … the application of the assumptions to reality is a 
matter for the inquiring subject.  In the case of testing general interpretations 
through self-reflection … this application becomes self-application by the object of 
inquiry. … The subject cannot obtain knowledge of the object unless it becomes 
knowledge for the object – and unless the latter thereby emancipates himself by 
becoming a subject.  (Habermas, cited in McCarthy, 1978, pp. 203-204) 
 
Thus, CKPP is a subjectivizing practice and the aim of this chapter is to show how it 
operates to provide the occasions for subjectivity to become.  This is accomplished by 
addressing the anxiety inherent in assuming the position of self-subject formation.  
 
Symbolic inference 
Provisionally, symbolic listening is the inference of meanings from the patient’s 
speech and other communicative behavior that are not explicitly expressed in their 
utterances.24  Let us call this the decoding practice of CKPP.  To the extent this decoding 
practice requires communicative moves that differ from everyday conversation, this 
interpretive analysis should be able to identify the decoding as the adoption of a particular 
position towards the content and sequence of Mrs. P’s speech.  Since this involves doing 
something through talking, thinking through the pragmatics of Kleinian symbolic 
interpretation may refine our grasp of this positioning.  In terms of the pragmatics of human 
communication, this decoding involves the translation of the patient’s analogic 
communications into the digital mode so that a problematic relational commitment can be 
made explicit and discussed.   
                                                 
24  For example, in the case of “John” described in the introduction above (pp. 9-10) it was inferred from his 
story about the car nearly hitting him that John was communicating about his anxiety in the session.  In that 
case the car symbolized the therapy, the driver was the therapist, and John’s gesticulating referred to his 
opening utterances of the session which were attempts to draw my attention to his suffering, and to which I did 
not respond, like the driver who was dangerously focusing on something else other than John’s crisis of the 
mom ent. 
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The quotes below refer to one of the “axioms” of the pragmatics of human 
communication outlined in Pragmatics of human communication: A Study of interactional 
patterns, pathologies, and paradoxes (Watzlawick et al., 1967).  What these authors argue is 
that in order for the content of any assertion or statement to be correctly understood the 
listener has to grasp the kind of relationship that is defined by the communication: 
Every communication has a content and a relationship aspect such that the latter classifies the former 
and is therefore a metacommunication.  (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 54, original emphasis) 
 
The ability to metacommunicate appropriately is not only the conditio sine qua non of 
successful communication, but is intimately linked with the enormous problem of 
awareness of the self and others.  (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 53, original emphasis) 
 
“That’s an order” or “I am only joking” are verbal examples of such communications about 
communications that one may hear spoken when the speaker perceives the listener either did 
not “get to it” in the former or took unintended offence in the latter example (cf., Ibid., p. 
53).  This relationship aspect of every communication commits the speaker and listener to a 
kind of relationship.  In the case of “This is an order” the relationship is an asymmetrical 
relationship of authority; in the case of “I am only joking” the relationship may be that of a 
friend, passive aggressive enemy, etc.   
The relational aspect of communication is meaningfully conveyed by analogic 
communication, which the authors define as nonverbal communication.  They caution, 
however, that by “nonverbal communication” they include gesture, the sequence, rhythm, 
and composition of words and utterances, as well as the context in which the 
communication takes place.  (Ibid, p. 62).  In the following excerpt, the cat communicates its 
relationship by means of acting it out.  The cat cannot say “be my mother” so it acts as if it 
were kitten with its owner, as if it were in the context of mothered: 
Thus, to take one of his [Bateson’s] examples, when I open the refrigerator and the 
cat comes, rubs against my legs, and mews, this does not mean “I want milk” – as a 
human being would express it – but invokes a specific relationship, “Be mother to 
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me,” because such a behavior is only observed in kittens in relation to adult cats, and 
never between two grown-up animals.  Conversely, pet lovers often are convinced 
that their animals “understand” their speech.  What the animal does understand … 
[is] the wealth of analogic communication that goes with speech.  Indeed, wherever 
relationship is the central issue of communication, we find that digital language is 
almost meaningless …e.g., courtship, love, succor, combat … in all dealings with very 
young children or severely disturbed mental patients.  Children, fools, and animals have 
always been credited with particular intuition regarding the sincerity or insincerity of 
human attitudes, for it is easy to profess something verbally, but difficult to carry a 
lie into the realm of the analogic. (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 63, emphasis added) 
 
The phrase “in all dealings with young children” is particularly relevant considering 
that Melanie Klein’s technical and theoretical innovations grew out of her analysis of young 
children.  In short, Klein translated the symbolic texture of her child-patients’ play through a 
process of identifying the child’s anxiety, interpreting what the child was communicating 
about a relationship through the play (the child’s metacommunication), and monitoring the 
child’s response to make adjustments to her understanding for the next round of: play-
moves, identifying anxiety, interpreting, observing (cf., Hinshelwood, 1994).  In the terms of 
Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson (1967) she was engaged in trying to adequately translate 
from the analogic into the digital, to talk explicitly about the relationship and the problems 
the children had with the commitment inherent in the communication – to the extent they 
engaged in symptomatic behavior.25  For Watzlawick, et al., a symptom is a non-verbal 
communication.  In terms of the case of Trude, described again below, the communication 
was on the order of, “It’s not me that wants to prevent Mom from making daddy’s babies at 
night because it’s hateful to me; it’s my night terrors and bed wetting.”  It was the hateful 
relation that she had difficulty committing to – except in play – until Klein digitalized it 
through interpretation. 
                                                 
25 Watzlawick et al. (1967) note that since analogic communication is characterized by the lack of negation, lack 
of qualifiers to indicate which of two discrepant meanings is implied, and the lack of temporal markers, that 
“Freud’s description of the id becomes virtually a definition of analogic communication.” (Fn8, p. 65) 
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I will now turn to consider the content and the causes of these early feelings of guilt 
by reference to another case.  Trude, aged three years and nine months, repeatedly 
played ‘make believe’ in her analysis that it was nighttime and that we were both 
asleep.  She then used to come softly over to me from the opposite corner of the 
room (which was supposed to be her own bedroom) and threaten me in various 
ways, such as that she was going to stab me in the throat, throw me out the window, 
burn me up, take me to the police, etc.  She would want to tie up my hands and feet, 
or she would lift up the rug on the sofa and say she was doing ‘Po—Kaki—Kuki’.  
This … meant that she wanted to look inside her mother’s bottom for the ‘Kakis’ 
(faeces), which signified children to her.  On another occasion she wanted to hit me 
in the stomach and declared that she was taking out my ‘A—A’s’ (stool) and was 
making me poor.  She then seized the cushions, which she repeatedly called children, 
and hid herself with them behind the sofa.  There she crouched in the corner with an 
intense expression of fear, covered herself up, sucked her fingers and wetted herself.  
She used to repeat this whole process whenever she made an attack on me.  It 
corresponds in every detail with the way she had behaved in bed when, at a time 
when she was not yet two, she started to have severe night terrors.  At that time, too, 
she had run into her parents’ bedroom again and again at night without being able to 
say what it was she wanted.  By analyzing her wetting and dirtying herself which 
stood for attacks on her parents copulating with each other, the symptoms were 
removed.  Trude had wanted to rob her pregnant mother of her children, to kill her 
and to take her place in coitus with her father.  She was two years old when her sister 
was born.  It was those impulses of hatred and aggression which, in her second year, 
had given rise to an increasingly strong fixation upon her mother and to a severe 
anxiety and sense of guilt which found expression, among other things, in her night 
terrors.  (Klein, 1955/1975, p. 5) 
 
 In this example, Klein demonstrates how she contextualized her symbolic 
interpretations of her child-patient’s behavior and speech.  Klein repeatedly emphasizes in 
her writings that “the generalized translations of symbols are meaningless” (cf., Klein, 
1926/1975; Klein, 1932/1975; Klein, 1952; Klein, 1955/1975), and that their interpretation 
must be contextualized to the transference – what they say and do with the therapist.  In 
other words, the symbolism that needs to be translated and interpreted is the symbolism that 
has to do with the relationship – that is, the analogical or metacommunicational aspect.   
 So, the decoding of CKPP is not just, “the inference of meanings from the patient’s 
speech and other communicative behavior that are not explicitly expressed in their 
utterances. (p. 91, above); it is translating the symbolic communications that tell the therapist 
how the patient is defining or trying not to define the relationship.  The “architecture of meaning” that 
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CKPP subscribes to can be characterized as follows: the secondary meanings that are 
inferred in and through the first are analogic metacommunications conveyed in and through 
the digital as well as non-verbal messages of the patient. 26  Moreover, since Kleinians believe 
the unconscious is structured of sensations interpreted as relationships (cf., fn 14, p. 61, 
above) from early childhood, the roots of these analogic meanings are the body and its 
functions in relation to the mother’s body; the baby’s body—mother’s body dyad are the 
metaphorical basis of language. 
So, for an example with regard to Kleinian theory, when Segal writes about a 
patient’s capacity to use words as symbols – a developmental achievement – she does so 
with reference to fecal attitudes in relation to the mother’s breast.  For purposes of 
illustrating the following passage, imagine a child that cannot play with clay, paint, or dirt.  
She has panic attacks around these substances because their identity is not distinct from her 
interpretation of them in terms of her phantasies.  The clay does not function as something 
that could mean any number of things – that is, as a symbol – its meaning is locked into that 
of persecutory-thing and is therefore sighted/cited as a frightening object – a symbolic 
equation, in Segal’s terms.  
When a substitute in the external world is used as a symbol it may be used more 
freely than the original object, since it is not fully identified with it.  In so far, 
however, as it is distinguished from the original object it is also recognized as an 
object in itself.  Its own properties are recognized, respected, and used, because no 
confusion with the original object blurs the characteristics of the new object used as 
a symbol. 
     In an analysis we can sometimes follow very clearly the changes in the symbolic 
relations in the patient’s attitude to his faeces.  On the schizoid level the patient 
expects his faeces to be the [introjected] ideal breast; if he cannot maintain this 
                                                 
26  Compare , “Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not 
satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first 
intentionality …What gives rise to this work [of interpretation] is an intentional structure, which consists not in 
relation of meaning to a thing but an architecture of meaning, in a relation of meaning to meaning … 
regardless of whether that relation be one of analogy or not, of whether the first meaning disguises or reveals 
the second meaning.  This texture is what makes interpretation possible, although the texture itself is made 
evident only through the actual movement of interpretation.”  (Ricoeur, 1970, pp. 16-18) 
96 
 
idealization his faeces become persecutory, they are ejected as a bitten-up, destroyed 
and persecuting breast.  If the patient tries to symbolize his faeces in the external 
world the symbols in the external world are felt to be faeces – persecutors.  No 
sublimation of anal activities can occur in these conditions.   
     On the depressive level, the feeling is that the introjected breast has been 
destroyed by the ego and can be re-created by the ego.  The faeces may then be felt 
as something created by the ego out of the object and can be valued as a symbol of 
the breast and at the same time as a good product of the ego’s own creativity. 
     When this symbolic relation to faeces and other body products has been 
established a projection can occur on to substances in the external world such as 
paint, plasticine, clay, etc., which can then be used for sublimation. (Segal, 
1955/1988, pp. 167-168) 
 
However, with regard to current Kleinian practice, “… the general tendency…is to 
talk to the patient, especially the non-psychotic patient, less in terms of anatomical structures 
(breast, penis) and more in terms of psychological functions (seeing, hearing, thinking, 
evacuating, etc.).  Together with this emphasis on function, concentration on the patient’s 
immediate experience in the transference often leads to discovery of deeper layers of 
meaning, some of which may be seen to be based on infantile bodily experience” (Spillius, 
1988b, p. 9).  To say, then, that the aim of CKPP speech is to “reach,” “address,” or “make 
contact with” the “infant-in-the-patient,” is to say that CKPP is focused on infantile 
messaging and message interpretation – the elements of communication that index the 
mothered context.   
The emphasis of CKPP on the relational dyad, viewed in terms of infantile modes of 
understanding is consistent with the view of Watzlawick et al., that the more “mature” and 
“healthy” the relationship the more the relational aspect of messages “recedes into the 
background” (p. 52).  This is due to the fact that “all analogic messages are invocations of 
relationship, and that they are therefore proposals regarding the future rules of the 
relationship” (p. 101).  Theoretically, then, the healthier the relationship the less conflict 
there is about who is what in their obligations to the other.  In contrast, infantile messaging 
and message interpreting is very much concerned with regulating the maternal relation, since 
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adequately ‘instructing’ the mother in terms of it’s needs (appropriately defining their 
identities vis-à-vis each other) is necessary for the infant’s survival, and infants do not have 
the capacity for digital communication, since digital communication requires words, syntactic 
logic, and the ability to translate from the analogical into the digital and back again. 
A characteristic that sets CKPP apart from everyday communication is CKPP’s 
emphasis on how messages are to be taken and given as invocations of relationships, their relational 
implications, rather than the surface content aspect (informative value) as is the case in everyday conversation.  
Perhaps, then, rather than refer to a principle of “symbolic expression” the rule of CKPP 
might be characterized as the principle of analogic decoding – the symbolic interpretation of 
the patient’s material in terms of his or her ongoing relational commitments and the identity 
claims and goals involved in those commitments.  Let us call this the “analytic attitude” of 
CKPP.  The adoption of this attitude by the therapist towards the patient’s speech is 
confirmed by the five questions Dr. R provided this author, since all of them point towards 
the live ongoing relational positioning of the patient-therapist dyad (cf., pp. 58-59, above).   
 
Formulating and reformulating 
… any communication, as we shall see, implies commitment and thereby defines the 
sender’s view of his relationship with the receiver.  (Waltzlawick, et al., p. 51) 
 
Communicating commits one to an identity and the sighting/citing of the other in 
one way or another in relation to that identity, as well as the possibility of having one’s 
identity commitments (claims and goals) contested.  And from the preceding section: (1) this 
kind of communicating is done symbolically through analogic communication, which (2) in 
CKPP is subject to analogic decoding – the symbolic interpretation of the patient’s material 
in terms of relational commitments and the identity claims and goals involved in those 
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commitments as they occur as a part of the ongoing conversation between the therapist and the patient.  
Thus, the governing question for this last leg of the interpretive analysis is:  How do the 
seven characteristics (Chapter 3), with particular emphasis on symbolic decoding (Chapter 4, 
previous section), figure into the construction of the ongoing therapeutic conversation in 
such a way that they contribute to the self-distanciated pragmatic positioning that 
characterizes “the food” of CKPP?  
According to CA everyday conversation has a turn taking structure.  So, to the extent 
the game of CKPP is “up to” something other than an everyday conversation, we can 
hypothesize that there will be a  departure not only in terms of what is said and how it is said, 
but when it is said through the course of the ongoing construction of the dialog.   The seven 
characteristics already outlined in the preceding chapter deal in one way or another with 
what is said and how the interpretive utterances are structured, but they do not provide a 
guideline for the way the therapist takes his or her turns when speaking with the patient.  
The eighth characteristic of CKPP is its turn taking structure.   
In other words, formulating these recognitions in interpretive utterances requires 
communicative work between the patient and the therapist.  Our primary interest is in the 
therapist’s side to this communicative work, which involves a further explication of CKPP’s 
hermeneutic presuppositions of understanding and how they contribute to what is said (the 
content of utterances), how it is said (the structure of utterances), and when it is said (how 
they affect the turn taking system).  
This does not mean, however, that the patient is seen as simply a passive receptacle 
for the therapist in the position of absolute objective-truth-speaker – a common 
misunderstanding of psychoanalytic practice in general.  Quite to the contrary, the following 
will show how the author’s understanding and communicative behavior was modified by the 
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patient’s actions.  Paradoxically, it will show that the turn taking system of CKPP is 
organized around instances when the patient is not participating as an “autonomous 
cosubject” (cf., Kögler citation, p. 85, above) of the critical dialog, even if that dialog occurs 
within a fundamentally asymmetrical power relationship of dependence.  In CKPP one 
intervenes when the patient is not working to understand his or her problems for his or her 
self.  
034 I think one way you are trying to keep some powerful feelings away is by turning our conversation to 
035 events in the past that are easier to talk about. 
 
036 Yeah to make the comparisons.  I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad.  I’m in extreme           
037 circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism. 
 
Again, Mrs. P corrected my understanding of her second extended turn by means of 
initiating a repair of alignment.  This was done through a retrospective sighting/citing of her 
turn and who she was as the subject of that turn: the identity of “trying to figure out why I’m 
so sad.  I’m in extreme circumstances” (036-037) as she grasps “my daughter’s wedding and 
the recent terrorism.” (037) My subsequent utterances show alignment to her assumption of 
the position “trying to figure out…” by giving her a characterization of herself in her 
“extreme” situation.  But how did I arrive at this characterization, since it includes terms not 
employed by Mrs. P such as “anger”, “contain…inside”?  
038 Perhaps a part of you is feeling sad, scared, and angry at your daughter for getting married as if  
039 she were deserting you now like you felt by your sister, and the problem is you don’t feel you have a 
040 way to contain these feelings inside. 
 
Following from the previous section, this requires interpreting the relational 
implications of Mrs. P’s communications, but how?  Taking an interpretive look suggests 
that it was based on adopting a particular position (analytic attitude) towards the content and 
sequence of Mrs. P’s speech thus far in the session, and towards her second extended turn in 
particular. 
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Mrs. P applies a specific emotional term to her identity – “I’m feeling guilty” (022).  
This shows that she understood my previous observation, “It’s like you drop your feelings 
that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them” (017-018), as indicating a problem to 
be corrected, since she agrees with the assessment and picks one feeling to focus on out of 
the miasma of “overwhelming” feelings.  In short, in response to “you drop your feelings” 
she names one, picking it up, as it were, to look at it rather than just standing in it. 
Mrs. P justifies her extended turn by explaining, “Yeah, to make the comparisons” 
(036).  What Mrs. P appears to be comparing are two different contexts in which some 
emotional component of the “extreme circumstances” is at work.  The first context for this 
upsetting state is motherhood as a backdrop of roles for evaluating her own role in her 
daughter’s wedding.  It is as if Mrs. P had uttered, “Is the feeling because I’m not taking care 
of things for her as a mother should, or maybe I’m a controlling mother like my own and I 
have no control that I feel I should?”  Yet in 028 she abruptly changes the context of the 
upsetting feeling(s) – is she still working on the feeling she called guilt? – to childhood (“I’ve 
tried to let my own children,” lines 026-027, is followed by, “the sister who I was in the arms 
of,” lines 028-029).  In the context of childhood the upsetting feeling is linked to her 
grasping her mother as institutional, and her sister as a mother-substitute-sister who, while 
more caring than an “institutional mother,” “went off” when Mrs. P was still a child in need 
of more than an institutional mother.27  The basis of the “parallel,”(032) then, is her grasp of 
significant people as leaving her, whether because they withdraw from her by leaving (the 
sister), sending her away or responding only out of duty (the institutional mother), or as a 
result of her decision (her sending her children away). 
                                                 
27  In a previous session Mrs.P had mentioned this memory as her first memory, back in infancy, of being held 
by her sister, wearing tartan, in front of a fireplace.   
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And if one assumes that these two ‘bad’ feelings are linked by virtue of their 
sequence in her speech – just as the last word of a sentence can change the meaning of the 
whole, or in CA the subsequent utterance shows how the preceding is to be interpreted – 
then Mrs. P’s “guilt” has to do with feeling guilt about the overwhelming sense of loss – 
grasping her daughter as leaving her by getting married.  Moreover, the other part of her 
“extreme circumstances” is the “recent terrorism” – i.e., people afraid in a situation 
involving the collapse of security and the loss of life (“end of life issues”; 9/11 context).  So, 
the extreme circumstance is feeling scared in the face of the loss of life (sadness) and feeling 
guilty about the magnitude of this feeling because it is interfering with her ability to fulfill her 
role as mother to her daughter.  
So, the position that changed towards Mrs. P’s extended turn and allowed for the 
formulation had to include grasping Mrs. P’s turn as an attempt to figure out what is 
upsetting her rather than just a deflection.  This involved the seven characteristics of CKPP 
already outlined (p. 87, above).  First, note taking was used.  Second, her material that was 
recorded provided the basis for my response.  Third, specialized technical knowledge was 
drawn upon to formulate how I understood and responded to her material (where did 
“angry” and “contain …inside” come from?).  Fourth, analogic data was inferred from her 
material and used to try and understand her immediate problem (“trying to survive this 
week” (001-002), facing “extreme circumstances”).  Fifth, explicit or digital data was 
employed to understand the problem.  Sixth, the responses were made in the form of 
interpretive utterances that asserted my beliefs about her experience in the moment, and 
seventh, these assertions took the form of a hypothesis.   
In Kleinian terms the analytic attitude is that her speech contained “representational 
content” that needed to be understood within the context of “[her] particular emotions and 
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anxieties and in relation to the whole situation which is present in the analysis” as Klein 
articulated the principle of symbolic interpretation in regard to her play technique (Klein, 
1955/1975, p. 137).  This implicates practices and underlying assumptions of CKPP.   
Mrs. P is ostensibly talking about what the separation from her daughter is to her, 
how she is painfully grasping it.  But this speech is produced in a session that is her last 
before she separates from the therapy.  Furthermore, she began the session talking about an 
“irony”: how in her new post her confidence in growing yet she is afraid.  Therapy is a work 
situation and Mrs. P is new at it – she has only been a patient for five weeks.  So, by this 
point in the session I was decoding that Mrs. P was distressed by the pending loss of me, as 
one on whom she depends like her sister-daughter-institutional mother (Compare, 067-068, 
p. 119, below, where I first explicitly stated this hypothesis to Mrs. P).  Furthermore, clinical 
tradition assumes that breaks in the treatment, whether holiday, sick days or sometimes even 
weekends, register as a significant loss for patients and that “you are safe in assuming that it 
will come up,” as Dr. R would say, regarding themes of loss before and after breaks in 
treatment.  And, as happened in this session, I often times forget this piece of wisdom until 
contexts of loss were implicitly or explicitly indexed during a session before a break.   
Translating the symbolic content (i.e., not just what she says but how she says it) of 
what Mrs. P says is a critical interpretive act.  And, as a critical interpretive act, it has a 
“ground of possibility” that “is made possible by a largely implicit preunderstanding.  This 
preunderstanding is internally differentiated into a symbolic sphere of basic beliefs and 
assumptions, a practical sphere of acquired habits and practices, and a subjective sphere that 
reflects biographical events and experiences” (Kögler, 1996, p. 251, emphasis in original).    
Retrospectively, for example, my use of the word “angry” could be an example of 
the subjective sphere, the symbolic sphere, or both informing the interpretive act.  In terms 
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of the symbolic register of Kleinian beliefs and assumptions, using “anger” instead of “guilt” 
may have been a misinterpretation based on the understanding that Mrs. P’s guilt was a 
result of unconsciously projecting and identifying her daughter as angry towards Mrs. P.  
The assumption in this case is that Mrs. P was unable to explicitly index (identify herself) as 
an angry person.  Instead she positions herself as guilty in the face of someone else’s anger – 
a punishment phantasy – which is really Mrs. P’s grasp of her daughter’s wedding.  In other 
words, a part of her would like to punish her daughter for leaving her, which is why she 
sights/cites her marriage as a bad thing.  In this case, citing “anger” is an example of trying 
to fit Mrs. P’s experience into a theoretical preconception that either does not match the 
situation at all or is not the salient issue in terms of her main anxiety of the moment.   
On the other hand, or perhaps in tandem with the symbolic aspect, it may have been 
that I uttered “anger” from the subjective register, where biographical events and 
experiences shaped my understanding as a critical interpreter.  In this case I derived “anger” 
from how I would feel if I believed someone were abandoning me and leaving me to fend 
off fears about death all by myself, or my own reaction to the twin towers attack.  “Anger”, 
then, would be an ASSOCIATION on my part that is not based on a theoretical 
presumption, but rather my own personality and personal experience.   
Finally, it could have been that Mrs. P struck me as angry – she might have referred 
to her daughter’s wedding in a derogatory tone.  In this case, to be with Mrs. P at this 
moment of the session would have been like being with a resentful person.  Using my 
experiential reaction to her self-presentation in this way would have been shaping or 
formulating my utterance in terms of the COUNTERTRANSFERENCE – recall that one 
of the five questions for framing the interpretive apparatus of CKPP is: what is it like inside 
to be with this person? (cf., pp 59-60, above). 
104 
 
Articulating “the problem” as Mrs. P not feeling she “has a way to contain these 
feelings inside” (039-040) also stems from the symbolic sphere of Kleinian presuppositions 
about reality. In colloquial speech, people sometimes say things like “I’m so excited I just 
can’t contain myself.”  This notion of containing oneself is also a technical concept 
developed in the Kleinian tradition, referred to as CONTAINING or CONTAINING 
FUNCTION.  To simplify the explanation, imagine a baby is crying at the top of his lungs.  
His mother is instantly alerted and scurries it to make sense of the cry.  It doesn’t stop when 
she holds him or offers him a bottle.  She checks his diaper, talking to him in a calming way.  
But as her baby screams louder she may begin to panic and believe her baby is also 
panicking.  Eventually she figures out he has an earache and puts some medicine in his ear 
while continuing to offer reassuring words.  In Kleinian lingo, the baby, unable to 
communicate through words, resorts to communicating by giving a piece, as it were, of the 
experience to his mother.  He “evacuated” his unbearable anxiety by putting it in his mother 
(SPLITTING it off and PROJECTING IT into her) who was able to make sense of it 
because she experienced it as in herself ( she “swallowed” the PROJECTIVE 
IDENTIFICATION), resulting in her doing things to help him tolerate it (she acted to 
CONTAIN it, provided a CONTAINING FUNCTION).  Ultimately this means putting 
words to the experience, since at some point the child can say, “mom I have an earache” 
rather than just start screaming (i.e., containing it himself).  Through the rest of his 
childhood there will be countless occasions where the mother will model how he is to handle 
states or situation that seem overwhelming.  It is this model that becomes his GOOD 
INTERNAL OBJECT whose primary function is to contain – i.e., make manageable – 
painful emotional experiences, so that they can be understood and communicated through 
words. 
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Asserting, “the problem is you don’t have a way to contain these feelings inside” 
(039-040) is in response to “I’m in extreme circumstances” and “overwhelmed.”  In other 
words, through her speech, Mrs. P was PROJECTING (as in actors projecting an emotional 
identity claim) distress, which stirred up some anxiety in me and I was trying to give it back 
to her through what I said in an altered form (the sense I made of it) – that might help her 
make more sense of it.  
But why did I provide the interpretive utterances when I did?  Up to this point the 
interpretive analysis has not examined how the turn taking system of everyday conversations 
is modified (if at all) for a CKPP therapeutic conversation.  We have just examined how the 
content and, to some extent, the construction of interpretive utterances is related to the 
critical hermeneutic preunderstanding of CKPP.  Now the challenge is to look at how the 
content, construction, and deployment of interpretive utterances worked together to constitute the 
author’s work during the therapeutic conversation.  This will be the eighth characteristic of 
CKPP tied to the practical, symbolic, and subjective spheres that govern the other seven. 
In CA turns are constructed around “transition relevance places” (TRPs): “the spot 
that participants recognize as the potential end of a turn, [the] place where a transition from 
one speaker to another becomes relevant” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 81).  TRPs can be words, 
phrases, clauses, or entire utterances.    So, did I understand the last word or entire utterance 
as the TRP of Mrs. P’s prior speech? (036-037) 
041 It could be.  Yeah. I feel like I’d add to them remorse.  Is remorse a feeling or are         
042 sad and remorse the same thing?  Remorse is the biggest and that comes to how I           
043 feel.  It’s limiting my concept of my daughter’s freedom.  It’s not like she’s being 
044 taken off to jail… 
 
 Neither.  I argue that identity claims can function as TRPs, conveyed through 
emotional signaling.  Simple behaviors may also function as TRPs in everyday 
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conversation.28  Mrs. P’s response, in fact, suggests that the TRP I recognized was her 
attitude displayed through her talk: “I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad” (036).  My 
interpretive utterances (038-040) provide something to help Mrs. P “figure out why”.  Mrs. 
P’s conditional agreement and adding of “remorse” shows that she understood my 
utterances as a means for comparing what she is feeling to how I described it, refining her 
own sense of what it is that she is having difficulty with, “I’d like to add to them remorse.” 
 In Mrs. P’s next turn she continues to talk about her problem with the wedding.  
She not only remarks that “remorse” is the “biggest” problem, but comments on how it is 
affecting her grasp of her daughter: “It’s limiting my concept of my daughter’s freedom.”  
This last remark suggests that in Mrs. P’s remorseful position she grasps herself as a 
defective mother (“feeling guilty” in 022) because the feeling of loss (“so sad,” line 036) was 
limiting the extent to which Mrs. P was open to her daughter having interests distinct from 
her own.  In fact her following utterance, “It’s not like she’s going off to jail,” could be an 
attempt to cheer herself up, as if I came out to my car to discover a flat tire and said, “well at 
least I didn’t get killed from it blowing out on the freeway.”   
Mrs. P continues to speak of the wedding although the tone changes with her grasp 
of what the event will entail for herself, particularly her “all [her] hopes, wishes and 
ambitions for a daughter that I’ll keep repressing.”  Notice the change in position that occurs 
in her next speaking turn if we divide her utterances into two units for closer examination: 
041-046 and 046-049.  Mrs. P explains that she is going to repress these things because she 
believes she is not supposed to cry.  Beginning with the next turn (halfway through line 046) 
she shows that she has changed her understanding from wedding as disaster to wedding as 
                                                 
28  Take, for example, a child whose mother turns to her and says, “don’t do that.”  The mother self-selected a 
speaking turn based on the child’s misbehavior.  Similarly, “don’t talk back” exemplifies a TRP based on an 
offensive attitude from the perspective of the parent, and so on. 
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having something good and even something great, exceeding expectations (“the most you could 
ask for,” line 049). 
044                     …  She’s getting married and she’s fine and I’m keeping all my    
045 hopes, wishes and ambitions for a daughter that I’ll keep repressing because I’m  
046 not supposed to cry at the wedding.  So I probably feel good about the ceremony  
047 itself, ca use it’s being worked on by both sides of the family.  But I guess the     
048 greatest thing about it is how both planned the ceremony should go, which is the  
049 most you could ask for in an interfaith wedding. 
It is as if she collaboratively completes the injunction not to show how upset she is by doing 
the “repressing”; she aligns with herself behaviorally and chooses to focus on the pending 
loss of her daughter as really a positive event after all.  Mrs. P does “repressing” by using her 
subsequent speaking turn to change her identity from mother-to-the-bride-painfully-
sighting/citing-her-separating-daughter to the ceremony critic who approves of “interfaith 
weddings.”  Rather than using her speaking turn to continue talking about her painful sense 
of her daughter’s wedding, Mrs. P interrupts herself as a mother and speaks from the identity 
of chaplain.  With this shift of identity she alters her emotional grasp of her daughter’s 
wedding.  Yet, it is not the chaplain who has the problem with the wedding; it is Mrs. P as 
the mother.  By shifting to her chaplain identity Mrs. P has stopped speaking about her 
problem, “why I’m so sad …in extreme circumstances.” 
And, like a collaborative completion, her utterances “makes relevant an acceptance 
or rejection in the next turn.”  I self-select a turn to accept her repositioning as a rejection of 
speaking about her problem, an assertion that Mrs. P ratifies in her next turn: 
050 Just now when you began to feel unbearably bad about your wishes for your daughter’s wedding you 
051 began to focus on the bright side. 
 
052 Yeah, that’s the annoying thing that happens.  Yeah.  Because I’ve always done that and I don’t 
053 keep going and I don’t know why or where I stopped but something over and blocks whatever I try to 
054 get at.  I’m sure that happens when I’m doing my work.  My PC Response score is totally on the 
055 supportive side [some personality type test they are given] It goes from authoritative to instructional 
056 to all way over to empathic and supportive responses – my natural responses are empathic and very 
057 supportive.  But I’m naturally that way, but I cannot keep going [with what she is feeling as first 
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058 mentioned], but that’s kind of improved since I started coming here as it’s been reflected in my        
059 verbatims [group supervision].  I want to know why I do the little cheery deal, which you record as 
060 my dramatic voice. 
 
 Again, my response emphasizes some element of the action in the here and now of 
our conversation (“Just now when…”) and articulated a sequential relationship between 
what Mrs. P experienced and what she did in response to avoid that experience.  Mrs. P’s 
response to this shows she understood it as a move on my part to select her behavior as the 
topic for conversation, since she starts to talk about it as “the annoying thing that happens” 
and cites it as a problem for discussion (“I’ve always done that…I don’t know why or 
where… whenever I try”).  This exchange is another assessment-explanation adjacency pair, 
like that noted above (pp. 84-85). 
However, she changes the topic of the action from herself (I asserted, “you began to 
focus on bright side”) to some thing that “happens” to her in the passive voice (“that’s the 
annoying thing that happens”).   Notice also that her description, “I don’t keep going”, 
applies to this extended turn as well, since her talking about this “annoying thing that 
happens” is interrupted briefly by describing her identity as a chaplain again, as defined 
through their evaluation instruments (“My PC Response score is totally on the supportive 
side”) before returning to me as the one who makes an evaluation of her (“…which you 
record as my dramatic voice”).   
So far, then, the interpretive analysis shows that there is a to and fro quality to the 
turn taking in which Mrs. P and I engaged.29  Mrs. P talked about a problem to some extent, 
then talked about something else, which I countered with interpretive utterances that had the 
                                                 
29  While there is a distinction, I think it is obvious that turn taking is related to the content of what is said, 
even if Nofsinger never explicitly states this.  Otherwise there is no way to account for a person abruptly 
changing topic (interrupting and usurping another speaker’s turn) when they are bored with what is being said 
by the current speaker.  The point of this section is that the turn taking structure of CKPP, as a facet of its 
communicative competence, involves “rules” for the exchange of talk based on what and how the patient is 
speaking and what is or is not being accomplished by his or her talking. 
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effect of shifting the topic of the conversation back to a problem of Mrs. P’s.  In turn, Mrs. 
P talked in a bit more detail about the problem until she stopped.  This pattern is not 
random.  It reflects a specialized communicative practice on the part of the practitioner of 
CKPP in response to a particular move or moves of the patient.  Provisionally, the eighth 
characteristic of CKPP can be characterized as: make interpretive utterances when the patient has 
stopped talking about his or her problem in a way that provides more detail about her experience of it.  This 
shows that there is more than formulating what one says; there is the issue of adjudicating 
the right moments for making one’s moves.  So, in addition to the content and construction 
of interpretive utterances, the practical, symbolic, and subjective spheres must figure 
prominently in shaping how the practitioner of CKPP participates in the turn taking system 
of the therapeutic conversation – the deployment of interpretive utterances.  Practically, there are 
specific practices regarding when to make interpretive utterances; symbolically, these practices 
are derived from assumptions CKPP makes regarding infantile existence, particularly 
infantile modes of communicating and thinking; subjectively, it was through my supervision 
experiences and communications with Dr. R that I learned most of the elements of the 
practical and symbolic spheres of CKPP. 
 As Dr. R described it, in the discourse of the Kleinian tradition “interpretations are 
food and therapy is a feeding.”  How to interpret – the deployment of interpretive utterances 
– is as complex as the mother learning to feed her baby.  Just as the right combination of 
nutrients, provided in the right amounts, at the right time, are required for the baby’s body 
to develop, so too the baby-in-the-patient needs a recognition formula, as it were – the food 
of identity.  Just as mother’s milk contains the nutrients for the baby’s body, this identity-
food (more colloquially referred to as understanding) is contained in the therapist’s 
utterances (usually called “demonstrating empathy” in therapy speak). 
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 A baby learns to feed as the mother learns how to feed her child.  At the time the 
baby refuses its food for different reasons.  What does the mother do at these times?  
Sometimes the mother persists because she believes the baby needs to eat even if a fever 
makes him cranky or he doesn’t like the new kind of food or flavor.  Sometimes the mother 
recognizes she has tried feeding too much at once and gives him a smaller portion or spoon.  
Sometimes she notices the richer formula causes diarrhea so she may dilute it a bit or hold 
off on changing the formula until she believes the baby is ready.  All of these adjustments 
require the mother to use her judgment and attend to the baby’s ways of communicating for 
her to decide what’s the right way to feed this particular baby – especially if her baby has 
problems feeding, digesting, metabolizing or excreting waste. 
 The same sorts of complexities face the therapist trying to make interpretations.  
Throughout my supervision with Dr. R, the topic of making INTERPRETATIONS has 
been addressed in terms of a few guidelines concerning when, what, and why.  On numerous 
occasions I was anxious before supervision, afraid of having made a mistake and said 
something wrong or stupid.  And every time Dr. R emphasized how what I said effected the 
“flow of the material”:  “It’s not about whether or not what you say is right or not; it’s about 
how it effects the flow of material … like a river and you are moving rocks and want to see 
how it changes the flow.”  This flow of material is the feedback of the feeding baby, how the 
baby comports him or herself in response to “the flow” from the mother.  “What [she] just 
did is like the baby turning her head and spitting out [her] food … notice how [she] had a 
hard time taking it in, it was too much” is one way Dr. R would talk to help me see how my 
attempts at feeding were going.  According to Dr. R, every patient presents with “a problem 
of feeding” and the therapist’s job is to feed and point out the problems with feeding, where 
“food” and “feeding” are the guiding metaphors for gaining greater experiential 
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understanding of themselves, that is, INSIGHT.  An understanding about their experience is 
spoken by the therapist (food), which the patient may or not: hear (“take in” or “ingest”), 
consider (work to “metabolize” or “digest” what’s been said), or respond to in a productive 
way (the excreta, as in the case where the patient may be said to “soil” the therapist’s work 
and negate what understanding he or she was able to consider). 
This INSIGHT consists of who the patient – in PHANTASY – believes they are, 
and how and what they do with significant others to participate in creating their conscious 
reality.  In CKPP this goal is conflict ridden for patients, particularly those with a reduced 
capacity for tolerating some of the painful emotional realities that are a part of the human 
condition. 
 Recall that the PARANOID-SCHIZOID POSITION is the condition where the 
person is faced with an unbearable emotional grasp of a situation and SPLITS it off – 
attempts to get rid of having to experience it – by attributing either the emotion or the 
practice that gave rise to the emotion to someone or something else, who/which is then 
identified on the basis of this disavowed part of the person.  In the PARANOID-
SCHIZOID position the focus is on preserving the self against destruction.  The evacuated 
aspect is felt to be persecutory, a threat to the self and therefore must be annihilated.  Since 
the other is seen as possessing the dangerous aspect, he or she is sighted/cited as threatening 
– “his faeces become persecutory,” as Segal might say (cf., Segal citation, pp. 95-96, above), 
or in garden variety manifestations, one might accuse someone of being a “shit” when they 
don’t give what one wants or expects.   
As long as this aspect of the person is disavowed in this manner then it cannot be 
understood as a part or product of the self; it belongs, it is someone else.  And, therefore, 
any attempts to understand the aspect as an experience of the self will be RESISTED 
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because it will intensify the MAIN ANXIETY that caused the aspect to be split off in the 
first place.  This is a simplified way to explain how “the use of primitive splitting defenses 
…are working against understanding” (Josephs, 1982/1989, p. 140). 
 On the other hand, in the DEPRESSIVE POSITION the foregrounding concern is 
the preservation of the other as the source of goodness upon whom one depends.  
Returning to our hypothetical infant, suppose the infant has begun teething and biting on 
the mother’s breast while feeding.  The mother begins weaning, which the baby experiences 
as a frustrating reality that he is forced to deal with.  Around the same time the baby has 
begun to acquire the perceptual and motor capacity to perceive the mother as a whole 
person, which makes it harder for him to separate the good and bad experiences into two 
separate images of the mother.  He begins to have to deal with the fact that the good and 
bad breasts are aspects of the same whole embodied person.  In this circumstance, his 
hateful feelings, when frustrated, conflict with the desire to love the same person.  The baby 
must then deal with another set of anxieties besides those of fearing for his own existence; 
he begins to have concern for the good-but-now-attacked-and-therefore-damaged-mother.  
He now has to struggle with the painful feeling of causing the loss of the good (guilt) and the 
fear that the good-but-damaged mother might retaliate as he wanted to destroy her (as bad): 
I said that the baby experiences depressive feelings, which reach a climax just before, 
during and after weaning.  This is the state of mind in the baby, which I termed the 
‘depressive position’, and I suggested that it is a state of mourning in statu nascendi.  
The object which is being mourned is the mother’s breast and all that the breast and 
the milk have come to stand for in the infant’s mind: namely, love, goodness, and 
security.  All of these are felt by the baby to be lost, and lost as a result of his 
uncontrollable greedy and destructive phantasies and impulses against his mother’s 
breasts … There is a constant interaction between anxieties relating to the ‘external’ 
mother … and the ‘internal’ mother, and the methods used by the ego for dealing 
with these two sets of anxieties are closely related.  In the baby’s mind, the ‘internal’ 
mother is bound up with the ‘external’ one of whom she is a ‘double’, though one 
which at once undergoes alterations in his mind through the very process of 
internalization; that is to say, her image is influenced by his phantasies, and by 
internal stimuli and internal experiences of all kinds.  When external situations which 
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he lives through become internalized, people, things, situations, and happenings – 
the whole inner world which is being built up – become inaccessible to the child’s 
accurate observation and judgment, and cannot be verified by the means of 
perception which are available in connection with the tangible and palpable object-
world, has an important bearing on the phantastic nature of this inner world.  The 
ensuing doubts, uncertainties and anxieties act as a continuous incentive to 
the young child to observe and make sure about the external object world, 
from which the inner world springs, and by these means to understand the 
internal one better.  The visible mother thus provides continuous proofs of what 
the ‘internal’ mother is like, whether she is loving or angry, helpful or revengeful.  
The extent to which external reality is able to disprove anxieties and sorrow relating 
to the internal reality varies with each individual, but could be taken as one of the 
criteria of normality.  In children who are so much dominated by their internal world 
that their anxieties cannot be sufficiently disproved and counteracted even by the 
pleasant aspects of their relationships with people, severe mental difficulties are 
unavoidable.  (Klein, 1940/1975, pp. 345-347, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, the DEPRESSIVE POSITION is the position of doubting one’s own understanding 
of reality by working to differentiate the identity of the Other-in-a-situation from one’s own 
PHANTASIZED presupposition of the Other’s being as a such and such.  One’s own 
emotional states are not immediately attributed to another as either their cause or effect.  
The thing or person can begin to be differentiated from one’s emotional grasp of the object.  
This is the “depressive level” of using symbols rather than the “symbolic equation” type of 
thinking Segal writes about in her above-mentioned paper. 
In the DEPRESSIVE POSITION there is “continuous incentive” to observe and 
makes sense of how the “external object world” matches or does not match one’s own 
preunderstanding of the people and events that world.  It manifests itself as a concern for 
others as separate persons – who they are, what they think, feel and need – outside the self’s 
own agenda.  Therefore, it is a situation where the person is able to differentiate a position 
they are taking on the world from a definitive grasp of the world or the Other in that world. 
Is the breast destroyed or just absent?  Am I hungry because the breast is withholding from 
me to punish me or do I see the breast as mean because I can’t stand feeling hunger pain?  Is 
my wife a bitch because dinner isn’t on the table as soon as I walk in the door when I expect 
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it, and therefore I should abuse her as she has ‘abused’ me – the paranoid/schizoid response 
– or is the missing dinner and hunger pain a sign my wife had some problem that she might 
need my help overcoming – the depressive position containment of aggression and concern 
for the object?  In other words, in the DEPRESSIVE POSITION one can understand 
aspects of self experience as aspects of self experience – not someone else’s experience – because 
they are able to CONTAIN them “to emotionally manage the likely vicissitudes of human 
relating, be that the therapist-patient relationship or the parent-child relationship (or the 
intimate adult couple relationship)” (Ruszczynski, 1999, p. 103).   
Thus, in CKPP DEPRESSIVE POSITION functioning is a required for critical self 
reflection, for INSIGHT into the self: 
All our patients come to us, we and they hope, to gain understanding, but how they 
hope to gain it must vary, I am suggesting, according to their position; that is, 
according to the basic nature of their object relations, anxieties, and defenses.  The 
very nature of the defenses used in the paranoid-schizoid position in itself militates 
against understanding; understanding is frequently, but not always, not what these 
patients want.  In fact, many are against understanding despite their protests to the 
contrary …I suspect that it is only those patients in the depressive position who can 
use understanding in the sense that we tend to think of the term ordinarily, I mean in 
the sense of discussing, standing aside from a problem, seeking, but even more, 
considering explanations … ” (Joseph, 1982, p. 140)   
 
In terms of technical implications for CKPP, Joseph’s and Steiner’s work (cf., 
Steiner, 1993) has emphasized the importance of monitoring “the position from which he or 
she [the patient] is operating, so that contact can be achieved and with it real understanding, 
as opposed to subtle acting out and pseudo-understanding” (Josephs, 1982, p. 150).  
Optimally, in other words, one becomes more proficient at feeding, offering the addition of 
some new element of understanding about the patient’s PSYCHIC REALITY in a useable 
form to help the patient with the task of figuring out his or her own problems – who they 
are, what they feel, what they want, what they say the want but don’t want, etc.   With this 
understanding it is assumed that the patient will be free to make decisions about what they 
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do or do not want to do with regard to what they previously did not know they did, the 
components that contributed to their problems. 
 Dr. R offered the following as a rule of thumb regarding when to interpret: “You 
only need to intervene when the patient is defending.”  This piece of advice was offered in 
the context of explaining that one can look at the flow of material in terms of three basic 
moments.  The first is ACTIVATION, where the patient is actively working on his or her 
problem from the DEPRESSIVE POSITION.  The second is ANXIETY or 
DEPRESSION where the patient begins to experience emotional upset from working on his 
or her problem.  This upset, at some point or other, becomes too much to deal with, so the 
patient then DEFENDS against the feeling and against working on the problem that 
brought up the discomfort.  It is this last moment of the three that Dr. R marked as the time 
to offer an interpretation, because if the interpretation is close enough to what the patient 
can recognize he or she will go back to ACTIVATION and the cycle starts over.   
In terms of the inquiry into the turn taking system of CKPP, this suggests that the 
TRPs of everyday conversation are modified in CKPP to include the identification of a 
pattern of speaking: an attitude towards the self and the subject matter under discussion.  In 
the portion of the session examined above, this turn taking pattern can be seen in my 
interpretive utterances (016-018) where I interpreted Mrs. P to be “deflecting” for the 
second time in the session against “overwhelming feelings … fears of falling apart.”  Mrs. P 
ACTIVATED in her subsequent speech (019-023), beginning to talk about her guilt and 
relating it to problem.  I understood the rest of her turn (021-023) as a DEFENSIVE 
maneuver, judging by my response (034-035) to her turn, sighting/citing her speaking about 
her past as “turning our conversation to events of the past that are easier to talk about.”  
However, her next turn initiated a repair, to realign my understanding of her turn as an 
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example of ACTIVATION, turns where she was “trying to figure out” a problem in her 
experience.  In response, I realigned my understanding, showing I agreed with her, by 
formulating interpretive utterances (038-040) regarding why I believed she was in such 
“extreme circumstances.” 
Mrs. P ACTIVATED again in the first portion of her subsequent turn (041-046).  
This time the painful feeling was called “remorse” which she was able to experience and talk 
about for five lines or so (041-046) before DEFENDING by focusing “on the bright side” 
as I described it (050-051) and she ultimately renamed “my cheery deal” (059) – after briefly 
DEFENDING again (054-057).  Notice how ACTIVATION depends on something new 
being added to the discussion on the table, more detail about her problem is added to the 
ongoing construction of the conversation. This is one way to identify if the patient is 
speaking from the DEPRESSIVE POSITION. 
In the terms of CKPP, most of the additions comes in the form of an 
ASSOCIATION, which Dr. R defined roughly as “when the patient takes something from 
the here and now of the discussion and adds something to it.”  The same definition also 
applies to the therapist, since the therapist’s associations (again, loosely defined as ‘what 
comes to mind’ while listening or talking about something) also shape what he or she says.  
For example, I told Mrs. P that (lines 038-039) “Perhaps a part of you is sad, scared, and 
angry …” For any of the reasons discussed above, “anger” was largely my associations to 
“my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism,” which I dropped as an explicit topic 
when Mrs. P brought up (added) “remorse” in her subsequent turn.   
 What you interpret ideally includes “something she doesn’t already know about 
herself.”  For when Mrs. P explained (036-037) “Yeah to make the comparisons …I’m in 
extreme circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism” I could have 
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MIRRORED her by replying with something like, “your daughter’s wedding seems like a 
catastrophe on the scale of the World Trade Center bombings.”  In effect, I would have 
been highlighting what she was experiencing or believed to be true about the state of things, 
but not adding some other element for her to consider how who she is (or what she does 
being the kind of person she is) is implicated in what and how she experiences (cf., “…and 
the problem is you don’t feel you have a way to contain these feelings inside,” line 039-040).  
As Dr. R reiterated, “your job is to make the unconscious conscious.”  So, another part of 
keeping the “flow of the river going” is the process of making something that Mrs. P does 
known to her that was unknown – although recognizable when shown to her – as in 052 
above, she agrees by asserting “that’s the annoying thing that happens.”  “That’s” was 
recognizable when point out, but simply done moments before and moments later 
(beginning with “My PC Response score…,” line 054), as seamless and un-thought-worthy a 
shift as changing gears while accelerating your car. 
 This extended turn of Mrs. P’s (052-060) also reveals something about the clinical 
phenomenology of SPLITTING, which up to this point has been described as trying to get 
rid of awareness of part of the self (pp. 76-77, above) that is rejected as part of the “me” (p. 
78, above), because it is experienced as unbearable (p. 111, above), and therefore impedes 
understanding one’s self in relation to others in a more differentiated manner (pp. 113-115, 
above).  As in Mrs. P’s extended turn above, throughout the session SPLITTING occurs 
when the subject who is speaking – the voice, the “I” of the utterances – abruptly changes because an 
emotional grasp becomes too much so it can no longer be the foreground subject matter of the talk.  Thus, 
one “I” starts to talk about “the annoying thing that happens … I’m sure that happens when 
I’m doing my work” (055).  But instead of say, going on to give an example and “make 
comparisons” to “figure out why” as she did in her second extended turn, the chaplain “I” 
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resurges again and relates it to how empathic she is.  Yet the ascendancy of the chaplain “I” 
does not last and her figuring-out voice, so to speak, regains saliency: “I want to know why I 
do the little cheery deal, which you record as my dramatic voice.”  In fact, the rise and fall of 
the chaplain “I” is one way to trace Mrs. P’s movements to the SPLITTING DEFENSE: 
“the most you could ask for in an interfaith wedding” (049); “processing things to do with 
my daughter’s wedding all this introspective stuff between now and Tuesday when I leave” 
(020-021); and the analysis of 005-015, where it was a lready shown to be a struggle to 
maintain the saliency of the chaplain “I” and its perspective on things.  Furthermore, notice 
that there is not a resurgence of her chaplain voice in the latter six-eighths (021-033) of her 
second extended turn, which I had erroneously sighted/cited (034-035) as defensive speech.  
 Now, in CA ‘occasioning’ is the way “[participants] are skilled in using utterances as a 
resource for constructing another utterance.  We will say that one utterance occasions a later 
one, or that certain talk was occasioned by certain earlier talk.” (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 69, 
emphasis in original).  Therefore, this interpretive analysis shows that more than utterances 
are occasioned in CKPP; a change of position was occasioned by my prior interpretive 
utterances. 
Mrs. P’s last utterance 059-060 is a question, which, based on my subsequent 
utterance, I understood as a request for a response to understand (“get at” or grasp) more 
about her “cheery deal” that “over and blocks” the emotion(s) she tries to speak about.  In 
this position, Mrs. P is ACTIVATED, sighting/citing one of her own social practices (the 
identity “cheery deal”) as the topic for discussion.  And this sighting/citing is occasioned by 
her alignment with my prior understanding, where I sighted/cited her deflecting speech.   
So, another way to talk about the cycle of ACTIVATION è 
ANXIETY/DEPRESSION è DEFENSE è INTERPRETATION è ACTIVATION is 
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that it defines a turn taking system organized around the occasioning of a position where the 
patient sights/cites something he or she does automatically, without awareness and how it 
affects some aspect of his or her experience.  I am arguing on the basis of the empirical data 
that just as one can align with the topic of talk to achieve understanding, one can also align with the position 
one takes towards the talk for understanding to take place.  I am also arguing this on the basis of 
theory since analogic alignment (understanding) is required for digital alignment. (cf., Waltzlawick et 
al.)  In the terms of Waltzlawick et al., my prior interpretive utterance analogically 
communicated a “proposal regarding the future rule of the relationship … by my behavior I 
can propose love, hate, combat, etc., but it is up to you to attribute positive or negative 
future truth value to my proposals” (p. 101).  What I proposed wasn’t hate or combat but 
critical self-reflection.  This is the physiognomy of “reflexivity-in-interpretation” (cf., Kögler 
citation, p. 85, above).  I showed or projected reflexivity – a reflective position towards one’s 
messaging – to Mrs. P, a sighting/citing of herself that she could (and did) align with by 
reflecting on her position.  In Kleinian terms this might be called an INTROJECTIVE 
IDENTIFICATION move on her part – “taking in” what I fed her. 
To the extent the relationship I proposed (a stance for herself to adopt towards her 
messaging) was critical hermeneutic reflexivity, we can expect the feeding to address the 
symbolic, practical, and subjective spheres as discussed above (cf., p. 102).  Recall Mrs. P just 
expressed a desire, “I want to know why I do the little cheery deal …”:  
061 Like I’ve been saying. I think these fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed get dropped and   
062 perhaps it’s because you don’t expect another person to stay with you and help you make sense of 
063 what feels overwhelming inside.   
 
064 Yeah. [tearing] that make sense.  Yeah because principle people at crucial ages for me they        
065 disappeared whether death or loosing a sister going to college or marriage is like a death.  Yeah. 
 
066 So, perhaps inside you feels out of control because of there are several death-like changes you are  
067 dealing with right now – the bombing of the terrorists, your daughter’s wedding, and the fact that we 
068 won’t be meeting next week because you won’t be here 
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The feeding is another assessment of her identity, sighting/citing her as too afraid of 
being left on her own to deal with “fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed.”  I was 
sighting/citing her identity in relation to another person as the reason she does the “little 
cheery deal,” that “annoying thing” that “blocks” whatever she “tries to get at.”  Thus, along 
with all eight characteristics already articulated, these interpretive utterances tie Mrs. P’s  
“cheery deal” way of dropping “fears of falling apart” (a social practice of the practical 
sphere) to beliefs about “another person [‘s]” reality (symbolic sphere) based on personal 
experience (subjective sphere) 
Of course the “another person” indexed here was myself; Mrs. P did not expect me 
to help her “make sense.”  The first introductory remark, “Like I’ve been saying” indexes the 
first and second responses I offered to Mrs. P in the session: “I think your feeling 
overwhelmed inside” (003), “your fears of falling apart … it’s like you drop your feelings that 
feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them” (016-018).  In fact, these interpretive 
utterances are almost a verbatim repetition of my second turn.   
Compare this recent exchange (below, box on the left) to the second one of the 
session (below, box on the right).  The difference between the two assessments is that the 
early one (at right) describes how she  “deflected” us and offers a theory about why – as if 
she sighted/cited us an unable or unwilling to “tolerate” them.  The latter assessment does 
not mention how her “fears…get dropped” but specifies how we might not “tolerate them”; 
the dropping is related to how she is grasping some other person – me – as leaving or not 
staying “with you to help you make sense of what feels overwhelming inside.” 
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Notice that in the beginning of the session I indexed our immediate here and now 
relationship using “I” and “we” whereas in 062 I said “another person” instead of “me.” In 
so far as the instruction of anxiety is to hide one’s identity that may offend the other, one 
may argue that it was out of my own anxiety that I said “another person” rather than “me” 
to avoid identifying (and thereby 
implicating) myself as the object of her 
fears.  In retrospect I did not want to be 
identified as so self-absorbed as to think 
that after only five sessions Mrs. P would 
need my presence so badly that the 
possibility of not having it for a week 
would register “like a death.”  In 
retrospect that is what I should have said, 
and what Dr. R would have pointed out as my own defensive maneuver to avoid something 
– perhaps the intensity of the patients’ TRANSFERENCE, or to avoid “being wrong,” or to 
And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached 
your fears of falling apart a part of you got scared and 
deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept.  
It’s like you drop your feelings that feel overwhelming 
as if we couldn’t tolerate them. 
 
Yeah, I’ve always done that. [Tears stream] Yeah, I’m 
probably going to be processing 15,000 different things.   
Yeah, processing things to do with my daughter’s 
wedding all this introspective stuff between now and 
Tuesday when I leave. [Tears stream] This isn’t very 
deep -- no for me it is -- I think one of these things is 
I’m feeling guilty because I haven’t been able to help out 
too much with my daughter’s wedding and it goes way 
back because I can’t remember anyone in my family 
who hasn’t really been totally involved in their 
daughter’s wedding plus the problems I have with the 
need to control, usually mom’s do their daughter’s 
weddings.  But I’m still from that tradition, so I’m 
probably feeling a lot of conflict about -- emotionally I 
have some input into this.  Intellectually I’ve tried to let 
my children make all the major decisions on their own.  
I think maybe I’ve identified with my own mother who 
was major controlling, which is what dynamic women 
are.  And the sister I was in the arms of -- I think I 
used her or she filled the shoes of my mother.  I think I 
haven’t looked enough at the input she [the sister] had 
on my life because she went off when I was ten.  I still 
have my own mother [her mother died in the 80’s] but 
she was -- I don’t know -- an institutional mother.  It 
was an institutional type relationship a parallel 
between my mother sending me off to school at an early 
age and my sending my kids away 
061 Like I’ve been saying. I think these 
fears of falling apart or being 
overwhelmed get dropped and 
062 perhaps it’s because you don’t expect 
another person to stay with you and 
help you make sense of 
063     what feels overwhelming inside.   
 
064 Yeah. [tearing] that make sense.  
Yeah because principle people at 
crucial ages for me they 
065 disappeared whether death or loosing 
a sister going to college or marriage is 
like a death.  Yeah. 
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avoid feeling like a “narcissistic fool” as Dr. R once called it.  This is an exa mple of how my 
COUNTERTRANSFERNCE anxiety (subjective sphere) shaped my utterance.   
Recall that Mrs. P and I had only met five times before, so it seemed like it would be the 
epitome of my own grandiosity to explicitly say “me” when all this time she has ostensibly 
been talking about World Trade Center bombings, her sister, mother, daughter, etc. – even 
though, as noted previously, I was indexing our relationship earlier in the session.  30 
 The second utterance in my response (062) shows that I have understood the point 
of much of her previous talk to be about Mrs. P being left, and modified what I understood 
to be the reason she was not talking about her feelings that “feel overwhelming” (003,017-
018), “some powerful feelings” (034) that she experienced as “unbearably bad” (050), 
“falling apart … feels overwhelming inside” (061-03).  The reason changed from her 
sighting/citing our identity as a couple “as if we couldn’t tolerate” to Mrs. P sighting/citing 
her own identity as left-alone to-deal-with (“you don’t expect another person to stay with 
you and help…” 062) that she will eventually identify as being an orphan (cf., 069-070, 071, 
078, below) 
 Mrs. P ratifies this assessment in her next turn and elaborates.  Yet notice how 
different Mrs. P’s elaboration is to my assessment here when compared with her two 
extended turns in the beginning of the session.  Here her response is an explanatory 
compliment to my move.  She is speaking from the position of the identity left-alone-to-deal-
with, (i.e., in the face of “principle people” who have “disappeared”) and from the vantage 
point of that identity she grasps deaths: “death or loosing a sister going to college or 
marriage is like a death.”  And by speaking as the subject of this identity, she is showing that 
                                                 
30  There was also another aspect to my COUNTERTRANSFERENCE anxiety.  Up until this session I had 
been worrying that Mrs. P was not going to come back for treatment after her holiday, which manifested itself 
in prior sessions when I would interpret that she wasn’t coming back or through double checking with her that 
she was planning to come back for her sessions the following week.   
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she is aligning with and ratifying left-alone-to-deal-with as the kind of person I had understood 
her to be.   
However, this explanatory compliment is much more succinct than her attempt at 
the beginning of the session (cf., Box at right, page 121), which is both more wordy and less 
coherent due to her anxiety as already shown (Chapter 3).  So, in this instance the pragmatic 
effect of “feeding” critical hermeneutic self-reflexivity – offering through discourse the 
occasion to assume a self-distanciated, sighting/citing of her identity – in a way that she 
could align with was that her speech became more coherent.  Thus, her anxiety was lessened; 
the urgency for avoiding an identity through deflecting speech recessed in saliency – at least 
for the moment.  In Kleinian terms my interpretation had a CONTAINING effect – I had 
“taken in” some of the anxiety Mrs. P was showing (“projecting”), “metabolized” it or made 
some sense of it, and fed it back to her as an understanding which she “took in,” and it 
helped reduce her MAIN ANXIETY through recognition.  Through feeding recognition 
came acceptance and an identity that had only been indirectly heard from the beginning of 
the session.  This identity has a voice concerned with losses in the situation of “like a death” 
(065).  The loss of a significant Other on whom she depended in an asymmetrical 
relationship is grasped as death, and it’s an overwhelming place from which to take a 
perspective and talk about.  This voice is in stark contrast to her “dramatic voice” as Mrs. P. 
characterized it above (060), that does its “cheery deal.” 
Indeed, Mrs. P described events linked with death in her first two extended turns: 
“people in crisis or end of life issues” in the context of her work (008); “the whole thing of 
counselors being sought out like madmen” in the context of 9/11 (011); the motherhood 
context of “my daughter’s wedding” (023); the childhood context of the sister who “filled 
the shoes” (029) of Mrs. P’s “institutional mother,” (031-032) who sent her off to school as 
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Mrs. P sent her own kids off to school.  Perhaps, then, these other contexts must be viewed 
in light of a supra-ordinate context, the context of death-like changes as mothered.   
In terms of the pragmatics of analogical and digital messaging, Mrs. P’s 
communicative behavior might be understood in the following way.  Mrs. P gave me the 
form that contained three “silences” that deal with analogical aspects of messaging.  If she 
had been able to translate her analogical propositions into digital language she might have 
completed the sentences with: “One of the easiest ways to hurt me is to desert me in my 
neediness because it’s like death”; “In relationship to me I wish men would not leave me at “principle 
times””; “In relationship to me I wish women would not leave me at “principle times”.”  Mrs. P 
then said that she was “trying to survive” the week.  Translating this digital content in terms 
of the analogical proposition, her message is “I’m in a state of panic because the rule of this 
relationship is annihilation by abandonment, so I don’t want to talk about it to you.” 
In my previous (066-068) turn, I showed that I understood her to be grasping her 
absence from therapy in similar terms – as a “death like” change, which she selects as the 
topic among the other events I mentioned:   
069 Yeah cause I like routine right and I’m not going to be here next week and I’m like one of those 
070 orphans – the smartest kids are the one’s who get abandoned in hospitals and learn to have to get 
071 along by being nice which fends off being orphaned.  Yeah, because that image just came to me right 
072 now I can – those little orphaned AIDS babies who have been dropped like a hot potato.  
 
 Mrs. P ratifies my addition of the absence of therapy from her life next week as 
another topic to be understood within the set of other death-like changes.  Indeed, she self-
selects it to continue talking about.  Missing therapy is a death-like change for “one of those 
orphans,” who like Mrs. P, must “fend off being orphaned.”  How does an orphan fend off 
being orphaned?  Unless, perhaps, what this contradictory statement implies is that as an 
orphan she is trying to fend off being kicked out of the therapy-orphanage by her new 
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institutional mother.  An orphan without an orphanage is on the street, homeless, and 
struggling to “survive this week.”  
In terms of emotional pragmatics, Mrs. P has a fearful grasp of having her existence 
negated (denied) by the withdrawal of the depended-upon Other.  She was sighting/citing a 
needed Other in an asymmetrical power relationship as reacting with dread in the face of her 
being too-much-to-handle, like a “hot potato.”  For de Rivera (1977, pp. 62-65) this is the 
grasp of panic, the emotion that instructs the self not to let the offending behavior, speech, 
or identity exist.  The orphan who has to act “nice” to “fend off being orphaned” is an 
orphan who cannot show her own distinct interests and concerns, like “those little orphaned 
AIDS babies” whose needs are so taxing and extensive that their mother’s leave them out of 
dread in the face of the challenge, dropping them “like a hot potato.”  Yet, it also seems to 
describe Mrs. P’s predicament in regard to her daughter’s wedding – she has to be the “nice” 
mother who doesn’t cry too much at her daughter’s wedding.  Mrs. P who previously 
described her mother as an “institutional mother” (031-032) now describes herself as an 
institutional orphan – one left in the hospital facing death, terminally ill no less.  Cast in this 
light, her second remark of the entire session, “I’m trying to survive this week” takes on a 
literal significance as a expression of panic, particularly given the fact that her first utterance 
is an admission that she was not compliant – not the “nice orphan” – not having completed 
the form as I had requested weeks earlier.  
The verb “dropped” is noteworthy, since the other things that have been assigned as 
the objects of dropping during our conversation are her feelings in relation to another (“It’s 
like you drop your feelings that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them” 017-018, 
p. 63, above; “these fears of falling apart or being orphaned get dropped … because you 
don’t expect another person to stay with you and help you make sense…” 061-062, p.121, 
126 
 
above).  It is Mrs. P’s AIDS baby (a baby feeling overwhelmed) identity that has been 
dropped by her speech that deflects, even though she has been attributing that dropping to 
her sister, daughter, mother and me as the therapist-mother; in Kleinian terms she has been 
PROJECTIVELY IDENTIFYING her sister, daughter and me as “institutional mother[s]”. 
So, when Mrs. P self-selects to speak in this turn by choosing the topic of her 
absence from me in the week to come, she has turned and grasped her therapy with me as an 
institutional relationship where she is terminally ill and under the threat of abandonment for 
her neediness by me, identified as the institutional mother.  Hence, Mrs. P was grasping me 
as a dread-filled institutional mother and her grasp was that of panic, the panic of having her 
existence as a separate being negated should it be sighted/cited.   
073 What I’m hearing is that right now you live with fears of being dropped by me like you felt dropped 
074 by your mother as a baby 
 
However, I was not the one who has been dropping her orphaned AIDS baby identity through 
deflecting speech.  As this record shows, I was doing the opposite.  I was actively pursuing this 
voice through refining my grasp of who Mrs. P was: forwarding a grasp of her identity and 
adjusting it based on what she said and did through her responses, then forwarding it again 
in three or four successive cycles.   
Yet, it seems that this is not the only grasp Mrs. P may have of me at this point, since 
she is continuing to talk from the perspective of the AIDS baby-self.  Recall, in the 
beginning of the session she said, “…and it’s ironic too because at the same time I feel like 
I’m making some progress in my new post.  In one sense it’s all brand new and in another 
it’s what I’ve always thrived on – it’s like crisis”  (005-006, p. 63, above).  So, if the “crisis” 
she has always “thrived on” is her state of panic as left-alone-to-deal-with (p.121, above), 
and then what is “all brand new” might be the contradiction that I was not leaving-her-
alone-to-deal-with now, in her “new post” as a patient.  In other words, the “irony” she 
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mentions is that something about this relationship is not how she expected it to be, like the 
other relationships of asymmetrical dependency in which she has been. 
This section has examined these cycles as the turn taking system of CKPP that is 
organized around occasioning not just understanding, but a specific position or attitude 
towards what is understood and how it is understood.  The analysis showed that the 
pragmatic function of these cycles is grounded in the critical hermeneutics of CKPP and its 
presuppositions of understanding.  Their purpose was shown to give feedback – pun 
intended – that is characterized by reflexivity-in-interpretation, where the analogical aspect 
of the patient’s messaging is translated into digital interpretive utterances.  When Mrs. P 
recognized her situation in what I said it contained the anxiety that made it difficult for the 
patient to digitize the analogical aspects of her experience.  Finally, when the patient 
momentarily swallowed the feeding, she assumed a self-distanciated position of critical self-
reflection where she worked to translate the analogical aspects of her experience into digital 
communication.   
However, showing the positioning of the patient in front of a point where she may 
or may not pivot, turn and adopt the role of critical self-reflection does not address how 
talking to the “infant-in-the-patient” is necessary for subjectivizing work of CKPP. This 
following chapter, after a summary of findings from the first two, will look into this 
question.  
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5.  Weaning: Discussion and conclusion 
At weaning time the infant feels he has lost the first loved object – the mother’s 
breast – both as an external and as an introjected object, and that his loss is due to 
his hatred, aggression, and greed.  Weaning thus accentuates his depressive feelings 
and amounts to a state of mourning.  The suffering inherent in the depressive 
position is bound up with an increasing insight into psychic reality, which in turn 
contributes to a better understanding of the external world…  Failure in working 
through the depressive position is inextricably linked with a predominance of 
defences, which entail a stifling of emotions and phantasy life, and hinder insight. … 
It is only by analyzing the negative as well as the positive transference that anxiety is reduced at 
the root.  In the course of the treatment, the psycho-analyst comes to represent in 
the transference situation a variety of figures corresponding to those, which were 
introjected in early development (Klein, 1929; Strachey, 1934).  He is, therefore, at 
times introjected as a persecutor, at other times as an ideal figure, with all shades and 
degrees in between.   
     As persecutory and depressive anxieties are experienced and ultimately reduced in 
analysis … the earliest frightening figures undergo an essential alteration in the 
patient’s mind. …  Good objects – as distinct from idealized ones – can be securely 
established in the mind only if the strong split between persecutory and ideal figures 
is diminished, if aggressive and libidinal impulses have come closer together and 
hatred has been mitigated by love.  Such advance in the capacity to synthesize is 
proof that the splitting processes, which, in my view, originate in earliest infancy, 
have diminished and that integration of the ego in depth has come about.  When 
these positive features are sufficiently established we are justified in thinking that the 
termination of an analysis is not premature …  (Klein, 1950/1975, pp. 44-47, 
emphasis in original) 
 
TERMINATION is the term for the situation where the therapist-breast disappears 
“irrevocably.”  This chapter will argue that contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytically 
oriented psychotherapy as a whole and as the turn taking system governing each session may be 
understood as weaning.  Provisionally, then, weaning is the situation of asymmetrical 
dependence where self-subject formation is fostered at the same time that infantile desires, 
fears, and phantasies are elicited so they can be mourned – not reinforced.  This, then, is the 
endpoint or “goal” of CKPP viewed as a language game, as a specialized type of 
communicative competence.  
129 
 
This study has employed a hermeneutic methodology to articulate the specialized 
communicative competence of CKPP.  It has shown that CKPP is a specialized discourse 
and as such it has a unique way in which it coordinates behavior with, “… a set of norms, 
preferences, and expectations relating language to context, which speaker-hearers draw on and modify in 
producing and making sense out of language” (Ochs, 1990, p. 289, italics in original).  And, as a 
specialized discourse it requires the therapist to possess a specialized communicative 
competence, “basic qualifications of speech and symbolic interaction (role behavior) at his 
disposal” (Habermas, 1970, p. 138).  The aim of this discourse is an environment for “self-
formative processes” (cf., McCarthy, 1978, pp. 203-205).    
This environment is made up of controlled conditions that include everything from 
the length of the sessions and the fee to seven characteristics that typify how, what, why 
(Chapter 3) and when (Chapter 4) the therapist speaks.  The therapist uses interpretive 
utterances to occasion the self-initiated positioning of the patient in a critical self-reflective 
manner (Chapter 3) – where the patient examines his or her experience in terms of basic 
background assumptions, social practices of power, and biographical events (Chapter 4).  
Formulating and reformulating these interpretive utterances in terms of relational content 
(analogical decoding) and timing was shown to draw on the presuppositions of 
understanding – symbolic, practical and subjective spheres – that make up the critical 
hermeneutics of CKPP (Chapter 4).  This process of formulating and reformulating, in turn, 
defines the turn taking system of CKPP that requires the seven characteristics of CKPP 
already outlined (Chapter 3).  Finally, the turn taking system of CKPP that organizes 
interpretive utterances by governing their deployment defines the self-formative processes of 
CKPP as weaning. 
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However, what remains to be discussed is the implication of this communicative 
competence to understand the paradox of subjection, defined as the longing to submit and 
be subject to a power in order to become as a subject.  How does CKPP address this 
paradox of subjection?  And how is the handling of anxiety in CKPP the means by which 
the “infantile transference” or situation of infantile dependence is created through the 
deployment of interpretive utterances that articulate the sighting/citing of identity?  In other 
words, what is the allure and anxiety of weaning? 
The anxiety of weaning is posited as the anxiety of existing as a separate being-in-
time with another who demonstrates the capacity to articulate aspects of experience and 
motivations better than the patient does for him or herself.  The transgressively intimate 
utterances of the therapist create an intimacy in a conversation that is lopsided and therefore 
intimidating.31 Thus, the asymmetrical relationship of dependence is a necessary condition 
for CKPP to operate, since it simulates (or indexes in CA terms) the asymmetrical 
relationship of dependence in infancy.  In so far as the experience of the mother’s body is 
being-in-time for the infant, becoming a separate self in time involves a loss, a negation 
within this pre-dualistic milieu to for recognition of the infant’s separate being.  Thus, the 
absences of the mother in weaning, as the first signs of her existence as separate from the 
infant, are experienced as the sign of death – a threatening negation within the infant’s 
existence, of separation from the source of the self’s meaningful recognition.   
                                                 
31  According to An elementary Latin dictionary (Lewis, 1891/1993) the word “intimate”(verb) is derived from 
the Latin intimates, pp. of intimare “to put in,” “announce,” and the superlative intimus, “innermost,” “deepest,” 
and “profound.” Likewise the adverbial form intime is defined as the “inwardly.”  Thus, as intimate utterances 
about the patient, the interpretations of CKPP are announcements of the inward or innermost.  In so far as the 
indexical preposition “in” populates my interpretive utterances and Mrs. P. aligns with them this 
characterization would appear to hold true.  Tracing the process by which the therapeutic discourse of CKPP, 
as an ontological accomplishment, creates this “inner” is one aspect of CKPP that will not be addressed in this 
study.  
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On the other hand, the patient desires alignment with the therapist’s interpretive 
utterances because learning how the self works within the attentive gaze of a depended upon 
other mitigates the anxiety of being a separate self in time – one feels one belongs to another 
on the very basis one fears not belonging.  This reverses a double estrangement (within the 
self who speaks and between the self and the other) by a double recognition (by the self that 
recognizes the experience in the sightings/citation of the other).  In other words, whatever 
aspects of being-a-self-in-time cannot be brought within the set of sharable experiences on 
the basis of language remain terms of exclusion from others and from the self that is one 
subject among others, by virtue of a shared communicative competence in time – hence, 
they are terms for a sense of a present and future isolation both inside and outside the self.   
Thus, the discussion will require some further analysis within an altered interpretive 
framework.  For what will be shown (next section) is that in CKPP the therapist’s utterances 
transgress the range of the patient’s experience (the “horizon” called consciousness) and 
thereby open a site for the patient’s unnamed anxiety to be worded within the discursive site 
occupied by therapist who works to sight/cite it.  It is hypothesized that these transgressive 
utterances are alluring because they satisfy the following condition.  In so far as they are 
based on decoding the cryptic expressions of the patient, they re-create the situation where 
the part of the self that attempts to be understood without having to communicate explicitly 
can be satisfied – that is, it can avoid the paradox of adult subjectivity by exempting itself 
from the communicative requirements of intelligibility as an adult subject.  In short, the 
transgressive utterances provide the occasion for the pleasure of being intimately known.  
They are literally intimate utterances characterized by announcing what is inside the patient.  
This pleasure, in turn, is related to the isolation from a lack of intimacy and the anxiety 
involved in production of this intimacy. 
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It turns out that the paradox of subjection is the paradox of being together with and 
yet separate from the therapist.  CKPP addresses this paradox in that the job of the therapist 
is to embody the displacement or deferral of this paradox for the patient by articulating the 
patient’s preverbal expectations of the therapist, thereby dislodging them from their 
definitive role in defining the patient’s reality with and towards the Other.   
 
 
Weaning: The allure and anxiety of becoming a subject 
This section examines how CKPP addresses the patient as the subject of his or her 
experience and shows the patient how and what they unwittingly do to prevent self-
subjection.  Self-subjection is an intimate sighting/citing of experience in language, which 
allows problematic experience to become the subject of the patient’s conscious 
understanding and thereby his or her conscious action.  This is what Dr. R referred to in her 
injunction to “describe the patient’s inner experience.”  In other words, the patient can gain 
greater subjectivity in his or her life and feel less subject to problematic experiences.  This 
will require adjusting the interpretive framework of the analysis to re-examine how the 
discursive work noted in the previous chapter contributed to subject formation.  It turns out 
that addressing the infant-in-the-patient is central in CKPP because the infant-in-the-patient 
is the boundary where problematic experience can be materialized in discourse.  The infant-
in-the-patient is a nascent (pre-verbal) self-possibility.  Once materialized, it can become a 
basis for the self to subjectify its own experience. 
In Freud’s theory the structure of the mind is composed of three main parts 
differentiated by their functions.  The id, most closely related to the body, is the 
reservoir of the instincts and thus the source of all mental activities.  This means that 
it is the dynamic matrix from which the other systems, ego and super-ego, derive.  
The id represents a person’s unconscious, most primitive and elemental urges, which 
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are dictatorial and do not know compromise or renunciation.  The ego is the 
interpreter and intermediary between the various parts of the mind and the outside 
world.  The super-ego is the internal representative of the person’s most important 
objects, his parents, the internal residue of his earliest and most important emotional 
ties.  It is the system of all morality, conscious and unconscious. 
    These differentiations are brought about by the fact that the individual exists in a 
world on which he is dependent by virtue of his instincts: his wish to keep alive, his 
desire for pleasure and his fear of destruction. 
     It seems evident that an organism, which depends to vast extent on organisms 
and powers outside itself, for attaining its purposes, must be influenced and changed 
by such contacts.  Now what are the processes by which these alterations 
(differentiations of the original substance) are brought about?  I intend to show in this 
section the role, which the mechanisms of introjection and projection play in relation 
to these changes.  (Heimann, 1953, p. 122, emphasis added) 
 
In the Kleinian tradition INTROJECTION and PROJECTION serve as the terms 
for trying to understand the development of the person by means of exchange between inside 
and outside to avoid the mind-body-world cleavages.32 The phantasies about the inner world 
are the relational meanings ascribed to the infant’s bodily experiences: breathing, eating, 
voiding, burping, cramps, sounds, lights, etc.  Trying to imagine this requires suspending 
one’s adult natural attitude where the body operates as a backdrop for whatever we see, say, 
                                                 
32   Heimann, Isaacs and Klein were aware of the problem of using dualistic terms for explaining how the infant 
comes to have a self be virtue of its relations with others:   
   
The phantasies about the inner world are inseparable from the infant’s relation with the outer world 
and real people.  It is only a limitation in our means of description, which makes it appear as if there 
were two distinct entities, which influence one another, instead of one whole, one multi-faceted 
interacting experience.  (Heimann, 1953, p. 156) 
 
It was said by Dr. W. C. M. Scott, in the Discussion at the British Psycho-Analytical Society, 1943, 
that the adult way of regarding the body and the mind as two separate sorts of experiences can 
certainly not hold true for the infant’s world.  It is easier for adults to observe actual sucking than to 
remember or understand what the experience of sucking is to the infant, for whom there is no 
dichotomy of body and mind, but a single, undifferentiated experience of sucking and 
phantisizing.  Even those aspects of psychological experience which we later on distinguish 
as ‘sensation’, ‘feeling’, etc., cannot in the early days be distinguished and separated.   (Isaacs, 
1952, Fn2, p. 92, emphasis added)  
 
    The Kleinian doctrine of phantasy can be viewed as an attempt to overcome the dualistic constraints of 
language.  In order for there to be a shared world, there must be a way to account for that which is not shared, 
figurable in spatial terms of inside and outside.  Phantasies are ‘distortions’ of the shared world embedded in 
the body.  Thus, the concept of phantasy is an attempt to overcome the mind/body self/other dualisms.  
Furthermore, if there were only one world as some would like to think, then how could there ever be creativity 
or alterity?  A monism of Being is not the only alternative to Descartes’ ontological dualism. 
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hear, and do (cf., Merleu-Ponty, 1962/1992).  For the infant the body and its mobile flux of 
experiences are in the foreground of its awareness, since it has to learn how to exist as a 
body-in-time with Others.  If the light is too bright then close your eyes and turn away; if the 
colors are pleasing to the eye then stare and grab the thing being dangled.  The first 
challenge for the infant to master – one that is so overpracticed for adults that we are 
scarcely aware it goes on – is how to gain some control over what goes in and out of his or 
her body, physically, perceptually, and emotionally: 
Life is maintained through an organism’s intake of foreign but useful matter and 
discharge of its own, but harmful, matter.  Intake and discharge are the most 
fundamental processes of any living organism. The mind, also a part of a living 
organism, is no exception to this rule: it achieves adaptation and progress by 
employing throughout its existence the fundamental process of introjection and 
projection.  The experiences of introducing something into the self and expelling 
something from it are psychic events of the first magnitude.  They are the basic 
processes, not only for maintaining life (as in physical metabolism), but for all 
differentiations and modifications in any given organism.  Such taking in and 
expelling consists of an active interplay between the organism and the outer world; 
on this primordial pattern rests all intercourse between subject and object, no matter 
how complex and sophisticated such intercourse appears.  (I believe that in the last 
analysis we may find it at bottom of all our complicated dealings with one another.)  
The patterns Nature uses seem to be few, but it is inexhaustible in their variation. 
     The combined action of introjection and projection accounts for the change of a 
part of the id into an ego; disturbances in this interplay lead to failures in 
development… 
     The view that introjection and projection are the architects of the mental 
structure and that they build up the ego [and super-ego] from the beginning of life is 
not held universally among psycho-analysts.  It is mainly the work of Melanie Klein’s 
researches, which have yielded the data enabling us to appreciate this role of 
introjection and projection. (Ibid, p. 129) 
 
Take the following situation as an example to illustrate internalization.  One week 
you visit your friend with her infant and, like dozens of times already, she changes his diaper 
by holding onto his legs at the ankles and lifting his bottom to pull out the soiled diaper 
while talking to him in “you” terms (“You’re such a good boy,”  “Oh, you’re all dirty,” and 
so on as mothers can do).  Two weeks later you visit her again but you notice that while you 
are playing with the baby he suddenly lifts his legs while on his back, a behavior you haven’t 
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seen before.  You ask and his mother says, “Oh, that means he has to be changed … You’re 
such a good boy!”  The baby has managed to connect the internal sensation of discomfort 
with a behavior to make a claim on mother and thereby effect a change in the flow of his 
sensory experiences.  All this is tied together with the auditory sensation of “you’re …”   
 Throughout the duration of infancy and early childhood he or she will hear 
thousands of “you” predications.  It is through bringing his or her experiences into material 
language that the subject is formed from “the original substance” Heimann refers to in the 
quote above.  Yet for this to happen the infant and child must gradually give up the phantasy 
of OMNIPOTENCE that has been easily assumed by the infant, given the scenario just 
described, since it lends itself to the experience that he controls his world (his body-mother’s 
body) as an extension of his desire of the moment: 
The essential difference between infantile and mature object-relations is that, 
whereas the adult conceives of the object as existing independently of himself, for 
the infant it always refers in some way to himself.  It exists only by virtue of its 
function for the infant, and only in the world bounded by his own experiences.  
Whilst in reality the infant is utterly helpless and depends for the maintenance of his 
life completely on his mother (or her substitute), in phantasy he assumes an 
omnipotent position to his objects; they belong to him, are part of him, live only 
through and for him – he continues the pre-natal oneness with the mother…. 
     Two main patterns follow from the operation of introjection and projection in 
early object-relations, and their interaction leads to confusing and unstable situations. 
     (1) The infant’s feelings about his objects essentially revolve around their being 
‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ (and they are closely knit with his sensations) 
     (2) Within the fusion between self and object the infant tends to usurp the 
object’s ‘good’, i.e., pleasurable qualities, and treat them as belonging to the self, and 
to disown his ‘bad’ painful qualities and treat them as belonging to the object.  In 
other words, there is a tendency to introject what is pleasurable and to split off what 
is painful.  The connection between projection and badness is of particular 
significance for the understanding of infantile anxiety33  (Heimann, 1953, p. 142-143) 
 
 However, the omnipotent attitude is also the source of death anxiety.   Just as 
omnipotent gratification is interpreted as oneness with a perfect being, so omnipotent hatred 
                                                 
33  Heimann notes in a footnote to this passage the example of “the little boy who, seeing his baby sister 
sucking at his mother’s breast, pointed to it and said to his mother: ‘That is what you bit me with.’”   
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is interpreted as the threat of Armageddon; if love can conjure a heaven of perfect being 
then hate conjures hell and the end of being.  If all goes well, this anxiety and omnipotent 
attitude motivates the young child to learn language and play with things as symbols, since he 
or she seeks to discern, confirm, and disconfirm phantasies in every tangible thing (blocks, 
trains, words, pets, the therapist’s body parts and faculties) representing his or her own 
organs and their functioning in the context of a relationship.34  Indeed, in the Kleinian 
tradition the acquisition of language and development of cognitive capacities, contra the 
classical Freudian position, is motivated by the drive to better manage the anxiety and 
emotional pain of life – not to get rid of them as so many discharges.  Language helps the 
young child to deal with his or her anxiety as a temporal being facing the recurrence of 
painful and pleasurable experiences. 
Klein postulated that the sense of time begins with the birth experience – the 
prototype for a sense of before and after or “periodicity” (cf., Klein, 1923/1975, p. 99).  This 
implies that for Klein a baby’s being as a being-in-time is to be understood as repetition that 
first occurs in the context of the changing relationship to the mother’s body.  Being heaved 
into the world from the comfort of the womb is the prototype for time, life, and death.  It is 
a prototype for life in that the infant has a phantasy of the oneness that was. In other words 
the longing for the lost oneness within the mother becomes the prototype for the sense of 
                                                 
34  Isaacs offers a vivid example where this process can be derailed into a neurotic symptom:  
…a little girl of one year and eight months, with poor speech development, saw a shoe of her 
mother’s from which the sole was flapping about.  The child was horrified, and screamed in terror.  
For about a week she would shrink away and scream if she saw her mother wearing any shoes at all, 
and for some time could only tolerate her mother’s wearing a pair of brightly coloured house shoes.  
The particular offending pair was not worn for several months.  The child gradually forgot about the 
terror, and let her mother wear any sort of shoes. At two years and eleven months, however (fifteen 
months later), she suddenly said to her mother in a frightened voice, ‘Where are Mummy’s broken 
shoes?’  Her mother hastily said, fearing another screaming attack, that she had sent them away, and 
the child then commented, ‘They might have eaten me right up’. 
     The flapping shoe was thus seen by the child as a threatening mouth, and responded to as such, at 
one year and eight months, even though the phantasy could not be put into words till more than a 
year later.  Here, then, we have the clearest possible evidence that a phantasy can be felt, and felt as 
real, long before it can be put into words.  (Isaacs, 1952, pp. 90-91, italics in original) 
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“life,” the breast identified as good.  Similarly, the urge to reject the painful change of birth 
becomes the prototype for the sense of “death,” the breast identified as persecutory, and, 
together with the sense of time, paranoid anxiety – the possibility of being persecuted by the 
future, by what might come next as the sign of a “death,” a bad breast.  The baby has an 
urge to be (Eros) and a hatred for what it does not want to be (Thanatos) in time, since 
his/her being is bound to repeat itself in one way or another.  This implies that the infant’s 
relationship to the mother’s body is the paradigm for time and how he or she will fair 
(good=life or bad=death) from one moment to the next.35   
Thus, at some point the baby begins to differentiate painful states (loss of being = 
loss of oneness with the mother) from death and does this with and only with the help of the 
mother, who CONTAINS the anxiety, particularly as the baby begins the process of 
weaning, when “oral aggression” is at its peak (the baby can now bite the unsatisfying 
breast).   
Coming to our main problem, we find that the child feels, when the breast is wanted 
but not there, as if it were lost for ever; since the conception of the breast extends to 
that of the mother, the feelings of having lost the breast lead to the fear of having 
lost the loved mother entirely, and this means not only the real mother, but also the 
good mother within.  In my experience this fear of the total loss of the good object 
(internalized and external) is interwoven with feelings of guilt of having destroyed 
her (eaten her up), and then the child feels that her loss is a punishment for his 
dreadful deed; thus, the most distressing and conflicting feelings become associated 
with frustration, and it is these which make the pain of what seems like a simple 
thwarting so poignant.  The actual experience of weaning greatly reinforces these 
painful feelings or tends to substantiate these fears; but in so far as the baby never 
has uninterrupted possession of the breast, and over and over again is in a state of 
lacking it, one could say that, in a sense, he is in a constant state of being weaned or 
at least in a state leading up to weaning.  Nevertheless, the crucial point is reached at 
the actual weaning when the loss is complete and the breast or bottle is gone 
irrevocably.  (Klein, 1936/1975, p. 295) 
                                                 
35  For Phillips (1998) the “violent encroachments” of the “accidental eventness” is the ontological boundary 
that Time itself presents, inciting the infant to “dramatize spatially” through phantasy and create the inner-
outer distinction as well as the impetus to knowledge of the unpredictable “outer” world.  “In this sense, 
external reality is an a priori condition of infantile development, as the ‘outside-in-the-inside’ or the enigmatic 
object in the phantasy” (p. 172). 
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The baby needs the mother to help him differentiate what possible experiences put 
him in the face of death and which do not, so that every frustration from change does not 
feel like death – an unbearable state.  Where she is successful the baby is able to 
INTROJECT this security – make it a part of self-experience.  The painful experience can be 
CONTAINED, and later, understood and communicated through verbal language.  This is 
the contemporary Kleinian conception of EMPATHY. 36 
For Bion the elements of the baby’s (or patient’s) experience that register but have 
no distinct meaning are “beta elements.”  The mother (or therapist), by CONTAINING, 
uses her “alpha function” to make the beta elements less concrete and material by putting 
her baby’s experience into words (“Oh, its O.K., you just have an ear ache”). Again, the 
soothing and cooing and sensuous qualities of the words “bind” the anxiety of death the 
pain of the earache stimulates.  While the earache may still hurt, the infant can suffer the 
pain more easily because the edge of the annihilation fear has been removed by the mother’s 
understanding.  Beta elements are one example of      ,   Bion’s symbol for the contained.  
Alpha function is an example of       , his symbol for the container.  
The archetype for            is the mother’s breast/infant.  The scene … is of an infant 
in pain (patient’s mind) searching for and being found by the mother’s breast 
(analyst’s mind).  Bion’s conceptualization is that the personality is constituted out of 
dual elements:          .  In this case the patient’s mind had not developed the concept 
of a strengthening           .  This is neither a static situation nor one in which the 
infant is passively being ‘held’; Bion’s theory is that it is dynamic.  There is a      
seeking a      , and there is an intercourse between the two.  (Symington & 
Symington, 1996, p. 52) 
 
So, for Bion, the baby searches for a sense of itself in the mother’s mind, an identity that can 
make sense of an experience that registers but has no determinate form, an agitating gap, as 
it were, in his or her sense of self-in-a-situation.  Following this line of thinking, the therapist 
                                                 
36  For an explication of the Kleinian conception of empathy in terms of projective identification, 
container/contained, beta elements, and alpha function see Etchegoyen (1977). 
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job is to contain the patient’s unbearable experience through his or her understanding and 
model for the patient the           so the patient can gain a sense of confidence in the strength 
of their self to bear pain by understanding it.37  Yet, how can this process be examined as a 
result of productive dialog?  Gadamer’s examination of the relationship between the word 
and experience may shed some light on this question, since the therapist is not aiming to 
provide an experience that never occurred but a new experience through his or her 
discourse: 
Although in bringing up children, for example, parents may try to spare them certain 
experiences, experience as a whole is not something anyone can be spared.  Rather, 
experience in this sense inevitably involves many disappointments of one’s 
expectations and only thus is experience acquired.  That experience refers chiefly to 
painful and disagreeable experiences does not mean that we are being especially 
pessimistic, but can be seen directly from its nature.  Only through negative instances 
do we acquire new experiences, as Bacon saw.  Every experience worthy of the name 
thwarts an expectation.  Thus, the historical nature of man essentially implies a 
fundamental negativity that emerges in relation between experience and insight. … 
     [Insight] always involves an escape from something that had deceived us and held 
us captive.  Thus insight always involves an element of self-knowledge and 
constitutes a necessary side of what we call experience in the proper sense. … 
     In it [experience in general] all dogmatism, which proceeds from the soaring 
desires of the human heart, reaches an absolute barrier.  Experience teaches us to 
acknowledge the real. …  Real experience is that whereby man becomes aware of his 
finiteness. (Gadamer, 1960/1994, p. 356-357) 
 
For Gadamer consciousness is the experiencing self; every new experience is a 
moment of self-awareness since it involves the thwarting of a prior desire for what was 
anticipated in experience.  Thus, having been thwarted, the desire that conditioned the object 
as it was anticipated becomes both an object of self-awareness and the limit of the self.  
Hence a real experience “is that whereby man becomes aware of his finiteness.”  Moreover, 
the medium of this real experience is language, since: 
                                                 
37   For Bion ATTACKS ON LINKING are attacks on the process of         and        uniting to form an 
understanding, a conception.  
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Being that can be understood is language. …  To be sure, what comes into language 
is something different from the spoken word itself.  But the word is a word only 
because of what comes into language in it.  Its own physical being exists only in 
order to disappear into what is said.  Likewise, that which comes into language [as 
the totality of meaning] is not something pregiven before language; rather, the word 
[as a part of the totality of meaning] gives it its own determinateness. (Ibid., pp. 474-
475)  
 
Similarly, a desired experience (expectation) outside of language is not an experience subject 
to a consciousness.  It is an indeterminate urgency from which experiences can be brought 
into language and given a place within what can be understood as the self.  Trude could not 
tell her parents what was terrifying her at night, nor could the little girl Isaacs describes (cf., 
fn 34, p. 136, above) say what horrified her about her mother’s broken shoes. 
Just as Gadamer is not arguing that all Being is reduced to language, this does not 
mean that the indeterminate urgencies do not exist or find alternate expression, just that that 
expression is not one that can be consciously understood as a piece of self-knowledge, and 
therefore remains as a foreign body to conscious experience.  Instead it “comes out” in 
some other analogical (pre-digital) way as a symptom (in the case of pathology).  
Furthermore, since the desired experience cannot be renounced before it is announced it 
prevents new experiences from occurring, which is another way to describe the “repetition 
compulsion”; the patient has a block in terms of being able to learn from experience and 
thereby the generation process of new experiences from the old grinds to some kind of halt, 
whether it is experienced as anxiety, depression, a compulsion, obsession, and so on: 
That is why the person who is called experienced has become so not only through 
experience but is also open to new experiences… the perfection that we call “being 
experienced,” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows better than 
anyone else.  Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone 
who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and 
the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new 
experiences and to learn from them.  The dialectic of experience has its proper 
fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in its openness to experience that is made 
possible by experience itself.  (Ibid., p. 355) 
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On this account, to view pathology as the result of “developmental arrest” is to view 
pathological expressions as the clues to areas where new experiences are not possible and 
avoided: every patient is inexperienced in some area and is struggling with the allure and 
anxiety of becoming more experienced in this or that area of life by bringing these 
experiences into language.  There is a tension involved in leaving the comfort of familiar 
experience and with it the deep-seated or “sedimented” ontological preconceptions about 
the self and the world.  In this sense there is always a virtual “infant-in-the-patent” in the 
process of languaging experience and on the verge of a breakdown in its virtual (expected) 
world, which is an anticipation of the destruction of his or her familiar life.  Becoming, then, 
can be conceived as iteration or the repetition of the self that has been modified through the 
languaging of some new aspect of experience.  Weaning as the becoming of the self is the 
unfolding of a new time in a new space of issues by means of the word and the relational context of 
power, difference, and repetition (where time = the repetition of passing presents) within which the word is 
uttered. 
The word organizes a heterogeneous network of events, compressing as it were, the 
urges and sensations that impinge from within and without into the ready-made, molded, 
acoustic surface of the spoken word.  Figuratively speaking, the result is a moment of 
subjectivity embossed from the flows of inner and outer perception – a space for the 
“you’re” cited by mummy at a point in time for the infant to occupy as part of the intelligible 
human world.  The baby projects a distress and introjects from the mother a material 
understanding that binds the distress – in part – by organizing it among her other “you”s 
(the “You’re so dirty” depends on a “You’re so clean,” since the meaning of either one 
depends on the contrast with the other).  Every apparently wonderful, ecstatic, terrifying, 
outrageous, and overwhelming experience of the child’s can find a home in a predicate of 
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the mother’s utterances.38  However, to benefit from this seemingly magical transformation 
of terror and distress into belonging, the infant must subject him or herself to the “saying 
power” of the mother’s words. 
 The infant is not forced from the outside to accommodate itself to the structure of 
language, because in order for a desire to produce its effect it must register its claim upon 
the world; verbal language becomes a new vehicle for its expression and organization.  
Getting emotional is the infant’s means for expressing desire, betraying a grasp of its 
situation in need of expression by analogical (nonverbal) or, later, digital (verbal) means:3940 
                                                 
38   Heimann’s paper does not address how introjection and projection operate as the infant begins to acquire 
language explicitly.  Although given the notion that it is the digital aspect of language that admits of logic, time, 
syntax, etc., the following passage suggests that the greater organization of the id into a dynamic relation with 
the ego and super-ego is a function of the child’s induction into linguistic competence:  
… the phantasies about internalized objects are uncoordinated, full of contradictions and of changes 
from one extreme feeling to another, and highly unstable.  Experiences with the outer world, with real 
people, are taken over and continued, partly with great distortions, under the sway of the instinctual 
urges.  In accordance with the modifications of instinctual aims, which, represent instinctual 
development and interacts with the progressive development of the ego, the infant’s phantasies about 
his internal objects also change.  The process can be described in terms of unification, 
consistency and stability; gradually the ‘internal objects’ assume an abstract character.  
Phantasies about living entities within the self develop into ideas and mental work with 
concepts, a process which begins in quite young children.  At the height of maturity this system of 
phantasies is resolved into the fo rmation of an integrated ego and a uniform super-ego.  That this, 
however, is achieved only in varying degrees, and may be again disrupted under conditions of strain, 
with the result that the primitive phantasies reappear, is a daily observation for the an alyst.  (Heimann, 
1953, pp. 156-157, emphasis added) 
39  Although this follows from de Rivera’s account of emotions, it may also provides a solution to a problem he 
was unable to address.  He argues that, “The idea of a matrix of emotions suggests that any particular emotion 
is the outcome of a pattern of “choices” that organize our relationship with another” (deRivera, 1977, p. 71)  
DeRivera distinguishes between a “decision” (conscious choices) and a “choice” (unconscious choices that 
structure how an event will be construed by emotional understanding).  However, he does not explain why one 
“choice” should be made over another.  It may be better to conceive of unconscious desire as the governing 
factor.  Just as perception is an interpretation based in an intention of the body which can only change with 
action (cf., Merleu-Ponty, 1962/1990), so an emotional apprehension of a situation depends on a governing 
desire that can only change with a change in desire as it is experienced (i.e., not simply by means of intellectual 
knowledge). 
40  The research of Stern (1985) is an example of how current developmental research has verified the notion 
that infants have an inborn capacity and means for interpreting their experiences.  From the perspective of 
cognitive science, Lakoff and Johnson argue that the sensorimotor systems of the infant are the basis of the 
“embodied mind” and rationality in a “cognitive unconscious,” which develops out of the metaphorization of 
sensorimotor experience: 
Our most important abstract concepts, from love to causation to morality, are conceptualized via 
multiple complex metaphors.  Such metaphors are an essential part of those concepts, and without 
them the concepts are skeletal and bereft of nearly all conceptual and inferential structure.  
     Each complex metaphor is in turn built out of primary metaphors, and each primary metaphor is 
embodied in three ways: (1) It is embodied through bodily experiences in the world, which pairs 
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From the moment of birth, the drive engages in a binary expression: sensation/affect 
and the object both coexist, and the presentation of the object clings to sensation.  
The Kleinian phantasy is the mechanism of this juncture, of the drives’ destiny to be 
both inside and outside: it is an “object-seeking” drive. (Kristeva, 2001, p. 142) 
 
However, this does not mean that the process of accommodating itself to spoken language 
by means of INTROJECTION and PROJECTION are conflict free.  For Butler this is the 
site of subjection, its paradox and ambivalence: 
In Althusser’s essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” the subordination 
of the subject takes place through language, as the effect of the authoritative voice 
that hails the individual.  In the infamous example that Althusser offers, a policeman 
hails a passerby on the street, and the passerby turns and recognizes himself as the 
one who is hailed.  In the exchange by which that recognition is proffered and 
accepted, interpellation – the discursive production of the social subject – takes 
place.  Significantly, Althusser does not offer a clue as to why that individual turns 
around, accepting the voice as being addressed to him or her, and accepting the 
subordination and normalization effected by that voice.  Why does this subject turn 
toward the voice of the law, and what is the effect of such a turn in inaugurating a 
social subject? … To desire the conditions of one’s own subordination is thus 
required to persist as oneself …. It is not simply that one requires the recognition of 
the other and that a form of recognition is conferred through subordination, but 
rather that one is dependent on power for one’s very formation, that that formation 
is impossible without dependency, and that the posture of the adult subject consists 
precisely in the denial and reenactment of this dependency.  The “I” emerges upon 
the condition that it deny its formation in dependency, the conditions of its own 
possibility.  The “I,” however, is threatened with disruption precisely by this denial, by its 
unconscious pursuit of its own dissolution through neurotic repetitions that restage the primary 
scenarios it not only refuses to see but cannot see, if it wishes to remain itself.  This means, of course, 
that, predicated on what it refuses to know, it is separated from itself and can never quite become or 
remain itself. (Butler, 1997, pp. 5-9, emphasis added) 
 
For Butler (1997) to be a subject is to have been given a place in language 
(subjection), “to occupy the site of the subject” where one can “enjoy intelligibility only to 
the extent” that one is “established in language” (pp. 10-11).  In other words subjection is 
fulfilling the conditions of intelligibility, where the person occupies a site worth the 
sighting/citing of the Other on whom the person depends.  In turn, by desiring subjection 
                                                                                                                                                 
sensorimotor experience with subjective experience.  (2)The source-domain logic arises from the 
inferential structure of the sensorimotor system.  And (3) it is instantiated neurally in the synaptic 
weights associated with neural connections.  (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.73) 
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one is enabled to exert power on the social order; one assumes a position of social weight, as 
it were, and can make a sense that has (discursive) effects on others.  This is how subjection 
is also the condition of possibility “to be a site of alteration” (p. 11).  If the baby doesn’t 
submit to the mother’s understanding of his cries, how can he ever hope to be understood 
and secure his food by crying and gesturing in the “hungry” way rather than the “wipe my 
bottom” way?   Drawing on Butler’s work suggests that the desire and fear of the therapist’s 
utterances stems from a primary “passion to be,” as Butler argues, but also a passion to not 
be dependent – “what it refuses to know” – because this dependency in an asymmetrical and 
intimate relationship has become the sign of the formed “I”’s extinction.  The therapist’s 
voice, then, is the sight/cite for hope and danger.  
Subjection requires mourning for desires that are prohibited if status as a subject is to 
be granted by the loved and needed Other(s).  In Gender trouble: Feminism and the 
subversion of identity, Butler (1990) used Freud’s account of melancholia to think through a 
new way to understand gender identity and sexual orientation based identity as 
performatives: the iteration through bodily action and expression of a claim upon which the 
“I” that says I am “man,” “woman,” “heterosexual” or “homosexual.”  To preserve the love 
from the parents that embody and speak the taboo against homosexuality, for example, the 
child gives up homosexual desires, gratifications, and fantasies by becoming their negation, a 
subject who could then utter in latter life with certainty “I could never be gay.”  Thus, Butler 
argues when examining identity as performative in general, “The formula “I have never 
loved” someone of similar gender and “I have never lost” any such person predicates the “I” 
on the “never-never” of that love and loss.  Indeed the ontological accomplishment of 
heterosexual “being” is traced to this double negation” (Butler, 1997, p. 23).   Extending this 
process to identity formation in general, this double negation is the “foreclosure of desire” 
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that is the condition of the subject, the “I” that speaks, because it not only denies the desire 
but denies its loss which is the trace of what was lost.  To admit the loss forces a turn to see 
what was lost and face the terrifying consequences: not being. 
Thus, one should find ambivalent reactions in the discursive wake of a therapist 
confronting the patient with the denied “I”s.  On one side the allure of the therapist’s 
sightings/citations is that they hold the promise of reunion with an unknown that is felt to 
be missing, the mark of an incomplete mourning for a possibility of having the other be involved 
in the creation of the self.  At the same time the sign of this incomplete mourning is the occasion 
of anxiety for the “I” that he or she has come to be bent on being, an “I” that is performed (as 
in the repetition compulsion) to quell the very anxiety over having the other involved in 
producing self-recognitions that transgress its restricted scope. 
Anxiety agitates “the subject already formed” (again, the patient) to turn away from 
the production of self-recognitions required for becoming since they are subversive to the 
“I”’s formation:   
What would it mean for the subject to desire something other than its continued 
“social existence”? …. The subject is compelled to repeat the norms by which it is 
produced, but that repetition establishes a domain of risk, for if one fails to reinstate 
the norm “in the right way,” one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the 
prevailing conditions of existence threatened.  And yet without a repetition that risks 
life – in its current organization – how might we begin to imagine the contingency of 
that organization, and performatively reconfigure the contours of the conditions of 
life?  (Butler, 1997, pp. 28-29) 
 
So, what is the paradox that confronts the unhappy “subject already formed” when 
he or she walks into the therapy situation?  The therapist’s job is the paradox.  The 
therapist’s job is to provide the occasions for “a repetition that risks life” as revealed by what 
is repeated in the patient’s communications.  The sum of the predicates produced by the  “I” 
are the contours of the condition of its formation and limitation: what is “in” the “I” is in 
his or her discourse.   
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In CKPP, then, the therapist’s transgressive understandings short-circuit this anxiety 
and its maneuvers of denial.  By transgressing the conscious content of the speaking “I” the 
patient is suddenly confronted with the sight of an identity that has already been invoked by 
the desire of the therapist – who has selected it as a topic for discussion.  If the reflexive 
self-understanding does not destroy the other with whom one can identify, then perhaps to speak 
it is not the sign of the end of the world.  It can be a “site of alteration” and articulation 
(ibid, p. 11) instead of a site (site, cite and sight) of extinction.   
When Mrs. P was ACTIVATING the discussion orbited a gap, as it were, in her 
understanding of a range of her experience (e.g., “why I’m so sad…”).  In this sense, the gap 
instigated the sites of the conversation between our “I”s because it was agitating, a problem 
to be talked about, a disturbing present that refused to pass.  Hopefully, Butler’s language 
provides a way to examine the sites of subjectivity in the session and how their constitution 
figured into Mrs. P’s turns towards and away from subjection. 
However, a person is not just a subject in the sense that a subject the term “subject” 
indicates the site a person occupies within the ever-mobile contours of discourse as a shared 
system of symbolic beliefs and practices of power (e.g., speech acts).  Nor is a person just a 
self in the sense that the self is a consciousness operating in a field of issues that originates in 
the visceral experiences of the body-in-the-world.  To acquire verbal language requires new 
experiences of a nascent self-possibility, an “infantile self” as a subject – a place or position – 
put into a structure of symbols and practices already formed within a context of belonging to 
another, a context of intimacy.  To be a person is to be both a self and subject, to inhabit 
physical, symbolic and psychological space – where psychological space cannot be reduced 
to language   
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In de Rivera’s terms, the psychological space that seems most relevant for the study 
is the dimension of intimacy.  The Kleinian account suggests that the paradox of subjectivity 
facing the infant and the infant-in-the-patient is its conflicting experience of intimacy, since 
paranoid anxiety can be understood as the anxiety of having the other involved in one’s own 
concerns and depressive anxiety as the anxiety of having the self be involved in the concerns 
of the other.  These are the two poles of de Rivera’s conception of intimacy as one 
dimension of the psychological space between people organized by the binary emotional 
pairs of fear and anxiety, love and security, desire and confidence, hate and depression.  
Along this dimension one can move the object towards (desire) or away from the self (hate), 
or the self towards (love) or away from the object (fear).  Therefore, if ACTIVATION is the 
conversational moment where the patient is positioned to align with the therapist’s 
understanding (to open him or herself to it and accommodate it), then it is also a 
conversational moment where the patient is positioned to accommodate more of his or her 
own experience to the extent that that is the only subject matter the therapist talks about.  
Conversely, if DEFENCE is the conversational moment where the patient moves away 
from ACTIVATION, then it is a moment where the patient fears (moves him or herself 
away) or hates (moves the therapist away) his or her own experience – again, assuming a 
situation where the therapist’s observation is accurate.  The analysis, therefore, should show 
how intimacy figures into the paradoxical person-forming process of CKPP that occurs in 
the discourse. 
But another framework is needed to understand how putting words to the “agitating 
gap” in her experience operated, if ‘making the unconscious conscious” is the moment of 
bringing some set of aspects of experience into language so they can be understood. 
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In Rhetoric as philosophy: the humanist tradition, Grassi (1980) argues that rhetoric 
is the basis of any rational discourse (i.e., the digital aspect of communication in the terms of 
Waltzlawick, et al.).  Grassi’s interpretation leans on Dante’s theory of true language as the 
expression of human historicity (pp. 76-82).  The power of this language is held in the power 
of the metaphor, or speech that allows people to imagine possibilities of relatedness to 
things and each other: 
It [the “archaic” speech] is metaphorical, i.e., it shows something which has a sense, 
and this means that to the figure, to that which is shown, the speech transfers 
(metapherin) a signification; in this way the speech which realizes this showing “leads 
before the eyes” (phainesthai) a significance … [it] sketches the framework for every 
rational consideration … rhetorical speech “comes before” every rational speech, i.e., 
it has a “prophetic” (prophainesthai) character.  (p. 20) 
 
Rhetoric is the basis of language because throughout human history language has 
changed when its guiding metaphors have changed as the result of human labor.  Through 
changes in human practices “tensions” are encountered in experience that require new 
names so that the foreign elements of experience can be assimilated within the governing 
symbolic order of the epoch: “through work, in temporal and spatial relationships … The 
concepts through which we come to understand and “grasp” each situation come from our 
ingenious, metaphorical fantastic capacities that convey meanings in the concrete situations 
with which we are confronted” (p. 100).41  If this account holds for the history of the 
individual beginning with birth, as well as the individual in therapy seeking to change 
through discursive work, then a possible “site of alteration” will be a moment in the record 
                                                 
41  For a historical example, Harvey’s treatise On the circulation of the blood (1955) was one aspect of a larger 
change that occurred in Europe: the change of the metaphorical basis of the human body.  His work facilitated 
the ascendancy of the mechanical metaphor for rational discourses on the body.   
   Harvey presents convincing arguments that can be substantiated by anyone who follows them in the text. 
However, the power of his claim that the heart is a pump was relational.  He argued for a new way to relate to 
this material thing called the heart: relate to it as a pump without spirit. 
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where new language and metaphors will be uttered by virtue of the assumption of a site that 
incorporates a new aspect of experience. 
These aspects of Butler’s and Grassi’s frameworks will provide an interpretive 
counterpoint to Bion’s          and enable the interpretive analysis to move forward with an 
altered texture.42  First, we turn back to some passages already examined to understand how 
Mrs. P was enabled to turn towards, and momentarily assume, a site of alteration before 
resuming the analysis of the last few exchanges of the session: 
061 Like I’ve been saying. I think these fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed get dropped and   
062 perhaps it’s because you don’t expect another person to stay with you and help you make sense of 
063 what feels overwhelming inside.   
 
Like other interpretive utterance already examined, the parameter of my subjectivity as 
disclosed to Mrs. P through these comments is a vision of herself that transgresses the sense 
she has been making in prior turns – transgressing the “cheery deal” (059) “I” formation, 
“that you record as my dramatic voice” (060).   
The discursive site occupied by my “I’ve been …” at this moment is predicated on 
her existence “you…you” (062) of the “because” clause.  This is a conception (          ) , a 
creation within the range of my subjectivity that uttered it.  For me to have existed at that 
moment as the subject producing these utterances required her to exist within the boundary 
of my uttering “I” as a subject with a gap in her experience that I desired to fill (           ).   In 
this sense, a “part” of Mrs. P was a component of the foundational conditions for my “I” 
formation to perform as a site of articulating, “because you don’t expect …” (062).  In other 
words, as the basis for my intelligibility, an aspect or part of Mrs. P’s existence was proposed 
in the “because” clause (062).   
                                                 
42  By “counterpoint” I mean in the sense of a musical composition where two independent melodies are 
combined to accentuate in a way that neither could on its own. 
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So, my “I” was the product of the interaction; its possibility was intertwined with the 
birth (            )of “part” of her subjectivity within that “I” formation.  Let us call this the 
“baby-self”, defined as a range of sensuously or viscerally apprehended experience ( b  elements)  that is 
ill defined (not understood and therefore “in need” of a function) and has the potential to become 
organized into an intelligible aspect of the self that can be spoken about (a conception            that can 
be put into words). 
At the same time the “you … you” opens a site for her baby-self to occupy a place in 
intelligible social existence – to be brought into language.  Thus, if she recognizes her baby-
self it is within this site of articulation, opened within my subjectivity, as the creative product 
(fecal gifts) of our verbal intercourse (           ) rather than a toxic product (persecutory feces) 
that must be kept away from both of us.  Also, if she recognizes the baby-self within this site 
then it becomes a possible site of articulation for her to occupy as a cosubject of the dialog – 
another         .  So, what does Mrs. P do with the site of articulation opened within my 
transgressive utterances? 
064 Yeah. [tearing] that makes sense.  Yeah because principle people at crucial ages for me they        
065 disappeared whether death or loosing a sister going to college or marriage is like a death.  Yeah. 
 
Notice there is no “I” spoken in her utterances. Instead, its place in language is 
occupied by tears (She could have said, “I want to cry that makes sense”).  The “sense” it 
made registered viscerally, she was “moved” by my speech as people say.  It seems that the 
“I” she invoked in prior utterances is in background; what is foregrounded is its condition of 
possibility, “because …”.  It is an unhappy “I” “because … for me”.  However, instead of 
choosing to speak her tears as the subject of the utterance (064), she occupies the syntactic 
place of a direct object in a sentence (“for me.”), where “principle people” are the subject of 
the “disappearing” action.  At this point, Mrs. P is not the subject of her experience, 
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occupying a site of alteration; she is speaking as the direct object (D/O) subjected to an 
experience.43 
Yet her “because” clause (064-065) is an elaboration within the parameters of the 
“because clause” in my prior turn (062-063), as if to say, “yes, the opening in your uttering  
‘I’ matches this content’ (         ) – “because …”” (064-065).  The “because” clause shows 
that the baby-self conception (            ) she a ligned with was an experience analogous to 
death: “loosing principle people … is like a death.”44   
In terms of the constitution of subject sites, then, by opening a place for the baby-
self within my experience – the reflexive limit of my uttering “I” – Mrs. P, likewise, opened a 
space for her baby-self within the parameters of her uttering and passive “I” (passive in the 
sense that she was subjected to the baby-self rather than the subject of it as a range of her 
experience).  In Butler’s terms the baby-self is the “discursive limit” of Mrs. P’s reflexivity, 
because it required the transgression of that very limit through my interpretive utterances for 
it to begin to be articulated by her.  At this point in the session, Butler might say that Mrs. P 
was facing the “temporal paradox” of the becoming subject: 
The temporal paradox of the subject is such that, of necessity, we must lose the 
perspective of a subject already formed in order to account for our own becoming.  
That “becoming” is not simple or continuous affair, but an uneasy practice of 
repetition and its risks, compelled yet incomplete, wavering on the horizon of social 
being [or not] (Butler, 1997) 
 
Moreover, this point for turning away or towards becoming a subject involved the 
transformation of Mrs. P’s emotional grasp of me.  As the person through whom the 
account of her becoming a subject already formed was taking place, she “met the other” 
                                                 
43  This suggests that while Mrs. P was working on a problem in her experience, she was doing so in a way that 
blamed the Other, dealing with depressive anxiety in a paranoid way.  
44  Thus, in Butler’s terms, the repeated experience of having lost “principle people” is an unmourned loss that 
has conditioned the formation of the unhappy, tearing “I” that is facing “a death” – “the loss marks the limit of 
reflexivity, that which exceeds (and conditions) its [the subject’s] circuitry.  Understood as foreclosure, that loss 
inaugurates the subject and threatens it with dissolution” (Butler, 1997, p. 23).   
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(me) to “take hold” of the reality I was offering, “bring it in”, and “show” me the baby-self 
that corresponded to my citation.  For de Rivera, these are the instructions of joy, 
confidence, security and self-regard, respectively.45  In other words, for Mrs. P to 
ACTIVATE to the extent she could, and face a painful aspect of her experience, she had to 
grasp me as a helpful (good) figure and within that figure catch sight of a range of her 
experience (the bereft baby-self) that was more or less off limits to the reflection of the 
subject already formed up to that point.  Aligning with a “good” me as I transgressively 
sighted/cited her, then, facilitated her speaking “I” to incorporate the baby-self within its 
utterances, so that it might become – quite literally – the subject of her talk.  If I was a good 
enough figure, then what I offer (a “part” of her) may not be so dangerous.  By desiring the 
baby-self and speaking it I demonstrated that the anxiety surrounding the identity has been 
overcome, thus making it easier for the patient to align with the production because it 
becomes a sign of belonging to the therapist, to life, and distinguished it from being a sign of 
estrangement from the therapist, that is, death.    
The next interchange shows the relevance of facing death for the appropriation of a 
site of subjectivity.  Mrs. P selects her vacation as the “death like” change to talk about in 
response to my interpretive utterances.  Like before, these utterances (066-068) appear to 
transgress the limit of her reflexive awareness, since she elaborates in her subsequent turn 
(069-072), giving a name to the baby-self: 
                                                 
45  According to de Rivera’s model of emotions, emotions are what define psychological space along the 
dimensions of status, openness, and intimacy (cf., deRivera, 1977).  Each emotion has an “instruction” by 
which it regulates our behavior in this psychological space.  For example, anxiety is “keep world out of the 
self.”  Obviously, his scheme has limitations.  However imprecise his model may be for deducing the patient’s 
emotional state, reasonable inferences can be made based on the interaction.  For example, in this instance it 
seems clear that Mrs. P agreed with my utterances, therefore she was not keeping the “world out”, so anxiety 
can be ruled out. 
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066 So, perhaps inside you feels out of control because of there are several death-like changes you are  
067 dealing with right now – the bombing of the terrorists, your daughter’s wedding, and the fact that we 
068 won’t be meeting next week because you won’t be here 
 
069 Yeah cause I like routine right and I’m not going to be here next week and I’m like one of those 
070 orphans – the smartest kids are the one’s who get abandoned in hospitals and learn to have to get 
071 along by being nice w hich fends off being orphaned.  Yeah, because that image just came to me right 
072 now I can – those little orphaned AIDS babies who have been dropped like a hot potato.  
 
 Here (069-072) Mrs. P selected her absence from therapy from among the other 
discursive sites from which to constitute an “I” to speak about “death-like change.”  In 
general terms, by aligning with the therapist who has just offered a sighting/citing of the 
missing sense of the self, the patient aligns with “a part” of herself that intuitively satisfies 
the contours of the gap in intelligible experience (again,          ) – the mysterious source of 
distress for the subject already formed.  Through inclusion of the baby-self this reunion, in turn, 
pushes the limit of the “I” that speaks; it is an elaboration of that “I” from within itself (so 
that in this example, Mrs. P goes on and offers a name for her baby-self, “orphaned AIDS 
babies…”).  At the same time this reunion         occasions putting the limit of her reflexivity 
in play by occasioning my next turn:  
073 What I’m hearing is that right now you live with fears of being dropped by me like you felt dropped 
074 by your mother as a baby.  
 
 073 is another assertion       , showing that I understood her “little orphaned AIDS 
babies who have been dropped” to describe her identity in relation to me, where I am 
identified as the deserting or withdrawing institutional mother.  Within the “I’m hearing…” 
is a discursive site        for Mrs. P as the D/O of my action, where I am figured in 
exclusionary terms.  Thus, it           opens a discursive a place      within the site of my 
subjectivity for her subjectivity     figured in overwhelming terms (dropped, overwhelming 
with need, AIDS baby-self), and thereby contradicts the propositional content of her 
analogic presupposition  (recall, that analogic messages propose a definition of the 
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relationship; it this case it is “you are abandoning”), since an orphan     without a      faces an 
end of life situation.46  The first few utterances of her next turn indicate three truth 
conditions for      .  
075 Well maybe but that’s if I don’t come back, because then essentially I would have been dropped by 
076 you. [asked to repeat, she did then began]  No, the only parallel is if you went out in front of a   
077 truck and got killed, that’s the logical parallel to that …. 
 
The first two truth conditions involve Mrs. P eradicating the possibility of treatment 
by leaving.  This is the “I” as a site predicated on “don’t come back,” a withdrawal of       
from      and the possibility of         ..   This a part of Mrs.P’s  “I,” her subjectivity already 
formed (the “essentially I” in fact) that rejects the possibility of being within the site 
(sightings/citations) of my uttering “I” as her therapist who “I would have been dropped 
by.”    
This indicates a temporal ambiguity, since the beginning of this utterance projects an 
ending that one would expect to be in the future conditional tense rather than the past (“I 
would be dropped by you” rather than “I would have been dropped by you”).  So, the first 
truth condition could be interpreted as her not returning to therapy after her holiday.  
However, the second seems more likely given the context of the communicative work so far 
in the session; it seems that the “would have been” condition refers to the session itself, and 
the moments where I could have dropped her (i.e., made no room within my discoursing 
subject site) but did not, thus contradicting her expectation with each repetition.  The 
iteration of my “I” was a paradox.  On this account her deflecting talk was the attempt to 
                                                 
46  In Kleinian terms, this was a TRANSFERENCE interpretation.  Notice that it structurally corresponds to a 
PHANTASY (cf., p. 61, above):  As Mrs. P’s. EXTERNAL OBJECT I exist in the condition of deserting 
mOther (an identity) as a result of her orphaned-AIDS-baby relationship to me.  That my condition of 
deserting depends upon her action towards me is underscored by her response that at face value does not seem 
– nor did it sound at the time – logical. 
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“not come back” and each time the deflecting “I” repeated this performance I brought her 
back, so to speak, providing a place, for the orphan baby-self. 
The third truth condition is formulated on the basis of negating the first two 
(“No…”).  In this scenario I am destroyed because I have put myself in harm’s way (“if you 
went out in front of a truck and got killed” 076-077).  Now, a truck belongs to the category 
of containing            vehicles that carry      contents      for consumption (produce, fuel, 
productive things like machines, etc.) or destruction (garbage and wastes of various kinds).   
Using this translation, the phantasy is that the attempt at containing her will destroy me, or 
she might be overrun by the therapy, since its aim is to deliver        .as a vehicle for insight. 
Yet I just contradicted one option by performing a subjectivity predicated on 
including her baby-self within its parameter (073-074), which Mrs. P confirms in her next 
utterance with a conditional clause “But ….”  She has finally incorporated    the conception      
offered in 073-074 (the         of my prior turn becomes a       for her to deal with in her 
subsequent turn).  Notice what happen to the “I” that “contains” the conceived baby-self, so 
to speak, for under 14 words.  Its position as the “I” that speaks is taken over, or perhaps 
run over, in the attempt by the minister “I” which is bent on being the “I” that offers me 
conceptions rather than taking in conceptions.  In other words, the self she is “wanting to 
have” in response to having the conception of the baby-self is the minister self that is not 
dependent on a mother-therapist in a hospital setting; she does the self she wants “to have”, 
she performs it to make baby-self disappear.  Previously, this pattern  (cf., pp. 107-109, 
above) has been articulated in terms of a “collaborative completion”: 
077                … But yes it could play right into not wanting  
078 to be orphaned, w anting to have a self.  I was doing reading on disappearance of the self into pre-
079 existence and there is literature on disappearance into pre-existence [stated in an emphatic tone to 
080 emphasize she is right] 
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 This kind of collaborative completion, then, is a means to exclude the baby-self from 
her conscious experience of the moment – to close the site for its possibility of becoming 
intelligible as an uttering “I.”   This is a double exclusion.  On the one hand, the baby-self (a 
range of her sensuously or viscerally apprehended experience with the potential to be 
brought into language) is excluded from her own awareness; “a part” of Mrs. P that has to 
deal with loss in the face of change is lost and avoided.  At the same time, the baby-self is 
also excluded from social reality because it cannot be spoken about, for to speak about loss 
would risk its resurgence.  Thus, it is impossible for Mrs. P to talk with others to secure their 
support in the face of losses since the hegemonic “I” wants nothing to do with loss, so to 
speak.  Its formation is predicated on the negation of loss in Butler’s (1997) terms.  Hence, 
loss also becomes the source of alienation or isolation from others (“its not like she’s being 
taken off to jail”, i.e., incarcerated and off limits to Mrs. P) 
In other words, her final utterance in this turn shifts topic and context away from 
her fear in the context of her relationship to me, her Other.  She interrupts herself – or 
better yet, the orphaned self that was speaking, forwarding a topic that is completely foreign 
to what has been talked about in the session, but not foreign to what she has been doing through her 
talking.  In 077-078 Mrs. P shifts from what she does not want to belong to her identity, her 
self – “be orphaned” – to what she does want to belong to her identity – “a self.”  The 
following utterance has a self, so to speak, she says “I was doing reading … ,” which 
suggests it is a different self (“I”) than the one previously speaking, not an “I” afraid of 
being orphaned, but an “I” that studies and ministers on “disappearance into pre-existence.”  
It is another example of “dropping” herself, “deflecting,” that “annoying thing that 
happens…and blocks whatever” she tries to “get at.”  At least that is how it seems I 
understood it at the time based on my response to her turn: 
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081 You are disappearing from here right now because we just touched on your fear of being orphaned by 
082 me so you mentally moved away to thoughts of before you existed. 
 
 Clearly the “you” in this utterance is not referring to Mrs. P in her physical presence 
as if she were teleporting out of the Enterprise on Star Trek.  Yet in a way she was 
teleporting herself out as the cosubject of a conversation in which I could participate.  I can 
contribute nothing to her understanding as a fetus (before existing as a baby how can one be 
said to exist?).  In effect, my assertion was pointing to how she extinguished her existence 
with me in the room as the orphan I was talking and listening to, “disappearing from here 
right now…”    
As with my previous utterances throughout the session, this assessment links her 
action in the here and now through her speech to her emotional sense of things, falling 
within the eight characteristics of CKPP outlined so far.  The pragmatic effect of my 
sightings/citation was to open a discursive site within my uttering “I” for Mrs. P to 
sight/cite herself as a subjectivity of her experience and not a D/O (I did not say, “oh, there’s that 
annoying thing that happens to you again”).  The description I uttered occasioned a moment 
for her to recognize her “I” in a moment of its formative repetition (performative iteration 
in Butler’s 1991, 1997 terms) based on a fear of loss –  “the annoying thing that happens.”  
Thus, the citation provides an occasion to alter that subjectivity by means of a double 
recognition that transgresses what she could apprehend in her experience – as the “subject 
already formed” on the ground of denying that aspect of her experience.  Apparently, the 
effect of this double recognition was to move Mrs. P: 
: 083 [Tears start streaming, nods in agreement, I let a few moments pass] 
 Of course what you, as the reader, cannot know since you weren’t there is how 
different it felt to be with Mrs. P by the end of the session.  Gone was the kinetic energy that 
projected the stress of busyness.  Gone was the see-saw smiling polite tone, the “cheery 
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deal” as she called it herself (059)– the traces of that presence crumpled on the desk in a 
small pile of used white tissues beside her, with one still clasped in her hands as if weighing 
them down in her lap.  Her face looked sad between those tears – cocked a bit towards me 
as her lips cocked to one side as though they slid there, as though repeating some form from 
Francis Bacon’s visual lexicon of anguish – tearing and nodding.  I waited a few moments: 
084 Our time is up for today 
 
 
This section has argued that the allure of the therapist’s voice stems from the longing 
to be understood without having to say what had been unspeakable out of the anxiety over 
the paradox of subjection.  The patient has a desire for life to be different in some way, yet is 
communicating in a way that the denial of who he or she could be organizes the 
performance or iteration of his or her “I”:  
The foreclosure of certain forms of love suggests that the melancholia that grounds 
the subject (and hence always threatens to unsettle and disrupt that ground) signals 
and incomplete and irresolvable grief.  Unowned and incomplete, melancholia is the 
limit to the subject’s sense of pouvoir, its sense of what it can accomplish and, in that 
sense, its power.  Melancholia rifts the subject, marking a limit to what it can 
accommodate.  Because the subject does not, cannot, reflect on that loss, the loss 
marks the limit of reflexivity, that which exceeds (and conditions) its circuitry.  
Understood as foreclosure, that loss inaugurates the subject and threatens it with 
dissolution.  (Butler, 1997, p. 23, emphasis in original) 
 
 Through discourse in an asymmetrical relationship of intimacy and dependence the 
patient was positioned to become the subject of her own experiences that had been excluded 
from occupying a space within her conscious subjectivity – the space of the self.  
This was achieved by addressing the infant-in-the-patient through transgressively intimate 
utterances.  The orphaned AIDS-baby self was recognized and occasioned by the therapist’s 
utterances for alignment by Mrs. P as the self of the subject already formed who was in 
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crisis.  Once she aligned with the “baby-self” its experience was verbalized by her self as part 
of her conscious self – that is, it become a possible object of knowledge for Mrs. P. as a 
subject in discursive co-existence with the therapist-mother.  Thus, the section has provided 
an account of how the self-subject forming process works in CKPP.   
To be understood as a preverbal infant is to be understood without having to say 
what one is experiencing.  The experience is materialized in the discourse47 of the Other and 
thereby signifies a possibility for relating to that Other – a sign of mutual belonging and 
accommodation of the self to the Other and the Other to the concerns of the self (reciprocal 
love in de Rivera’s account of intimacy).  On one side, the yearning to be understood and 
sighted/cited differently fueled the patient’s utterances, since the symptoms are the pressing 
disruptions in the story of which she is conscious, the inscriptions of an unhappy “I” or “I”s 
on the text of her life.  They are not “the scars of a corrupt text” but the traces of a nascent 
who, a lonely voice in the room trying to be heard.48  That there are absences in what the patient 
could sight/cite about herself is a given, since the “I” that speaks is predicated on what 
cannot or must not be allowed to be heard lest it risk falling out of the range of human 
                                                 
47  For Butler (1993) discourse has material effects as a reiterated acting (a pragmatically performative network 
of norms) that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface.  On this account, the 
self is the more or less stable reiteration of patterns of relating that is materialized “on” or “within” the site of 
the body, creating the effect of a pre-given fixity or substance.  Hopefully, the parallel between this and the 
Kleinian account of phantasy, internal object relations, introjection and projection is clear. 
48  I think, however, that Butler’s points apply both to pathological and non-pathological situations.  Referring 
to pathological cases as instances of a “corrupt text,” as McCarthy cites Habermas, implies that the 
communication of ‘normal’ people is without ambiguity or contradiction. There may be less in non-
pathological cases but no one is completely self-transparent.  Compare, McCarthy (1978): 
As Wittgenstein stressed in his account of “language games,” the “grammar” of ordinary language 
games governs not only the connection of linguistic symbols but also the interweaving of speech, 
action and bodily expression.  In a normally functioning language game, the different classes are 
complementary.  In pathological cases, however, they no longer fit one another; actions and 
nonverbal expressions belie what is expressly stated.  The acting subject either does not observe the 
discrepancy or is not able to understand it.  Nevertheless the symptomatic expressions … are 
expressions of the subject.  They cannot be dismissed as accidents: “their symbolic character, which 
identifies them as split-off parts of a symbolic structure, cannot be permanently denied.  They are the 
scars of a corrupt text that confronts the author as incomprehensible.” (p.197) 
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intelligibility: a state of no meaning for anyone (psychosis) – against a backdrop of 
psychological death, a “disappearance into pre-existence.”  
 
 
 
A satisfactory early relation to the mother…implies a close contact between the 
unconscious of the mother and the child.  This is the foundation for the most 
complete experience of being understood and is essentially linked with the preverbal 
stage.  However gratifying it is in latter life to express thoughts and feelings to a 
congenial person, there remains an unsatisfied longing for an understanding without 
words. …This longing contributes to the sense of loneliness and derives from the 
depressive feeling of an irretrievable loss.  
  
     ~ Melanie Klein (1963), On the sense of loneliness 
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Conclusion 
The error [the structural model of psychic apparatus based on non-observable 
entities] becomes obvious if one examines more closely the evidential basis of 
psychoanalysis, namely, the clinical experience to which Freud himself constantly 
referred in defending the scientific status of his work.  The analytic dialogue between 
patient and therapist was the sole empirical basis for the development and quasi-
experimental testing of psychoanalytic theory; thus the meaning of its concepts and 
hypotheses must be explicated in connection with the analytic situation and not in 
terms of an empirically unjustifiable energy-distribution model.   
 (McCarthy, 1978, p. 196) 
 
While the practice of contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented 
psychotherapy has been described in other works of varying degrees of clinical-theoretical 
sophistication (e.g., Hinshelwood, 1994; Joseph, 1988; Ruszczynski & Johnson, 1999; 
Solomon, 1995), what is new about this study is the method by which it has been conducted, 
the genre in which it is written, and the extent to which it has attempted to reconcile the 
practice of CKPP with contemporary philosophical works that address the problematic 
conceptions of selfhood and subjectivity; specifically, what it means to be a self, a subject 
and how therapy is one culturally created and perpetuated arena within which selfhood and 
subjectivity are produced through discourse.   
The primary aim of this study has been to show through a detailed analysis of one 
session how the practice of CKPP operates: explaining its assumptions, practices, and the 
involvement of the therapist.  As worded in the introduction, the study has deployed a 
hermeneutic methodology and nonfiction genre to tell a story of contemporary Kleinian 
psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy from the perspective of a novice.  The study has 
empirically shown that as a form of communicating it involves patterned linguistic usage and 
role behavior that are coordinated into a specialized “communicative competence” with the 
aim of an ontological accomplishment: self-subject forming processes. 
162 
 
Like the account of a zoo provided by a tour guide, this account is a systematic yet 
idiosyncratic report on the workings of CKPP from the inside.  Just as the tour guide would 
adjust his account of some aspect of the zoo or animal’s behavior depending on how your 
questions required more detail – explaining this building in environmental or historical 
terms, those animals in zoological terms, and perhaps both in commercial terms (“you can 
buy pictures of that tiger in the gift shop”) – the cyclical form of hermeneutics required the 
interpretive framework to change along with the evolution of the governing question as the 
analysis proceeded.  Thus, a creative nonfiction genre was chosen.   The nonfiction is in the 
“facts” of documented utterances exchanged during the session and the literature cited 
throughout the analysis; the creative is in the weaving together of a wide array of different 
perspectives and shifting narrative voices: here the therapist speaking to the patient – there 
the supervisee listening to the memory of the supervisor offering guidelines and bits of 
clinical wisdom, here the researcher of the communicative exchanges – there the theoretician 
grappling with complex conceptual issues.  The result is an idiosyncratic story of CKPP as a 
“system of possibilities and resources, frustrations, and obstacles, and two [researchers] will 
find both commonalities and differences in their accounts of it” (Packer, 1985, p. 1093).  
Nine characteristics stakeout the territory of CKPP viewed as a specialized communicative 
competence.  These are numerically indicated in the following paragraphs that descriptively 
summarize these findings. 
From the patient’s perspective, imagine you walk into the same room every week, 
perhaps two or more times per week, at the same time for an uncanny conversation with a 
stranger, who, by virtue of their strangeness, is able to tell you secrets about yourself with 
unflinching candor that you never knowingly told them – and at times these secrets were 
things you never knew until they were first mentioned by this stranger.  This makes him or 
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her stranger and not less so, particularly because all you see him or her do is (1) write down 
everything you say, think about it, and tell you things you don’t know about yourself as he or 
she learns about you.  You pay for this doubly strange person to learn with you and about 
you in an uncanny relationship.  You are assured that whatever you say and do during that 
hour will never be revealed to anyone else without your permission.  All of this is 
intimidating because this person knows you intimately while you know nothing about his or 
her private life.  You are letting this stranger matter so much in your life that you want to 
depend on them to help you change yourself, while you have little if any idea of how your 
words affect them other than how they speak to you about yourself.  Built into the other 
stable elements that frame your visits is (2) an asymmetrical relationship of dependence and 
power. 
From the perspective of the therapist, each session is also a brush up against the 
uncanny.  The patient comes in with a problematic present that refuses to pass.  Each 
session involves some anxiety.  No matter how many times you’ve done it in your career or 
with this particular person, you can never predict how you will be implicated in that 
problematic present.  Neither can you predict with any certainty how he or she will respond 
to your (3) descriptions about the patient’s reality that, by the standards of every day 
conversations, are transgressive in form and function since they aim to foster a 
metamorphosis in the patient’s life, one intimate session at a time.   
Moreover, this task involves resisting what one habitually does in everyday 
conversations with friends who have problems: you may not give advice, must resist asking 
questions, offering reassurance, offering prescriptions for what he or she should or should 
not think or do, or telling stories about yourself to show that you can relate.  While your 
comments are (4) grounded topically in what the patient says, they must go beyond that to 
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show the patient experientially in (5) the here and now of their relationship with you what he 
or she does, does not do, and the consequences of their action for contributing to their 
experience of the problematic present that refuses to pass.  In other words you are restricted 
to offering (6) descriptive hypotheses about the form and sequence of the patient’s 
experience and how its elements are related outside their everyday awareness.   
In addition to the challenge of formulating these interpretive utterances that 
articulate – optimally – something new and unpredictable and the facing the consequences as 
the patient responds, there is the challenge of knowing when to say them.  Unlike the turn 
taking structure of an everyday conversation, you try to speak (7) only when you think the 
patient is not engaged in a critical self-reflection of their problematic experience.  How do 
manage all this?  What are your tools?  One tool is the note writing that provides a record of 
what has been going on in relationship for you to use to (8) decode the patient’s stories and 
patterns of communicating in terms of his or her main anxiety and the relational practices of 
power that subtend the problematic present that refuses to pass.  Another tool (9) is the set 
of theoretic-clinical concepts and techniques that you have learned from readings and from 
supervision, which include five guiding question to govern learning about the here and now 
of the other: how does the patient see me?  How is the patient trying to use me?  What does 
the patient do with what I say?  What is the main anxiety?  And, what does it feel like inside 
to be with this person?   
The nine characteristics described above constitute the communicative competence 
of CKPP.  Originally, it was hoped that the design of this study would be able to show how 
this specialized communicative competence was the direct result of supervised clinical 
practice, since it is assumed in the empirical literature that supervision works by means of 
“changing trainee characteristics.”  However, as the analysis proceeded it was realized that 
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while the communicative competence could be articulated that a longitudinal element was 
needed to trace the changes in communicative skills as the direct result of the supervision.  
Yet, it also became apparent that the communicative competence of CKPP was geared 
towards subject formation by means of a paradoxical communicative effect.  Thus, rather 
than include the longitudinal element, it was decided to focus on the subject forming 
processes as an example of the “paradox of subjection.”  
Given the tropography of CKPP is coordinated by tropes of mother-breastfeeding 
infant dyad, the paradox of subjection was examined as the operation of weaning, which 
defined the specialized communicative competence of CKPP taken as a whole – a 
framework for the conversation as well as the communicative patterns operating within that 
framework.  This paradox refers to the notion that in order to become a subject that can 
have effects on others and the larger social world one must desire subjection; in order to 
have a recognizable form with social weight, one must desire and submit to a process of 
formation.  This paradox was redescribed for research purposes as the subject-forming 
process of CKPP.  Examining these subject-forming processes occasioned by the 
transgressive utterances of the therapist required looking at the instances where preverbal 
aspects of experience were languaged to try and articulate how this process worked.   
More concretely in terms of this analysis: Mrs. P came to the session with a 
problematic present that refused to pass.  This began with a fragmenting anxiety over feeling 
“so sad.”  However, as she and I worked to learn more about it, the anxiety became 
articulated as the grasp of herself as being deserted by her mother and sister in the past, her 
daughter in a pending marriage, and ultimately, deserted by me as one of a string of 
“principle people” that “disappeared” when she needed them – that is, when she was 
confronted with a situation of deprivation.  This evolution of learning involved a paradox.  
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One the one hand the orphaned AIDS-baby self is a definitive identity, a metaphor that 
sketches out the framework within which she understands the repetition of time in her life –
a reiteration of desertion where her concerns are the reason the other flees (“disappeared” or 
they push her away  (“dropped like a hot potato”).  This orphaned identity was the correlate 
of an institutional mother identity.  On the other hand, as a mother figure, I was not 
abandoning her concerns in the session.  I was pursuing them through interpretive 
utterances.   
Thus, in general terms, it seems that the paradox of subjectivity, through the 
specialized communicative competence of CKPP, is for the therapist to become the paradox of the 
patient: the Other who could be what one always expects yet discursively effects a 
displacement of one’s expectations, thereby opening the possibility of a new relationship.49  
Furthermore, it is by embodying (i.e., verbalizing) the displaced expectation that a new 
experience of another is made possible and the problematic present might begin to pass.  
CKPP addresses the paradox of subjectivity through discourse in an asymmetrical 
relationship of intimacy where the patient is positioned to become the subject of his or her 
own experiences through a discursive subjection to them.  In Habermas’ and Kögler’s terms: 
in a productive dialogue of asymmetrical power and dependence, knowledge about the self 
becomes knowledge for the self through the alterity of the Other by means of the experience of a 
difference in a relational repetition.  This is the critical hermeneutic formulation of CKPP as 
weaning. 
 Additionally, in its creative non-fiction aspect, this study has provided a window into 
a therapeutic method that is based on a radical shift in the history of psychoanalysis:  the 
                                                 
49   By “discourse” I mean the entire interactive process of sense making between participants that involves the 
embodiment of role behavior, speech, and affective expression, that draws from “a set of norms, preferences, and 
expectations relating language to context, which speaker-hearers draw on and modify in producing and making sense out of 
language,” as described by Ochs (1990, p. 289, italics in original) 
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shift from the governing trope of the surgeon to that of the mother-feeding-infant.  While it 
is beyond the scope of this study to address this topic with the thoroughness it deserves, a 
discussion of its impact regarding the understanding and handling of the transference 
requires discussion.  The ethical implications will be addressed in the Afterward, along with a 
self-appraisal of the study. 
As already noted, Grassi (1980) argues for the primacy of metaphor in the 
contouring of any rational discourse, the speech that frames the speaker-hearer’s possibilities 
for imagining relatedness to things and each other.  As argued by Stepansky (1999), the 
dominating trope upon which Freudian discourse has been erected, practiced, taught, 
defended and criticized is that of the surgeon.  Although he carefully explicates and 
examines the real and possible dangers inherent to metaphorizing psychoanalytic therapy 
along the lines of surgery, he also argues for it when used in a sophisticated and elastic 
manner.  In short, the problem is not inherent to the metaphor, but how it is appropriated: is 
it used as a starting point for imagining the benefits and the risks to deepen and complexify 
discourse, or as tunicate on critical reflexivity at the expense of those who are really 
suffering, or worse, to justify abuses of power? 
The problem, I submit, has never been with medicosurgical analogies per se.  Rather, 
it has always resided in the truncated vision of medicosurgical activity that underlies 
and informs such analogizing – and in the tendentious use of such analogizing by the 
supporters and detractors of classical psychoanalytic technique….  Modern surgery, 
both in its therapeutic obligations and in its technical ministrations, opens to a 
wealth of metaphoric possibility that awaits appropriation by contemporary doctors 
of the mind.  We have briefly considered Ferenczi’s transmutation of Freud’s surgical 
metaphor into an obstetrical metaphor, with analytic treatment figuring as a 
“midwifery of thought.”  This image, which fruitfully combines elements of passive 
receptiveness (the analyst as “onlooker at a natural proceeding …”) and active 
intervention (“… but who must be at hand at the critical moment with the forceps in 
order to complete the act of parturition that is not progressing spontaneously”) has 
yet to be pursued beyond Ferenczi’s early writings of the 1920s.  Yet the obstetrical 
metaphor approximates Selzer’s vision of the modern surgical act, of operative 
restraint in the service of a creative thera peutic task, far more adequately than 
Freud’s original metaphor did. (Stepansky, 1999, p. 223-224) 
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However, Stepansky is in error with regard to the fate of Ferenczi’s obstetrical 
metaphor.  As Ferenczi’s analysand and pupil, Melanie Klein pursued and transformed it 
into the image of the mother-feeding-infant with important consequences for the theory and 
practice of psychoanalysis, particularly with regard to the notions of phantasy and 
understanding transference as “the total situation.”50 
Burston (1996) rightly notes that for Freud and his followers, “unconscious fantasy is 
a device to avoid the experience of something real” while for Laing (like other existential-
phenomenologists) the true function of fantasy, “is to express the truth of lived experience 
in symbols and metaphors, whose intuitive and poetic insights often exceed our conscious 
                                                 
50    As noted in the beginning of Chapter two, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive 
analysis tracing the complex web of the development of Klein’s thought and her place in the history of 
psychoanalysis.  Many aspects of this have not been addressed such as the political context within the early 
psychoanalytic movement (e.g., the mixture of theoretical and personal animus that characterized the schism 
between Klein, Freud, and Anna Freud), how the specific conceptual and technical innovations of Klein’s 
developed on or out of the work of her analyst mentors Ferenczi and Abraham, the negative consequences of 
her decision to analyze her own children, including the schism that developed between Klein and her own 
daughter who sided with Grover, Anna Freud, et al., during the Freud-Klein controversies, etc.  Furthermore, 
there is the lingering controversy over how Freudian Klein was or was not.  In the early phase of her work 
Klein and her followers were adamant that their work represented the logical extension of Freud’s and that 
therefore it was legitimate despite the protests of Anna Freud and Freud himself.  Burston (1991, 1996) 
characterizes Klein as a “crypto-revisionist” who, while identifying and speaking with the tongue of the 
orthodox, was actually subverting the orthodoxy in an self-deceptive or sneaky manner.  I disagree, or rather, I 
think the matter is too complex to be resolved since Klein, Freud, and Anna Freud openly disagreed on Klein’s 
assertions about phantasy and the priority of the internalization of good objects in the depressive position for 
the resolution of the Oedipal drama to occur (recall that for Freud internalization of objects only begins with 
the resolution of the Oedipal situation well after infancy). 
       Since I doubt Klein was so dense as to not notice that Freud and his daughter rejected her clear divergence 
publically and in writing, for example, with respect to phantasy and the development of internalized objects in 
infancy (cf., Sayers, 2000), one may wonder what was her interpretation of orthodox Freudianism to which she 
proclaimed allegiance?  Could it have been Freud’s commitment to explore the unconscious and adapt theory 
and technique to evolve with clinical findings and material?  Since Klein used the classical technique with 
children whereas Anna Freud did not, does this mean that Klein was more Freudian than Anna Freud and 
Freud himself? Clearly there was a political interest in claiming legitimacy by invoking the name of Freud.  
Perhaps there was also a psychological benefit for a female, divorcee, lay analyst, who followed her clinical 
instincts into the hitherto fore unexplored terrains of children and psychotics which both Anna and Sigmund 
had written off as unanalyzable according to their version of classical technique.  Perhaps Ms. Klein needed the 
psychological support of identifying her exploratory zeal with the earlier Freud’s to overcome her own anxieties 
about diverting from the popular path of least resistance.  Perhaps Ms. Klein secretly hoped to curry the favor 
from a surrogate father figure that she never received from her own father, another Jewish doctor who rejected 
Melanie publicly while glowing in the accomplishments of his other daughter.  As a student of contemporary 
Kleinian technique these questions continue to have historical and political interest, but they have little bearing 
on the practice of CKPP, and I doubt the historical evidence exists to conclusively decide the issue.  
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rationality and acuity.  If fantasy in this sense is allied to our conscious adult selves, we 
become more, not less, in touch with reality” (p. 215).  Freud’s conception of fantasy as 
necessarily and only distorting was related to the Freudian conception of transference as 
something to be removed, for, by definition, the transference is the distortion of the analyst 
due to unconscious fantasy.  The goal of Freudian ana lysis was to remove the transference, 
like a surgeon removes an excess of the body that hampers normal functioning. 
 For Klein, phantasy can be distorting but is also necessary for participating in a 
socially agreed upon reality (“reality testing”), as well as creativity.  Consider the following 
hypothetical examples for illustration.  Two different patients see the therapist smirk a little 
when he hears their responses to an interpretation.  After a few minutes, patient A draws the 
therapist’s attention to it and says, “you know I’m sure this is just my reaction, but when you 
smirked while I was talking I felt like you were telling me my reaction was stupid and it really 
hurt.”  Patient B notices the smirk and starts yelling at the therapist, accusing him of plotting 
to cut off his penis, and no amount of apology or reassurance seems to soothe patient B.  In 
both these cases phantasy is at work and in both cases it can be viewed as an expression of 
“the truth of lived experience in symbols and metaphors” (ibid., p 215). 
For patient B, his persecutory castration phantasy is “true” in the sense that he felt his 
right to assert his viewpoint was cut off by hurt feelings due to the therapist’s gesture.  It is 
metaphorically true.  However, his persecutory castration phantasy is distorting in the sense 
that the idea of cutting off his penis due to his speech was nowhere in the therapist’s mind, 
the therapist had lapsed into a daydream about his pending vacation.  His phantasy was 
distorting his sense of his therapist’s identity and his identity in relation to the distorted 
therapist.  His phantasy was distorting in that it has the weight of an ontological and 
epistemological conviction that if the patient has a perception that it must be true and not 
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subjection to negotiation with other people (“omnipotent phantasy” in the jargon).  His 
phantasy was also distorting by attributing a motive without any evidence of its veracity (a 
“projective identification” phantasy), and, because of the omnipotent phantasy, it was 
impossible to assess or question the veracity of the attributed motive.  Furthermore, because 
of the above phantasies, it was impossible for the patient to notice that his radical shift in 
identifying the therapist was related to his emotional pain of hurt and anger, and that when 
he feels angry he sees others as attackers.  This hypothetical case is one where paranoid-
schizoid phantasies dominate the transference.  The fact that his castration phantasy may be 
a poetic description of his actual experience does not mean that it is an accurate appraisal of 
social reality, however that may be locally defined by consensus.  The therapeutic goal is not 
so much to surgically remove the transference but to provide the necessary conditions for 
the patient’s phantasies to mature through understanding – from surgery to growth and 
development in a “holding” relationship.  It is not just the sense of the therapist that is 
transferred, it is the whole experience of the “total situation,” the relational context is transferred, as 
noted in Chapter 3 above.  Stated differently, perhaps more hermeneutically, because a pre-
reflective, bodily sedimented, relational context is transferred, the therapist “shows up” as 
this or that depending on the phantasized context of the relationship activated at that 
moment. 
Like patient B, patient A’s had a phantasized reaction to the gesture.  But the nature 
of his phantasies were on a depressive order, and therefore resulted in thought and speech 
that made it possible to negotiate the meaning of the event with another person, before the 
rapid foreclosure of possible meaning as in the case of patient B.   Notice patient A said, “it 
felt like you were …” indicating his grasp of the demeaning significance as a possible 
meaning, it was “as if” the therapist had purposely hurt him.  The persecutory interpretation 
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is still virtual, because it contrasts with other possibilities that he uses verbal language to try 
to sort out before committing to an interpretation of the therapist (significantly lower 
omnipotence).  Patient A also acknowledges that may be “just [his] reaction” indexing his 
idiosyncrasies as a factor contributing to his understanding (the phantasy that his 
participation has a causative effect on the attitude of a separate and important object towards 
himself).  The fact that he initiates a reparative conversation with the therapist indicates that 
he values the therapist as a good other whose “goodness” or good will he has a responsibility 
to maintain through accommodating the therapist’s perspective.  Thus, the hypothetical case 
of patient A shows how depressive phantasies are necessary for “reality testing,” understood 
as the ability to negotiate social reality between two different yet related people.  Removing 
depressive phantasies is neither desirable nor possible. 
One may question the use of the term phantasy in this latter case.  Although patient 
A has better “reality testing” than patient B, the term phantasy is still appropriate because 
the disturbing, possible meaning that patient A described was one possible meaning.  As a 
possible meaning that patient A spontaneously produced it was neither a fact nor a given.  It 
was an intended relational meaning that may or may not have been true – a virtual reality 
about the therapist, as light emanates from the sun’s reflection on a plane mirror from a 
virtual focus.  Phantasies may be thought of as virtual foci, possible points from which an 
interpersonal event can be illuminated in different ways, can mean very different things.  The 
virtual precedes the actual in creation, including the creation of the meaning (shared or not) 
of an interpersonal event.  Transference as the total situation can be developed and 
differentiated to broaden the patient’s range of tolerable interpersonal meaning in therapy, 
but not removed from examination as long as the therapist maintains the blankness of the 
screen, to the extent this is possible. 
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Methodologically, this study has implications for supervision and psychotherapy 
research.  Every psychotherapy session or supervision meeting, to some extent, depends on 
communication between the participants, and this study has demonstrated an empirically 
grounded, systematic, and rigorous interpretive method to articulate such communicative 
patterns.  Demonstrating efficacy in either of these arenas would require studies designed to 
assess longitudinal effects of the communicative work by comparing changes in 
communicative competence, which can be traced to the communicative work of the 
supervisory or therapeutic encounters – bearing in mind that not all intervening variables can 
ever be ruled out when studying human phenomenon from any perspective. 
The method demonstrated here may also be used for the comparative study of 
therapeutic approaches in terms of their theoretical constructs and practical implications.  
For example, “empathy” is a key word for many different schools of therapy although it is 
by no means clear that they define the concept the same.  One idea for a future study might 
be to elicit verbatim session records or excerpts for Kleinians, ego psychologists, self-
psychologist, and Rogerians who have defined them as exemplifying “empathy.”  These 
records would then be analyzed for their communicative patterns to discern what 
characterizes “empathy” in these various therapeutic discourses, as well as any patterns that 
characterize patient responses to these “empathic” moves.   
Similarly, within the Kleinian tradition, one interest of the author’s is to solicit 
session vignettes from Kleinians that exemplify various central anxieties that can be 
articulated into patterns of distorted communications and communicative aims.  For 
example, in so far as a clinician can diagnose a patient based on the kind of transference the 
patient enacts, can “Schizoid,” “Narcissist,” and other “personality types” be reconfigured as 
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certain patterns of distorted communicative agendas?  One benefit of such a project is to 
produce research results that have immediate clinical relevance, since it would provide 
clinicians – inside and outside the Kleinian orbit – with clear, participant-observer accounts 
that may be used to identify patterns in their everyday practices. 
 This would take clinical research in the direction of fulfilling Habermas’ goal of 
reconstructing psychoanalytic theory as a theory of systematically distorted communication  -
- using Kleinian theory rather than Freudian.  Kleinian theory is well suited for such a 
project, since it is already “purged of [Freudianism’s] neuropsychological trappings” 
(McCarthy, 1978, p. 198); contemporary Kleinian psychological theory is a purely 
psychological account of relational dynamics between people, viewed as dynamic 
organizations of composite parts, functions, and modes. 
Unfortunately, this study did not address one significant area of Kleinian ontology 
and ontological work of its technique: for Butler the “inner” of the subject is a result of 
melancholia through discursive interaction and not an unproblematic pre-given that is 
“discovered” by clinicians and social theorists.  Kleinian theory implies this in that the 
mechanisms of introjection and projection are the means by which the “internal world” is 
built up – that is, it is a construction for navigating the vicissitudes of social attachment.   
A related problem this study has highlighted – although not addressed directly – is 
the problematics of the terms “self,” “subject,” “mind,” “ego,” etc.  Are these the same?  Do 
they each indicate one facet of a multiplicity we might designate as the “person”?  Butler, 
following Foucault, reserves “subject” to indicate a placeholder in a discursively 
circumscribed cultural milieu.  But is there not more to being a person than the point of 
interface within language?  Has the “linguistic turn” in philosophy and the human sciences 
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of the 20th century culminated in an early 21st century “linguisticism” just as the dawn of the 
20thjCentury was struggling with psychologism, historicism, and sociologism? 
True, the “linguistic turn” has provided a way out of the mind-body, subject-object cleavages 
called intersubjectivity.  Yet if there is more to personhood than being a subject, a node in 
language, then intersubjectivity has split us off from this extra-linguistic.  Rather then being 
an “encapsulated ego” we are encapsulated within the horde of a sensus commnis.   
The Kleinian thesis of phantasy, the examples provided above involving Trude and 
the child terrified by her mother’s broken shoes, as well as the therapeutic encounter itself, 
attest to the fact that there is a sense outside of language, a sense about which language must 
organize itself.  In the case of Mrs. P, her “I” was threatened with dissolution by the 
encounter with loss as a transcendental empirical problem (it was transcendental in the sense 
of transcending the range of her linguistically mediated empirical perception).  The discourse 
of the therapy became organized around this problem.  The problem was realized in 
language but it constituted the language as much as the language realized it.  Love, hate, guilt, 
reparation, envy, greed, anxiety, depression, death, loss, these are all so many problems of 
becoming as a person that have organized literature, poetry, and visual art across cultures 
and history as much as these artistic forms have realized various expressions of these 
problems for various peoples. 
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 Examine the painting of Francis Bacon’s at left (Head 1, 1948, Richard Zeisler 
Collection; Louisiana Museum for Moderne Kunst, 1998).  At an initial glace this image is 
disturbing.  Attempts to say, “what it is” are thwarted despite the fact that one’s words try to 
cling to its sense like antibodies swarming a foreign protein.  “Oh, my gosh,” “Gross,” 
“ugly,” “you call that art?” “I could do that.”  One can imagine the words that go out to 
attack the disturbing sense that disrupts the common sensibility of art, threatening the “I” 
that utters them.  Our language faculty hits its limit in the attempt to comprehend Bacon’s 
image.  His image is an imaginary that resists inscription, like a bloodstain in the wash.   
His image is a new presentation of an affect and perception that could only be 
realized by an artist that imposed restrictions on his palette of color (e.g., reds, purple’s), 
visual lexicon of images (e.g., the 
gaping mouth, fragmented body 
parts tenuously held 
together/confined by external 
structure), techniques for brushing 
(e.g., construction of tense geometric 
spaces through the use of line), and 
philosophical interests in subject 
matter (e.g., visceral experience) to 
create his works on canvas.  Similarly, 
CKPP utilizes a disciplined 
communicative competence – the 
discipline of techniques and the 
techniques of discipline – to occasion 
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self-creative moments in therapy out of something that is there to be realized, a virtual reality 
of and for the patient, as much as its disciplined use of language shapes what is realized. 
 So, if there is sense, perception, and affect outside of language, how then to 
conceptualize the person?  Kleinianism is a doctrine of parts – aspects of experience 
(emotions), faculties (seeing, talking, thinking, imagining), and modes (taking in, putting out).  
This suggests an image of the person that is both a one and a many at the same time: a 
diacritical unity.  Indeed, the notion of splitting implies that the overly defended person is 
trying not to be more than one thing – i.e., trying to avoid feeling good and bad, happiness 
and loss, to avoid thinking about a feeling, etc.  Its “integrated ego” is not a monad of 
experience, but a unified multiplicity confronted with potentially rapturous encounters.  In 
the case of Mrs. P., for example, the session could be characterized as helping her encounter 
loss as a unified self composed of parts, which threatened the “I” with rupture as a totalized 
unity, a multiplicity confined to one possibility.   How can this conception of the person be 
used productively in psychopathology as the study of deformations in learning from 
experience? 
 The author is interested in pursuing this doctrine of parts and its theoretical 
implications by the critical and reciprocal examination of Kleinianism and Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism.  Deleuze writes the following about learning:  
For learning evolves entirely in the comprehension of problems as such, in the 
apprehension and condensation of singularities and in the composition of ideal 
events and bodies.  Learning to swim or learning a foreign language means 
composing the singular points of one’s own body or one’s own language with those 
of another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a hither 
unknown and unheard-of-world of problems (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 192) 
 
Deleuze’s conception of learning is based on that of the person figured as a diacritical unity 
rather than a totalizing unity: a composition of parts that reconfigures its organization in 
terms of a localized field of problems like every other organism.  For Deleuze the singularity of 
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the human organism resides in how it approaches some problems differently. 51  While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to explicate his work, the author is interested in the 
exploration of dialoguing Kleinianism and Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism to articulate 
a conception of the person that avoids dualizing knowledge, the person, the person in the 
human world, and the human world from the rest of nature.   
Finally, Deleuze succinctly questions a basic premise of psychoanalytic theory that 
has not been adequately addressed: 
Consider the two presents, the two scenes or the two events (infantile and adult) in 
their reality, separated by time: how can the former present act at a distance upon the 
present one?  How can it provide a model for it, when all its effectiveness is 
retrospectively received from the later present?  Furthermore, if we invoke the 
indispensable imaginary operations required to fill the temporal space [e.g., Lacan’s 
object a or Kleinian phantasy], how could these operations fail ultimately to absorb 
the entire reality of the two presents, leaving the repetition to subsist only as the 
illusion of a solipsistic subject?  (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 104) 
 
 Deleuze offers a solution to this problem in theory; however, if it is to hold weight it 
must bear itself out empirically.  The hermeneutic methodology employed in this study is 
well suited to examine this question and explore the implications of Deleuze’s philosophy 
for conceptualizing the person, and specifically, the person as the patient in a contemporary 
Kleinian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51  Take for example “the problem” of light.  Photosynthesis is one of the plant’s responses to the problem of 
light; the bee, like other insects, responds to light by using it for navigation and the temporal organization of its 
activities; the mosquito, like many organisms, has developed a special kind of eye that is particularly attuned to 
blues, purples, and reds, since these colors predominate in the evening and the morning.  Deleuze writes 
regarding animals that  “An animal forms an eye for itself by causing scattered and diffuse luminous excitations 
to be reproduced on a privileged surface of its body.  The eye binds light, it is itself bound light.  This example 
is enough to show the complexity of synthesis.  For there is indeed an activity of reproduction which takes as 
its object the difference to be bound” (Deleuze, 1968, p. 96).  In terms of the faculties such as memory, 
thought, sense, language, etc., for Deleuze these work in concert – giving the appearance for common sense of 
a unity of the faculties under one “I” – but really work independently.  So for example, the painting of Bacon’s 
forces one to comprehend it primarily through sense perception and affect since the language faculty meets its 
transcendental limit – i.e., the limit of what about the painting can be put into words.  (cf., Deleuze, 1968, pp. 
138-147) 
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Afterward 
 
 
 I would like to take this moment, and I mean “moment” because I am evaluating 
some personal implications of this study at this particular time in my training.  I am going to 
discuss what I think are the implications of the paradox of subjection, but this time from the 
perspective of my story.  Immersing myself in CKPP and subjecting myself the discipline of 
it’s technique, under the tutelage of Dr. R. in supervision and putting my skills in the 
interpretation of texts to work, so I could allow the literature to teach me as I learned the 
power practices of its knowledge-power complex, has changed my subjectivity.52  As Judith 
Butler says, it has changed my subjectivity by inducting me into a symbolic order, situated in 
a power-knowledge complex.  But, also like she says it should work, in order to do so I had 
to desire and have faith in some inarticulate notion of the kind of clinician I had hoped to 
become; I had to turn to it from inside; the desire had to motivate me to become the kind of 
subject one has to be in order to do work within its symbolic order.   
This means risking for both patient and training therapist.  To believe in a life – that 
is point of faith in Kierkegaard’s use of the term.  To have an authentic dream is to believe in 
a life, to dream it up and change to continually approximate it – that radical idea of self-
creation that the Enlightenment philosophers gave us as part of our tradition, culminating in 
one strange historical form – the original Euro-American way.  Does the fact that this was 
dangerous and involved other ideological aspects that led to genocide and now 
environmental degradation mean that none of it should have happened?  
My point in this is to refigure the “concern” for abuses of power in CKPP.  I think 
this may, has, have, and unfortunately does happen.  With power comes responsibility and 
                                                 
52  I am forever indebted to my undergraduate education at St. John’s College for providing an intellectual 
climate that fostered self-directed learning in such a disciplined way.  
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part of the point of training is develop that sense of responsibility and respect for the new 
powers you have.  The implication of this work is that I have been learning to practice 
wielding a subjectivizing voice and receive payment for it.  I have been learning how to be 
able to “call it as I see it” as a therapist, to speak in a voice that is challenging for the patient 
to hear and for me to utter.  The damaging subjectivizing voice is one that chronically closes 
down on possible meaning too quickly without self-correction and is not based on the 
clinical evidence – like the stereotypes of Kleinian work and, as I see it, poor therapy in 
general.   What are the institutional safeguards for this?  Humility, close supervision, and my 
own therapy.  I am told Betty Josephs continues in her own group supervision with her 
peers and she has been practicing for fifty years! 
So, I would also like to discuss some of the ethical issues around deploying a 
subjectivizing voice.  For if Judith Butler is right about subjection then that means some 
kind of new power will be the outcome, as what practices (repeated behaviors with an 
intended effect) I need to operate in this new way develop and the one’s I don’t need will 
atrophy – a loss of certain desires.  The lost desires demarcate the outer parameter of my 
becoming self as it becomes.  53  (I would like to thank Roger Brooke for pointing this out, 
although in analytic terms of the Oedipus complex).  54  So as a therapist this requires I not 
exhort the patient to do this or that, because the patient has to decide to keep going and in 
                                                 
53 What are these lost desires for me?  One has been the desire to go into academia, which I had originally 
wanted to do.  Do I miss it?  Not really, I would still like to teach but not in that context. Another, more 
difficult one to work through, has been the loss of desire to maintain or cultivate certain friendships, since the 
demands of this way of working require a certain kind of support.  This has been a cost that, while unfortunate, 
was consciously accepted because I believe this way of working is worth it for me and also for the people who 
come to me for help.  It has caused some tension in my relationship with important thinkers in my life who 
have had to struggle to listen to my use of concepts that seem too “realist” or simply, too anachronistic for 
their taste.  Of course some doors close as others open. 
54 This is where I question how much post-structuralists, other than Judith Butler and her followers, really 
understand the psychological implications of their notions.  Foucault, for example, I think used the term 
“subject” without ever defining it because if he defined it he would see Oedipus starring him in the face.  In 
other words, how is it that the human subject is shaped by change in time without it – a priori – having the kind 
of subjectivity that can be subjugated, an embodied subjugation of desire?  I think this is the point Dr. Butler 
makes in the Psychic Life of  Power. 
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which direction to change for him or herself, out of desire and in the face of anxiety around 
the losses becoming a new kind of subject require.  
So what is this power?  It is the power of wielding a subjectivizing voice in a highly 
structured communicative context potentiated by its very structure with emancipatory 
potential –– the nature of which I have phenomenologically described in this study.  Self-
subjection into CKPP has yielded some other derivative consequences – for once you 
subject yourself to a specific symbolic order and its attendant power-knowledge complexes 
your worldview changes as well.  You may start interpreting world events in its terms if you 
want.  You might reel at the implication of how much we communicate in our everyday 
interactions without any awareness of the messages we’re sending out if you decide to focus 
on that.  One also has to face many of the issues your patients deal with and it is very 
emotionally challenging work.  In order to speak to the patient where they are in a fresh and 
genuine way you have to be able to identify its analog in yourself as the point from which to 
speak.  This kind of work has challenged me to grow emotionally as a person. 
So what are the limits of this power?  That is an ongoing question for me.  It has 
been suggested that as a dyadic metaphor that the mother-infant metaphorizing would 
preclude dynamics that are triadic.  Theoretically, I do not agree with this since the infantile 
feeding situation is triadic and not dyadic for Klein.  By three months the infant recognizes 
that the milk is the term for struggle with the mother. That is when the Oedipal struggles 
begin.55  Clinically, the four times patients have prematurely dropped out of treatment I have 
been able to find problems in my ability to accurately show them that I see and can name 
their anxiety.  So, based on my experience with dozens of patients and their wide range of 
                                                 
55 Not to mention the fact that the note writing creates a triadic dynamic in the therapy – the patient has to 
watch your mouth “mate” with the words you write down – watch you have a relationship with your own mind 
that they are excluded from. 
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presenting problems, the limitation so far indicate my lack of experience more than an 
inherent blind spot in the theory or practice as it stands.  This does not mean that there are 
not any blind spots.  And if there are, and when I find them, I am free to try and understand 
them in terms of this tradition and work to alter it if that is necessary, or go somewhere else.  
Practically, there is the problem of what to do with this kind of work in our managed-care 
age.  How amenable is it to working on a short-term basis?  Is there an ethical way to do 
that? 
A central component of this voice is its focus on the here and now relational 
transactions as they occur.  It has been asked, “What are the ethical consequences of this 
aspect of the technique in terms indexing the symbolic content in terms of the patient’s 
relationship to the therapist?”  Specifically, what about the real unethical activities the patient 
may come in and describe and what about the self-aggrandizing stance that relates what the 
patient does to the therapist?   
One of the difficulties I struggled with to work in this way was accepting the idea 
that as their therapist, I could matter as much as these kinds of interventions suggest.  It 
takes courage and discipline to engage in a relationship that can matter that much to 
someone, precisely because of the emotional challenges and the responsibility involved in 
the work.  From the “outside” it seems off the charts that this level of attachment is at issue 
so quickly, therefore to talk about it with the patient must be off and a sign of making “wild 
interpretations,” or could only be the product of the need for narcissistic supplies from the 
patient.  I can relate to that sentiment.  I thought it too at the beginning.  But from the 
“inside,” what I find more strange and continue to be surprised by is that once I muster up 
the courage to make one of these comments, how, when accurate, the patient agrees and 
seems a bit more relaxed or comforted by hearing it.  All I can say at this point is that this 
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level of attachment is always at stake for everyone to the extent we are precariously attached 
as subjects.  I base this assertion on both my clinical experience and the work of Judith 
Butler, because that is her point in the Psychic Life of Power – subjection is our paradoxical and 
ambivalent basis for attachment to others – “intersubjectivity” in newer terms. 
 As far as the patient’s extra-therapeutic activities that he or she presents in the 
session is concerned, these are important as objects of projection.  In other words, two 
different personalities will describe the same event it different ways; their experiences will be 
different.  What is more clinically important is how they systematically interpret the events 
and people in their lives, because this one means for identifying with how they are 
constituting their experience.  Of course this does not mean that, for example, John wasn’t 
almost hit by a car, or that a married man who describes compulsively cheating on his wife 
isn’t really doing it, or that it does not have an adverse effect on his wife.  But his ethical 
consciousness is his responsibility to develop, as part of developing as a subject with a 
conscience that is robust enough to commit and authentically see and care for the good of 
anOther.  And developing a network of supportive friends is part of what it would mean for 
John to slowly give up trying to be invisible out of a paranoid anxiety.  A free subject needs 
others on whom to depend and must be able to be the dependable other for someone else, 
able to sustain and nurture a social bond with another person. 
 This brings us to another paradox.  The paradox of not exhorting patients to be a 
this way or that – the restraint (not hiding) of neutrality and note writing – yet by your very 
way of comporting yourself the patient becomes a certain kind of subject, in the sense of 
new capacities as a self.  Is this the hidden normative agenda at work?  Probably, although 
I’m not so sure it is hidden in CKPP, as I have described some of its values in the preceding 
paragraph and the study itself.  But as Judith Butler also points out, there is no outside 
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power and discourse for a socially intelligible subject.  Perhaps we need to be discussing this 
question more: what kind of subjects our psychotherapy practices are fostering in society 
and as a society in general?  It would seem like a good idea to believe in the kind of 
subjectivity that one is endeavoring to foster, both in terms of consciously accepting 
responsibility for what you are doing and in terms of professional integrity.  As I understand 
them, I accept the values implied in CKPP about developing subjectivity. 
Of course it might be asked, “What if the patient doesn’t share the values in CKPP?  
How would it respect that difference of the Other in terms of treatment and isn’t it 
contradictory to think of CKPP as a universal model and claim that it is a model that 
respects difference? 
There was a patient I worked with for six months, Jean, who, after six months of 
therapy, decided she wanted to terminate psychotherapy to pursue pharmacotherapy and 
social activism groups to deal with her problems – bear in mind I had referred her for 
psychiatric evaluation and medication but she refused.  During our final termination session 
she explained that she had finally realized that when she first came to see me she wanted me 
to help her forget her unprocessed (my paraphrasing) experiences of childhood sexual abuse 
rather than deal with them, and that I wasn’t going to help her do that.  Jean was right on 
both counts, so we ended therapy because she decided that what I was offering was not what 
she was looking for.  However, it did help her to clarify what she did and did not want in a 
therapy at this time in her life.   
My point is: how can Joe or Jane public-at-large make a truly informed decision 
about whether or not their values in a therapy are a reasonable match with the therapist 
unless they make and renew the decision based on their experience?  And if it is true that 
CKPP fosters autonomy and a greater sense of possessing freedom-of-mind, then it is up to 
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the patient to decide who and how they want to become based on their experience, including 
the length of treatment.  Similarly, if I think a patient has a problem that I am not qualified 
to help them with or do not want to help them with for whatever reason, I can and should 
refer them elsewhere.  Perhaps this issues points to the fact that respecting difference 
involves determining to what extent one can or is willing to accommodate it. 
The question of “universal applicability” is more complex.  If Judith Butler is correct 
about her universal claim for a paradox of subjectivity, and CKPP is a subject forming kind 
of work, then it would follow that CKPP could have a universal applicability even if not 
universally distributed as a cultural form.  Similarly, if I drove a car into the deepest recesses 
of some unexplored land and came across an indigenous human group without auto 
technology, my car would still exist and work for them if I showed them how to drive.  So, 
the car has (virtual) universal applicability even if it is not universally distributed or realized.  
The issue of an imposition of values is of another order: the ethics of introducing a foreign 
technology into a culture and the unforeseeable consequence of such an introduction to the 
vernacular society.  Again, the principle of self-determination seems to be the best safeguard 
for respecting cultural and individual integrity.  What I am arguing about CKPP is that it is a 
model that respects differences by fostering individual subjectivity. 
 
Coming full circle, then, it seems this qualitative study lends support to Wampold 
and Holloway’s argument that, “whether it be changes in skill level, attitudes, self-
understanding, or some other characteristic, the effect of supervision results most proximally 
in some modification of therapists’ characteristics.  These changes in the therapist will then, 
it is hoped, result in the delivery of more efficacious treatment . . .. all effects of supervision 
are transmitted through therapist characteristics” (1997, p. 12, italics in original).  However, 
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the vehicle of “transmission” is not the therapist’s “characteristics” if this is understood 
simply in behavioral terms.  This study suggests that it involved a change in the therapist’s 
being-in-the-world. 
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SESSION TRANSCRIPT 
(Original notes not corrected for spelling and grammer) 
Key:  Black type = Subject’s utterances 
         Blue type  = Therapist’s utterances 
         Brackets   = Editorial and non-verbal notations from original notes 
 
The three or four of theses are the silences that I wasn’t able to come up with anything 
for.  I’m trying to survive this week. 
 
I think your feeling overwhelmed inside and don’t quite know how to deal with the 
feelings of being scared inside. 
 
Mmmhmm.[slight tearing] Yeah and its ironic too because at the same time I feel like I’m 
making progress in my new post and in a way my confidence in growing.  In one sense 
it’s all brand new and in another it’s what I’ve always thrived on -- its like crisis.  It’s not  
always successful -- the visitations with patients.  When people in crisis or end of life 
issues, but it somehow works out -- but it’s a success  when I make out a report and 
evaluate my work, but I guess at the same time I go with whatever is my fear or maybe 
I’m making someone else fear my own.  Oh, in chaplaincy I saw it addressed this week 
on television this whole thing of counselors being sought out like madmen doing all these 
services and work.  Its what people demand or ask for.  But the chaplains are probably 
the most pathetic ones when you get a group together you say, “I don’t know what to 
say” which gets people to talk about fear.  Whatever I’m afraid of when someone is going 
to get in there on my fear I deflect them  
 
And I’m seeing it in here that when I just approached your fears of falling apart a part of 
you got scared and deflected us by focusing on crisis as an abstract concept.  Its like you 
drop your feelings that feel overwhelming as if we couldn’t tolerate them. 
 
Yeah, I’ve always done that. [Tears stream] Yeah, I’m probably going to be processing 
15,000 different things.   Yeah, processing things to do with my daughter’s wedding all 
this introspective stuff between now and Tuesday when I leave. [Tears stream] This isn’t 
very deep -- no for me it is -- I think one of these things is I’m feeling guilty because I 
haven’t been able to help out too much with my daughter’s wedding and it goes way back 
because I can’t remember anyone in my family who hasn’t really been totally involved in 
their daughter’s wedding plus the problems I have with the need to control, usually 
mom’s do their daughter’s weddings.  But I’m still from that tradition, so I’m probably 
feeling a lot of conflict about -- emotionally I have some input into this.  Intellectually 
I’ve tried to let my children make all the major decisions on their own.  I think maybe 
I’ve identified with my own mother who was major controlling, which is what dynamic 
women are.  And the sister I was in the arms of -- I think I used her or she filled the shoes 
of my mother.  I think I haven’t looked enough at the input she [the sister] had on my life 
because she went off when I was ten.  I still have my own mother [her mother died in the 
80’s] but she was -- I don’t know -- an institutional mother.  It was an institutional type 
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relationship a parallel between my mother sending me off to school at an early age and 
my sending my kids away. 
 
I think one way you are trying to keep some powerful feelings away is by turning our 
conversation to events in the past that are easier to talk about. 
 
Yeah to make the comparisons.  I’m trying to figure out why I’m so sad.  I’m in extreme 
circumstances – my daughter’s wedding and the recent terrorism. 
 
I hear that a part of you is feeling sad, scared, and angry at your daughter for getting 
married as if she were deserting you now like you felt by your sister, and the problem is 
you don’t feel you have a way to contain these feelings inside. 
 
I could be.  Yeah. I feel like I’d add to them remorse.  Is remorse a feeling or are sad and 
remorse the same thing?  Remorse is the biggest and that comes to how I feel.  Its 
limiting my concept of my daughter’s freedom.  Its not like she’s being taken off to jail.  
She’s getting married and she’s fine and I’m keeping all my hopes, wishes and ambitions 
for a daughter that I’ll keep repressing because I’m not supposed to cry at the wedding.  
So I probably feel good about the ceremony itself, cause it’s being worked on by both 
sides of the family.  But I guess the greatest thing about it is how both  planned the 
ceremony should go, which is the most you could ask for in an interfaith wedding. 
 
Just now when you began to feel unbearably bad about your wishes for your daughter’s 
wedding you began to focus on the bright side. 
 
Yeah, that’s the annoying thing that happens.  Yeah.  Because I’ve always done that and I 
don’t keep going and I don’t know why or where I stopped but something over and 
blocks whatever I try to get at.  I’m sure that happens when I’m doing my work.  My PC 
Response score is totally on the supportive side [some personality type test they are 
given]  It goes from authoritative to intrstructional to all way over to empathic and 
supportive responses – my natural responses are empathic and very supportive.  But I’m 
naturally that way, but I cannot keep going [with what she is feeling as first mentioned] , 
but that’s kinda improved since I stared coming here as its been reflected in my verbatims 
[group supervision].  I want to know why I do the little cheery deal, which you record as 
my dramatic voice. 
 
Like I’ve been saying. I think these fears of falling apart or being overwhelmed get 
dropped and perhaps its because you don’t expect another person to stay with you and 
help you make sense of what feels overwhelming inside.   
 
Yeah. [tearing] that make sense.  Yeah because principle people at crucial ages for me 
they disappeared whether death or loosing a sister going to college or marriage is like a 
death.  Yeah. 
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So, perhaps inside you feels out of control because of there are several death- like changes 
you are dealing with right now – the bombing of the terrorists, your daughter’s wedding, 
and the fact that we won’t be meeting next week because you won’t be here. 
 
Yeah cause I like routine right and I’m not going to be here next week and I’m like one 
of those orphans – the smartest kids are the one’s who get abandoned in hospitals and 
learn to have to get along by being nice which fends off being orphaned.  Yeah, because 
that image just came to me right now I can – those little orphaned AIDS babies who have 
been dropped like a hot potato.  
 
What I’m hearing is that right now you live with fears of being dropped by me like you 
felt dropped by your mother as a baby. 
 
Well maybe but that’s if I don’t come back, because then essentially I would have been 
dropped by you. [asked to repeat, she did then began]  No, the only parallel is if you went 
out in front of a truck and got killed, that’s the logical parallel to that.  But yes it could 
play right into not wanting to be orphaned, wanting to have a self.  I was doing reading 
on disappearance of the self into pre-existence and there is literature on disappearance 
into pre-existence [stated in a tone to emphasize she is right or not crazy] 
 
You are disappearing from here right now because we just touched on your fear of being 
orphaned by me so you mentally moved away to thoughts of before you existed. 
 
[Tears start streaming, nods in agreement, I let a few moments pass] 
 
Our time is up for today. 
 
